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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an examination of the main issues Social Credit contended with 
while trying to succeed in New Zealand politics. Its historical and political 
analysis is in the context of the electoral system. 
The first section argues for and describes the changing electoral 
context and outlines how this created difficulties for Social Credit. It concludes 
that the movement faced very adverse electoral periods for third parties. The 
second part examines founder Major C.H. Douglas’s Social Credit vision and 
charts Social Credit’s political adaptations from its New Zealand beginnings to 
the time Bruce Beetham took over as leader in 1972. It challenges the myths 
that Social Credit could not change without ceasing to be Social Credit and 
that its economics were unworkable. 
In the third section the centrality of Beetham’s leadership to Social 
Credit success is explored by looking at his life, personality, beliefs and vision 
for the movement. It concludes that he believed in Social Credit and that his 
drive and dedication were essential to Social Credit’s revival. Then the thesis 
follows Social Credit’s electoral progress from 1972 to 1981. It examines the 
impact from its own activities and other political actors and circumstances. 
This includes effects from organisational changes, the effect of growing and 
changing membership and the sources of its votes.  
The fifth part outlines the factors that put Social Credit into permanent 
decline after 1981. These include the Clyde dam issue, the emerging New 
Zealand party, the 1984 snap election and the failure to revitalise the party. 
Finally, it examines Social Credit influence on the electoral system itself, 
particularly in regard to the move to proportional representation. Here its 
existence and size mattered more than direct action. 
 
The contribution of this thesis is, firstly, in challenging the usual roles 
assigned to third parties. Second, it outlines the characteristics of different 
electoral periods. Third, it examines the nature of Social Credit in a more 
positive way. Fourth, it looks at the electoral elements that shaped Social 
Credit’s successes and failures. Finally, it shows the effects of 
professionalisation on a typical party branch. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
The 1981 election campaign was not confined to the period between 
announcing the election date and polling day. Arguably, it was one of the 
longest in modern New Zealand political history and was certainly so for the 
Social Credit Political League. In varying degrees, it had been campaigning 
since September 1980 when the League’s local East Coast Bays by-election 
campaign became a nationwide one after winning the seat. 
 The result was bolstered by opinion polls, which put Social Credit level 
with Labour on 30% by the end of the year. It was unprecedented that ‘an 
electoral dog pound for strays’, as political scientist Austin Mitchell put it in 
1969,1 long regarded in political circles as a bunch of ‘funny money’ cranks 
should suddenly become a serious contender. This incredulity came from a 
long held idea that under a two-party first past the post (FPP) system a third 
party could only have a limited role. 
 However, it could be argued that it was not limited. In 1972, after 
becoming Social Credit leader, Bruce Beetham suggested that the League 
would reach the Treasury Benches by 1981. He based this view on the fact 
that Labour took 27 years to become the government from its formation as a 
third party.2 By 1981 it could be said that Social Credit was an unsuccessful 
third party as it had existed for 28 years with only two parliamentary seats to 
show for it while Labour had just become the Opposition 28 years after its 
formation in 1904.3 This assumed that the electoral system presented the 
same opportunity for third parties throughout and implied that Social Credit 
failure came from lack of appropriate effort.  
                                                          
1 Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 
1969), p.220. 
2 Spiro Zavos, Crusade (Wellington: INL Print, 1981), p. 32. Beetham considered that the 
Labour party began in 1908. 
3 The technical formation of the Labour party in 1916 was an exercise in unity rather than 
beginning a new party. A Labour party contesting elections independently from the Liberals 
was initially formed in 1904. 
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  Assuming the basis for electoral success to be the same throughout 
New Zealand’s electoral history was also a common view but the process of 
election changed markedly over seventy years. To compare it with Labour is 
simplistic. Certainly it did progress from a third party to a governing one and is 
the only one to have done so. However, Labour had a unique set of 
favourable political circumstances and was helped by an electoral system 
that, at the time, was far friendlier to third parties. Social Credit did not have 
these significant advantages. It had to operate in a quite different way than 
Labour did to succeed and compensating for these differences markedly 
reduces the gap between the two.  
The main premise of this thesis is that Social Credit was the most 
successful modern third party in New Zealand under the two-party FPP 
electoral system prevailing after 1935. Its success should not simply be 
measured in terms of electoral seats gained but by a whole range of 
measures.4 This would include positive ones such as party organisation, 
leadership, fundraising and publicity as well as countering negative ones such 
as the electoral system and access to media. Too often third parties have 
been in the position of Alice and the Red Queen, having to run as fast as they 
can just to stay where they are and run even faster if they want to get 
somewhere.5 This thesis considers such a range of positive and negative 
factors and analyses how successful Social Credit was in this context.  
Comprehensively detailing the whole history of Social Credit in New 
Zealand is beyond the scope of this thesis, so it focuses on several aspects. 
First, it covers the changing electoral context Social Credit worked in and 
argues that it initially operated in the electoral period most disadvantageous to 
third parties. Its revival under Beetham occurred in a period where electoral 
success was possible but very difficult.  
Second, it examines the nature of the movement itself and charts its 
adaptations to cope with changing electoral and political circumstances to the 
time Beetham took over as leader.6 Third, it explores the centrality of 
                                                          
4 The author is indebted to his supervisor Dr. Alan Simpson for this phrase. 
5 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 145. 
6 It does not take Raymond Miller’s view that Social Credit was several different parties. 
Raymond Miller, ‘Social Credit, An Analysis of New Zealand’s Perennial Third Party’ 
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Beetham’s leadership to Social Credit success by looking at his life, 
personality and beliefs. This includes his vision for the movement and whether 
he really was a Social Crediter. 
Fourth, the thesis follows Social Credit’s electoral progress from 1972 
to 1981 and examines the successes and failures of its own activities and the 
impact of other political actors. This includes necessary structural changes to 
its organisation and reworking Social Credit ideas into viable policy. Fifth, it 
outlines the main factors that put Social Credit into permanent decline after 
1981. Within these sections are three important themes: the impact of a 
growing and changing membership, internal mistakes that made Social 
Credit’s political life harder, and, one that may seem surprising, the effect of 
the Boundaries Commission on its ability to win and hold seats.  Finally, it 
examines Social Credit influence on the electoral system, arguing that a 
significant legacy was its contribution to the major shift to proportional 
representation. Arguably this section more properly belongs in the electoral 
context chapter but is placed last so the thesis ends on a positive note. 
This thesis is both history and analysis. Raymond Miller has already 
written a comprehensive study on Social Credit. While overlap exists, this 
thesis covers areas in detail that he has not and revisits some from a different 
point of view. Therefore its structure is more thematic and only loosely 
chronological. It aims to particularly provide more understanding of Social 
Credit as a political movement and third party, and the general struggles of 
third parties in New Zealand’s FPP electoral context but also to stimulate 
further study on electoral system changes and its historical periods.  
 The thesis begins by analysing the electoral context in which Social 
Credit operated. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(unpublished PhD thesis, Auckland University, 1987), pp. 14, 421. Instead it argues that the 
movement changed to meet electoral and political challenges without ceasing to be Social 
Credit. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Electoral Context 
 
The main part of this chapter charts the changes in the electoral system since 
Westminster style politics began in New Zealand in 1853 and examines its 
effect on third party prospects. It divides electoral history into periods and 
examines each period’s characteristics so that it is clear what chances third 
parties had to gain support and a foothold in parliament. Intertwined with this 
is consideration of the arguments for a homogenous electoral history and only 
a limited role for third parties. Other factors considered are the general nature 
of New Zealand voters and the size of the electorate. A second smaller 
section outlines Social Credit’s experience on the difficulty of maintaining 
winning support in seats due to frequently changing boundaries. 
 
2.1 Hurdles Third Parties Face  
 
A third party has many hurdles to overcome on the way to winning 
representation and political influence. It has to organise, find candidates, be 
led well and develop policies with effective ways to communicate them. Its 
programme and message must strike a chord in the electorate so that people 
will vote for the party.  
Unless a country uses a proportional system, a major hurdle a third 
party faces is the electoral system itself.  Over fifty years ago Maurice 
Duverger put forward a principle that using the plurality method (FPP) 
correlates to a dominant two-party system because of its mechanical and 
psychological effects. The mechanical effect is how votes translate into seats 
and the psychological effect is the impact of system mechanics on how 
electors cast votes.1 Under FPP both worked against third parties. As it was 
hard for third parties to win seats, electors did not vote for them because they 
could not win seats, an electoral double whammy. This was certainly true in 
New Zealand, yet despite this Labour as a third party eventually achieved 
                                                          
1 Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction (7th 
ed.) (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), p. 192.  
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major party status in the early 1930s and is still one today. So, could Social 
Credit have achieved another breakthrough and was it from its own party 
failings that it did not? 
 In 1973, historian Judith Bassett noted the plurality effect. Thus third 
parties  
 
serve to express the discontent of groups which feel neglected by the 
major parties. They are usually shortlived because the major parties 
normally respond…by trying to pacify the discontented group and to win 
back their lost supporters. Only if one of the major parties proves too rigid 
to accommodate to a third party threat can the third party find room to 
grow. The two-party system, therefore, depends on the infinite flexibility of 
the two parties. It is further reinforced in New Zealand by the first-past-
the-post election system which carries with it the fear that a vote for a 
third party will not merely be ‘wasted’ but will act against a voter’s 
intention to change the government.2 
 
Her view had unstated assumptions. Voters would only switch parties 
in a two-party system if the other party were deemed worth voting for. She 
assumed that it was and ignored the possibility of choosing a different 
candidate simply to gain a better MP. Bassett implied that major party neglect 
of a group will be expressed in third party protest but non-voting was also an 
option. She did not consider that a two-party system might become so 
dominant that a third party cannot grow even with major party inflexibility. 
Because a third party became a major one Bassett just assumed that it could 
happen again. Under this lies a further assumption that once a two-party 
system developed in New Zealand, it remained essentially the same 
throughout the twentieth century.  
 
2.1.1 Electoral Systems in New Zealand 
 
Three main electoral systems have operated over New Zealand’s political 
history since 1853. First, the provincial system dominated New Zealand 
politics. Although this was abolished in 1876, a recognisable two-party system 
did not emerge until 1890. New Zealand used the first past the post simple 
majority method from 1853 until 1996.3 Then it was replaced by a proportional 
system—Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), a hybrid of a purely list 
                                                          
2 Judith Bassett, ‘Third Parties: Prophets in the Wilderness’, New Zealand Today Part 7 
(Wellington: Paul Hamlyn, 1973) p. 190. 
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proportional system and FPP. This produced the third and completely different 
electoral system for electing politicians. 
The second major system, a two-party one under FPP spanning the 
elections from 1890 to 1993, can be viewed as a homogonous period. Both 
Beetham and Bassett took this approach but this was mistaken as the system 
evolved markedly from its beginning. Three sub-periods existed each 
possessing quite different characteristics. 1890 changed a no-party system to 
a two-party one but 1935 marked a second change. Bassett’s historical 
survey ends in 1972 without acknowledging the 1935 one and can be forgiven 
for missing another that had only just occurred with the 1972 election. These 
periods arose from the changing interaction of four components shaping the 
electoral system. 
 The clear difference in the political system before and after 1890 with 
FPP used throughout shows that a voting method, although providing a 
significant shape to an electoral system, is only one component.4 Two other 
significant components were how political organisations presented 
themselves to the electorate and how electors responded. Each affected the 
other’s behaviour. The focus of provincial government was candidates with 
personal and community standing willing to champion regional concerns. So 
parliament was made up of Independents arranged in regional groups with 
emphasis on the calibre of the candidate.5  
Political parties began a trend that shifted from candidate quality to 
party affiliation. Certainly able candidates did better but in safe seats an 
incompetent one would still win. Party organisation evolved from isolated local 
effort to centralised mass parties with electorate branches and went from 
open to closed selection methods. Electing the right candidate became 
electing the right party. 
Underlying these three components is a fourth: political 
communication. This progressively widened its focus in New Zealand. In the 
nineteenth century, communities were so isolated that the political process 
was localised and the provincial system pragmatically recognised this. Local 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 Apart from the Second Ballot system used between 1908 and 1913. 
4 It is often mistaken for the whole thing. 
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newspapers were the most common transmitters of information. As 
communities linked up, newspapers emerged to cover wider areas without 
replacing local papers but New Zealand never produced any with national 
circulations. Radio, the first nationwide medium, began in the 1930s followed 
by television thirty years later and now supplemented by the internet. Mass 
communication significantly shapes voter behaviour and the last mass 
modifier came in the 1970s from regularly published opinion polls. 
Consequently, the emphasis shifted from local electorate contests to 
national campaigns. The sum of individual electorate results initially 
determined the shape of parliament but the perception of how well a party 
performed nationally later determined voting in local electorates. This shift 
was largely complete by 1935 and the mass party predominated thereafter. 
So, the long evolution of the two-party system meant that the electoral system 
in 1890 was quite different from the one in the 1940s and different again in the 
1980s. Prospects for third parties and Independents were not the same in 
each period as the essential shift was from a loose two-party system to a very 
rigid one with a different voter response.  
 
2.1.2 The Flexible Two-party Period 
 
Three historical periods are identifiable and show up clearly in the election 
results. The first began in 1890 and finished in 1935. By then embryonic major 
party organisations were highly organised mass parties. The focus had also 
moved from purely local electorate contests to nationwide shifts in votes and 
from loose groups of independent and party MPs to complete party tickets.  
Initially parties did not consider it necessary to contest every seat. 
Some were omitted due to party weakness, others due to the futility of 
contesting another party’s strongholds, and the remainder for tactical 
reasons.6 This gave third party candidates and Independents room to be 
elected. Continued, though diminishing, emphasis on candidate calibre and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 Despite the introduction of party, this continued to be reflected in official election results. 
Party designations were unrecorded until 1957. 
6 The most extreme example was Dunedin North in 1919. Only two third party candidates 
contested it. Liberals used the Labour candidate as a surrogate while Reform supported 
Independent Labour.  
 9
the fact that individual electorate contests were divorced from how well major 
parties performed nationwide also helped their prospects. Fluidity in the two-
party system during this time enables it to be called the flexible two-party 
period. Independents gained seats although true Independents were rare. 
Most had varying affinities to a major party or Labour.7 Allegiances were also 
fluid as MPs moved in and out of party identification.8 
Third parties existed. Labour was the most prominent but there was 
also the Country party and the 1935 Democrats.9 The former two plus 
Independents won significant representation from a relatively large but 
fluctuating third party vote. Local factors could cause electorates to go against 
the general voting trend but this lessened as media and mass party 
organisation became more prevalent. Parliament ceased to be the aggregate 
of individual electorate contests.  
The electoral cycle also differed. A modern major party usually stays in 
office from two to four terms before defeat but the Liberals had seven 
consecutive terms followed by Reform on five.10 The Liberal party continually 
increased its vote share from 1896 to 1908 and Reform also did in 1922 and 
1925 after a 1919 low. Thus earlier governments were more popular in their 
latter periods of office whereas modern governments decline from growing 
tiredness of a stale administration. Since both Liberal and Reform 
governments then suffered a major loss at the next election, the pattern was 
sustained electorate loyalty followed by sharp rejection rather than continual 
erosion of support.  
 New Zealand had not yet reached a solid two-party system and 
government longevity was due in part to Opposition party weakness. The 
Opposition took nearly two decades from 1890 to accept the party system and 
go from a loose collection of like-minded MPs to a fully-fledged party. Once 
                                                          
7 Three famous Independents of this time, C.E. Statham, Charles Wilkinson and Harry Atmore 
were originally major party MPs. 
8 For example, Fred ‘Rainbow’ Pirani, MP for Palmerston from 1893 to 1902 was first a 
Liberal, then Independent, and finally an Oppositionist. J.O. Wilson, New Zealand 
Parliamentary Record: 1840-1984 (Wellington: Government Printer, 1985), p. 227. Political 
scientist Barry Gustafson credits him with six party labels. Barry Gustafson, Labour’s Path to 
Political Independence (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1980), p. 144. 
9 Prohibitionists also stood but they were not a political party as such. They usually only 
appeared to ensure a contest in electorates where the sitting member would otherwise be 
unopposed so that a local liquor poll was held.  
10 Twenty-one and sixteen years respectively. 
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the Reform party formed in 1909, three years later they were the government. 
In the 1920s there were three parties. Reform was the biggest while the 
Liberals and Labour vied to be the main opposition. The 1928 election gave 
all three equal strength.  If the Depression had not produced a coalition 
between the two anti-Labour parties, this three-way situation may have gone 
on for another one or two elections. This returned politics to two parties in 
1931 and the system was almost complete. However, the 1935 election was 
the last flexible one.  
 
2.1.3 The Rigid Two-party Period 
 
Depression anger bled coalition votes to third parties and Independents as 
well as Labour. Six candidates outside the major parties were elected on a 
sizeable third party vote. Without this, 1935 might have been the first election 
in the new period, which ran from 1938 to 1972. Successful Independents 
disappeared and, indeed, not many such candidates stood at all. Few third 
parties contested elections until Social Credit became a permanent third 
force.11 Major parties contested every seat even where prospects were 
hopeless and nobody withdrew for tactical reasons. This permanently reduced 
third party voting and some third parties only lasted a single election. The 
familiar electoral cycle where a party was elected and suffered continual 
support erosion until defeated was now established. With the minor party vote 
generally less than ten percent, there was little room for a third party to gain a 
parliamentary foothold. This can be regarded as the rigid two-party period.  
1935 was a marker rather than a rigid cut off point. The Democrat party 
straddled the divide. It displayed the characteristics of a third party in a rigid 
two-party system except that their vote distribution reached into the 25 to 35% 
range as would be expected in a more flexible system12 and, despite a strong 
campaign fund, did not contest every electorate. Independents continued after 
this election but of the six elected only two survived in 1938.13 National did not 
                                                          
11 Democratic Labour and two other small parties stood in 1943. 
12 10% of the Democrat vote was in this range compared to 3% or less for subsequent third 
parties on debut. 
13 Three were defeated and one retired. The residual third party vote in 1938 was 4%, much 
of it going to the remaining Independents. 
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oppose Charles Wilkinson in Egmont and Nelson’s Harry Atmore had no 
Labour candidate against him in 1938 or 1943,14 the last time party 
candidates withdrew for tactical reasons.15  
The electoral cycle under this system began with a government defeat. 
Then the new government was confirmed in office with a steady or bigger 
mandate. Both Labour in 1938 and National in 1951 went up16 and National in 
1963 had a slight loss. After that voters turned away from both major parties 
to third parties as in 1943, 1954 and 1966. Successive elections saw a shift 
back to the main parties. It was a question of whether to give the ruling party a 
last term accompanied by a third party squeeze. If the answer was ‘yes’ as in 
1946 and 1969, the governing party gained another term before a new cycle 
put the Opposition in. The answer was ‘no’ in 1957 and Labour came to 
power, truncating that cycle. Unfortunately, its small majority was insufficient 
to start a new one and Labour’s 1958 ‘Black’ budget upset voters so much 
that 1960 began a new cycle with National. 
Third parties could appear and gather support as in 1943 and 1954 but, 
as voter turnout remained high anyway, electors were happy to vote for main 
parties in their absence. Social Credit did not disappear in 1957 as the 1943 
parties did and this produced a new dynamic. Support for the party stayed in 
the 7-9 % range except for higher protest peaks.  
New Zealand now had a stable two-party system with a regular 
electoral cycle. Social Credit was a release valve for those unhappy with the 
two main parties and had enduring support from those supposedly few 
wholeheartedly embracing its tenets. Bassett saw it this way and Austin 
Mitchell’s infamous dog pound comment17 presumed an enduring role for the 
party on this basis. Both also presumed a small protest vote whose size 
fluctuated with the electoral cycle but constant in the long run. This was 
                                                          
14 Atmore only survived by 100 votes in 1943. 
15 1943 was also the last election that sitting MPs were re-elected unopposed. This occurred 
in just over half the elections in the flexible period. In 1943 two National MPs were serving in 
the armed forces overseas and could not campaign so their seats were unopposed by 
agreement between the major parties. 
16 Labour’s seats were the same but its share of the vote went up 10%. 
17 ‘[D]iscontented electors are neither an overwhelming force nor a source of permanent 
recruits… Thus the League becomes in one respect an electoral dog pound for strays.’ Austin 
Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), 
p.220. 
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insufficient to make Social Credit a major force but those moving into protest 
matched those moving out, allowing it to persist. Waikato University’s David 
McCraw argued that Social Credit’s sole political function was a ‘holding pen 
for protest voters’ when the government was most unpopular and before the 
main Opposition party became a viable alternative again. As the main 
Opposition regained credibility it ‘strip[ped] Social Credit of a major proportion 
of its protest “fat” ’. Thus it was a clearinghouse for transferring votes between 
the main parties.18 
This poor outlook for third parties left National and Labour holding a 
permanent monopoly on parliamentary seats. A third party could possibly win 
one temporarily in the favourable part of the electoral cycle. By this reasoning, 
a third party had to concentrate enough of the protest wave that peaked every 
twelve years or so in some local electorate to win it.19 This explained Vern 
Cracknell’s 1966 Hobson win and Beetham’s later victory in Rangitikei. 
 
2.1.4 The Rigid Two-party Period with Fragmentation 
 
However, governments began wrestling with intractable economic problems 
as New Zealand ceased being Britain’s South Pacific farm and living 
standards slid. Electoral stability was upset with 1970s oil shocks, high 
inflation, rising unemployment and fears in the export and farming sectors. 
The electoral system did not become more flexible as nationwide party 
support was still reflected in individual electorates but, with more willingness 
to punish governing parties for perceived failure, the response to the main 
parties changed. This period began in 1972 and lasted until the introduction of 
MMP in 1996. 
The main outcome was a long-term increase in third party voting. While 
potentially good news for a strong third party, proliferation of other third 
parties and minor candidates accompanied it. Despite most polling poorly and 
                                                          
18 David McCraw, ‘Social Credit’s Role in the New Zealand Party System’, Political Science 
Vol. 31 No. 1 (1979), pp. 55-57. 
19 Bassett, New Zealand Today Part 7, p. 195. 
 13
losing their deposits,20 they feature in election results from 1972 onwards. 
Advantages from increased voting were offset by third party splitting and 
reduced the likelihood of parliamentary representation. Social Credit had to 
compete with other ‘dog pounds’ for protest votes. The challenge for third 
parties was not in detaching votes from the main parties but in maximising 
their share. When governments changed the new winning party usually 
gained the same amount but the defeated party lost an increasing share of its 
support to third parties. This period can be referred to as the rigid two-party 
period with fragmentation.21 The electoral cycle still had support eroding from 
the ruling party to the Opposition but with violent swings as the new reaction 
from the electorate produced a disturbed pattern. 
Again 1972 was not a fixed point but a marker. There was a small 
increase in minor candidates in 1969 as Cliff Emeny’s small Country party put 
up candidates and other third parties were mooted.22 Based on the previous 
electoral cycle political commentators expected a close race between National 
and Labour. Against the cycle, most predicted a National win but some 
backed a close Labour victory like 1957. Its magnitude surprised everyone 
with the largest shift in seats since 1935. Voter swing was also larger than 
normal but not excessively and Labour’s landslide was attributed to the 
vagaries of the two-party system. With such a secure majority, Labour was 
expected to remain in power for several terms but this was derived from the 
old cycle.23 Nobody, including Bassett, realised the system had changed and 
this was the new context for Social Credit’s revival.24 
Therefore comparing Social Credit’s progress as a third party with 
Labour’s was not valid even though they both operated in a two-party system 
under FPP. Labour’s unique and unrepeatable set of favourable political 
                                                          
20 This deposit had been eroded over time and was no longer a serious disincentive to 
standing. A large increase may have significantly reduced extraneous candidates. See the 
Appendix. 
21 The author is grateful to American political scientist Pippa Norris for this definition. 
22 Including a South Island party and a Women’s party. A Liberal party appeared in 1963 but 
only for that election and failed to discomfit Social Credit. 
23 Had Norman Kirk stayed alive Labour may have been re-elected with a vastly reduced 
majority. 
24 Fragmentation exhibited itself in one interesting way. Dumping sitting members did not 
happen often but was accepted as a democratic decision. From 1969 some deselected MPs 
ran as Independents and in 1978 National also faced several Alternative National candidates. 
Social Credit’s internal problems produced the breakaway New Democrat party in 1972. 
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circumstances were not there for Social Credit. Labour had the flexibility in the 
system left over from the non-party period that allowed third party candidates 
to be elected and was considerably helped by the Second Ballot system 
operating from 1908 to 1913 under which it gained its first six seats, a far 
more proportionate system than FPP. When FPP was reintroduced Labour 
held its seats through electoral accommodation with the Liberal party despite 
contesting the 1914 election as two separate parties. World War One 
produced a main party coalition that left Labour as the only effective 
Opposition. This gave it enough voter support in 1919 to survive 
independently in an FPP environment.25 When it then stalled on a quarter of 
the vote for a decade, continued electoral flexibility gave Labour an enduring 
parliamentary foothold of ten to twenty seats throughout that time. Coalition 
between its main party rivals and an unparalleled Depression then enabled 
Labour to proceed rapidly to power. 
Labour progress would have been considerably more difficult in the 
rigid period and perhaps no better than Social Credit’s. Raymond Miller 
correctly concluded that Social Credit was initially constrained by the electoral 
cycle of the rigid period and relied heavily on protest votes.26 Social Credit’s 
later history was in the fragmented period when the third party vote trend went 
up, although with wild fluctuations. Miller’s analysis concluded well before the 
huge third party vote in 1993. Had the Alliance or New Zealand First united 
the third party vote as well as Social Credit did in 1981, third party 
representation would have been between ten and seventeen seats instead of 
four.27 This also implied that had Social Credit held its poll rating of early 1981 
(30-31%), its goal of six or more seats was realistic. 
 
2.1.5 Other Electoral Factors 
 
Social Credit was not the only third party to gain high support only to see it 
ebb away by Election Day. The New Zealand party peaked at 18% in early 
                                                          
25 For a full account of Labour in this period, see Barry Gustafson, Labour’s Path to Political 
Independence, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1980). 
26 Miller, pp. 434, 437. 
27 This range is based on seats won by combining Alliance and New Zealand First votes (ten 
seats) and the whole third party vote united behind a single candidate (seventeen seats).  
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1984 and saw its support slide to 12.3% on July 14. In 1992 the Alliance had 
32% in the opinion polls but only received 18.3% in 1993.28 New Zealand First 
support sharply rose to 28% in the polls during early 1996 then steadily 
declined to 13.4%. Furthermore, during the initial MMP campaign in 1996, 
voters could have transformed either the Alliance or New Zealand First into 
the main Opposition as they both had equal support with Labour at its 
beginning. Yet the electorate returned to Labour. The Greens often gained 
11% in opinion polls during MMP campaigns but always fell back to the 5 to 
7% of voters that consistently supported them. Therefore New Zealand voters 
are conservative.29 Many who consider voting for a third party change their 
minds when it comes to the ballot box. Increasing discontent with the two 
major parties expressed itself in third party voting but replacing one of them or 
giving a third party serious representation was not taken in any of four 
offers.30 Conservative voting works against third parties. 
A final general factor making it hard for third parties in New Zealand 
under FPP was a small number of parliamentary seats. A large population 
and parliament as in Britain gives a critical mass of seats. This allows local 
factors to predominate in some electorates because each is insignificant 
enough to ignore nationwide trends. This provides slightly more flexibility in a 
rigid two-party system and enhances third party or Independent chances to 
win a small number of discontented electorates in each election by 
successfully tapping into local concerns.31  
New Zealand lacked critical mass. Therefore there were not enough 
locally discontented electorates to sustain an enduring third party foothold in 
parliament. Social Credit was organised enough to successfully exploit those 
few that arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s but only won four seats in 
                                                          
28 The decline was partly due to competition with New Zealand First for the third party vote. 
29 It is not peculiar to New Zealand. The British Social Democrat party, formed in 1981, had 
initial opinion poll support to govern and again in 1982 from combined support with its Liberal 
allies. Support dropped to 25.4% in the 1983 election. A similar effect occurred when the 
Liberals won the 1962 Orpington by-election. Opinion poll support soared to 30%, fractionally 
ahead of each main party but declined to 11.3% in the 1964 election. 
30 Social Credit in 1981, the Alliance in 1993, and the Alliance or New Zealand First in 1996. 
Arguably, the electorate accepted the 1993 offer but this failed because two strong third 
parties split the vote. New Zealand First also siphoned off enough third party vote to prevent 
the Alliance winning the Selwyn by-election in 1994. 
31 The British Liberals survived under FPP in the United Kingdom by winning small numbers 
of such discontented electorates, which varied from election to election. 
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total. Holding only two at a time proved insufficient to maintain a constant 
presence in parliament especially when its vote dropped below 10%. Lack of 
critical mass in seats was a factor in Social Credit maintaining only a short-
term presence in parliament. 
Social and other structures in the United Kingdom also give major 
regional variations. Nationalist parties developed in Scotland and Wales and 
eventually won seats. Despite jokes about South Island separatism and 
Auckland being another country, there were no significant regional differences 
or social heterogeneity under FPP to spark similar parties in New Zealand.32 
 
2.2 Social Credit and the Representation Commission 
 
Adding to its problems in holding seats, Social Credit had difficulties with the 
Representation Commission over disadvantageous new boundaries.  
In the 1970s and 80s the Representation Commission was an 
independent eight member quasi-judicial body of senior public servants. Not 
being government appointed meant they were, in theory, politically impartial in 
boundary redistributions. Creating electoral districts with equal populations 
was the overriding principle but existing electoral boundaries, community of 
interest, communication links and topography were also taken into account. It 
attempted to meet these latter criteria within the framework of equality33 but 
electorates could not vary from the population quota by more than five 
percent, so accommodating natural communities of interest were limited in 
practice. Significant public objections to proposed boundaries were only 
considered if they did not extensively disrupt other electorates. An impartial 
process meant that party political advantages in some seats should be 
balanced by losses in others34 but Social Credit only had one or two. Adverse 
boundaries could jeopardise its hold on them. 
                                                          
32 Except for the Country party, a 1920s farmer’s party in the Waikato and north of Auckland. 
It did not become a wider rural party but regional strength gained it a seat from 1928 to 1938. 
33 Alan McRobie and Nigel S. Roberts, Election ’78:The 1977 Electoral Redistribution and the 
1978 General Election in New Zealand (Dunedin: John McIndoe, 1978), p. 24. 
34 Alan McRobie, ‘The Electoral System and the 1978 Election’, in Howard R. Penniman (ed.), 
New Zealand at the Polls: The General Election of 1978 (Washington DC: American 
Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp.75-78. 
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Furthermore, the Representation Commission evolved in the rigid 
electoral system. Its composition and terms of reference were governed by an 
entrenched section in the 1956 Electoral Act that had two parties as its 
underlying basis. Hence two ‘unofficial’ members were appointed, one for the 
government and one for the Opposition. Their intended role was merely to 
ensure that the redistributive process was fair, impartial and lawful but they 
participated at all stages and attempted to gain advantage for their political 
parties. Social Credit, as a third party, had no say in these appointments or 
direct involvement in the process. 
The quorum of four included the ‘unofficial’ party members, and this 
gave them significant influence in Commission decisions unavailable to Social 
Credit.35 Alan McRobie’s comment that advantages gained for main parties 
tended to cancel one another out reflects the two-party assumption.36 
Unofficial members might influence decisions that politically cancelled one 
another out for National and Labour but still be detrimental to Social Credit.37 
A simple way of resolving this was to have the Opposition Commission 
member also represent Social Credit and after the 1981 election he was 
formally obliged to do so.38 As a Labour party appointee, he was unlikely to 
support Social Credit advantage where it clashed with Labour’s. It was an 
impossible conflict of interest. Beetham recommended an additional 
‘unofficial’ member to represent third parties but this was not adopted.39 
 
2.2.1 Boundary Effects 
 
Social Credit was concerned that the electoral redistribution in 1982 should 
not adversely affect its two seats or ability to win more. In the top of the North 
Island Social Credit’s electoral strength was uniformly strong and proposed 
changes to Bay of Islands improved its prospects but by making it harder to 
                                                          
35 McRobie in Penniman, pp.66, 75, 76. 
36 Alan McRobie, ‘The Politics of Electoral Redistribution’ in Stephen Levine (ed.), Politics in 
New Zealand: A Reader (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p.265. 
37 Sometimes redistributions did help Social Credit in less obvious ways. The 1972 one 
helped Beetham by shifting the weak Sir Roy Jack into Rangitikei and the 1977 one created 
selection difficulties for National in the by-election. 
38 Alan McRobie, New Zealand Electoral Atlas (Wellington: GP Books, 1989), p.123. 
39 A single member representing all third parties could have similar conflicts of interest.  
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win Kaipara.40 In Auckland, East Coast Bays had to be reduced. As Social 
Credit voting strength was at both ends it had to accept that some support 
would be lost.41 In Pakuranga, the fear was that Edgewater, favouring Social 
Credit, would be removed and replaced with National leaning areas from 
Howick instead of evenly shrinking the electorate along its southern border. 
Indeed draft boundaries proposed putting Edgewater into Panmure despite 
the Tamaki Estuary topographical barrier separating them.42 Final boundaries 
showed more balance with only some of Edgewater put into Otara instead 
and including less of Howick.43 While not making Pakuranga impossible to win 
it was still a serious disadvantage. 
Rangitikei, however, was drastically altered and Beetham’s Marton 
stronghold put into neighbouring Waitotara.44 This attracted a flurry of 
objections about natural community interest from Marton,45 and strong protest 
from Beetham and Social Credit.46 The Commission justified its decision by 
saying it tried various configurations for centre-west North Island electorates 
and all had unsatisfactory features. This bland response implied that possible 
alternatives could have included Marton but it stayed in Waitotara and 
Beetham blamed this for his loss in 1984. ‘National had tried everything…in 
the previous two elections and had been unable to take the seat… [B]oundary 
changes were all that was left.’47 His campaign manager, Don Hoggard, 
agreed. ‘The boundary changes cost him the seat’48 but did they? 
                                                          
40 In Kaipara National’s majority went from 1029 to 1491 and in Bay of Islands from 864 to 
466, an overall disadvantage to Social Credit of 63. Alan McRobie, Election ’84 (Christchurch: 
MC Enterprises, 1984), pp. 24, 32, 49; Clifford Norton, New Zealand Parliamentary Election 
Results: 1946-1987 (Wellington: Political Science Department, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1988), pp. 199, 218. 
41 New Zealand Herald, November 17, 1982, section 1, p. 20. Putting Sunnynook in the 
Glenfield electorate potentially enhanced Labour’s chances by enticing back former Labour 
voters. This would not occur with the northern end in Albany. 
42 New Zealand Herald, November 13, 1982, section 1, p. 12. 
43 McRobie, New Zealand Electoral Atlas, p.124. National’s paper majority increased from 783 
to 1240. In East Coast Bays Social Credit’s majority fell from 758 to 272. McRobie, Election 
’84, pp. 49, 70; Norton, pp. 258, 307. 
44 Initially Social Credit’s president, Stefan Lipa, cautiously accepted the changes as it 
strengthened Social Credit’s position in Waitotara. New Zealand Herald, November 27, 1982, 
section 1, p. 12. However, it was not strengthened to a win and did so at the cost of 
jeopardising the hold on Rangitikei that Beetham had so carefully built up. 
45 Including the local National party. New Zealand Herald, November 23, 1982, section 1, p. 
24.  
46 The Dominion, July 10, 1984, p.17. 
47 Daily News, July 16, 1984, p.5. 
48 New Zealand Times, July 15, 1984, p.3. 
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Rangitikei has existed from 1853 and originally included Marton, Bulls, 
Hunterville, Taihape and Waiouru. All have appeared in other electorates 
since 1881 but Marton (with Bulls) was only temporarily shifted south into 
Manawatu from 1896 to 1911. Otherwise Marton was always part of 
Rangitikei until 1982.49 In a choice between Bulls and Marton, Bulls was 
usually transferred.50 The 1982 redistribution departed significantly from usual 
practice by including Bulls and excluding Marton.51 It is hard to believe a 
solution did not exist that included Marton in line with historical precedent. In 
this light the Commission’s justification seems particularly lame and its 
decision open to accusations of political motivation. If Bulls had been 
excluded instead, as well as National leaning areas that were newly included 
like Rongotea, Beetham would have held on.52  
Legally, the commission did nothing wrong but for the four main 
changes detrimental to Social Credit in 1984 it was compensated only in Bay 
of Islands. This is hardly a balance of gain and loss. The Commission 
significantly weakened Social Credit progress towards a permanent 
parliamentary foothold, particularly in Rangitikei where a fairly safe Social 
Credit seat became marginal.53 This reduced Social Credit prospects to hold it 
and spurred greater National efforts to win it. The ‘basic insecurity of tenure 
which is accepted as a cost of being a parliamentarian can be greatly 
magnified as a result of an electoral redistribution over which the MP has 
absolutely no control’54 applied with a vengeance to Beetham in 1984. If part 
of a politician’s existence is defined as serving a community, then Beetham 
suffered by putting the part he served best into a neighbouring electorate.55 
                                                          
49 Hunterville was reintroduced from 1938 until 1987 and Taihape in 1954. Feilding became 
part of it in 1946 apart from 1972 to 1978 where it was a principal town in Ruahine. 
50 To Foxton from 1881 to 1887, Manawatu from 1919 to 1946, and Patea (later renamed 
Waimarino) from 1957 to 1972, forerunner of Waitotara. 
51 For changes to Rangitikei, see McRobie, New Zealand Electoral Atlas, p.28 and every 
fourth page to p. 122.  
52 Even leaving Marton’s Social Credit majority of 200 in Waitotara unchanged. As Beetham’s 
personal majority in Marton was 800 in 1981, a personal vote for Beetham would have given 
Social Credit a margin at least twice this. In 1984 Bulls gave National a margin of 200 and 
Rongotea, 100. See E.9, The General Election of 1984, pp. 73, 101. 
53 Beetham’s paper majority fell from 2376 to 469. While National’s paper majority fell in 
Waitotara from 2784 to 1238, this still was an overall disadvantage of 361 to Social Credit. 
McRobie, Election ’84, pp. 79, 102; Norton, pp. 330, 381. 
54 McRobie in Levine, p.266. 
55 McRobie and Roberts, Election ’78, p. 26. This is no longer acceptable under MMP where 
the party vote determines MP numbers in parliament. Electorate contests are now about 
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He could have switched to Waitotara but this would be seen as political 
opportunism without guaranteed success. Besides, Waitotara had a strong 
Social Credit candidate already and to swap would have been messy. The 
Commission put Beetham into a political cleft stick.  
Changes were not politically neutral in Pakuranga and East Coast Bays 
either. Shifting concentrated Social Credit support into other electorates did 
not improve its chances in them but encouraged former party allegiances to 
reform. Neutrality was harder in East Coast Bays because of where Social 
Credit support lay but Pakuranga could have been treated neutrally. Third 
party prospects of winning and holding seats was difficult enough under FPP, 
especially one lacking critical mass, without the Commission making an 
already unlevel playing field far worse than necessary. It is hard to escape the 
impression of political bias when the 1984 boundaries were more favourable 
to Labour but less favourable for Social Credit in its top three seats.56 
Unfavourability continued in the next boundary changes. In 1986 
Knapp’s East Coast Bays majority again fell and Neil Morrison’s already small 
Pakuranga majority slashed but these were small reductions compared to 
1984. Beetham, though, had to overcome an increased National majority in 
his 1987 Rangitikei re-election attempt and Marton remained in Waitotara,57 
which made his job harder. Boundary changes also contributed to Knapp’s 
defeat in 1987 although they made little difference elsewhere. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
finding the best representative. Thus community of interest should be a more important 
principle than strict equality of population. 
56 T. Verdon, ‘Boundaries Leak See Labour Hopes Running High’, New Zealand Herald, 
October 2, 1982, section 1, p. 6. 
57 McRobie, New Zealand Electoral Atlas, p. 126. Knapp’s paper majority fell from 2020 to 
1908 and Morrison’s from 172 to 44. National’s majority in Rangitikei rose from 504 to 836 
and in Waitotara from 3314 to 3435. The party’s other rural hopeful Coromandel also saw a 
rise. Only in Wanganui was the effect neutral. Colin James with Alan McRobie, The Election 
Book (Wellington: Allen and Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1987), pp. 98, 100, 119, 124, 135, 
136; Norton, pp. 218, 239, 307, 330, 381, 385. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Establishment and Revival 
 
Despite the strictures of the two-party electoral system affecting a third party’s 
vote, its own nature and interaction with voters is also important. This chapter 
examines Social Credit’s nature and development as a political movement 
from its first appearance in the 1930s. It charts the issues that caused Social 
Credit to become a party in the 1950s and its development to 1972 when it 
nearly disintegrated. Then it examines the movement’s revival under 
Beetham. The final section concentrates on problems caused by the influx of 
new members in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
 
3 The Progress of Social Credit  
 
3.1 The Initial Nature of Social Credit 
 
In its political development Social Credit went through several phases. When 
it began in New Zealand it was closer to a popular social movement. Major 
Douglas’s Social Credit ideas were debated and accepted with Social Credit 
Associations springing up all over the country in the early 1930s, with interest 
concentrated in Northland, Bay of Plenty, Waikato and Taranaki.1  
Ideas that took root were not just monetary reform ones although these 
had great attraction to solve Depression problems. Social Credit was a wider 
philosophy.2 Major Clifford Hugh Douglas, a British army engineer, initially 
wandered into the economic realm because he wondered why a nation could 
                                                          
1 Miller, p. 21. 
2 Critics focus on the A + B theorem which stated that the cost of an item (A + B) could not be 
bought with the money paid out in wages and salaries (A) and therefore a monetary gap 
existed that had to be filled by other means. The trouble with attacking this single formula was 
that it did not take into account all the components in Douglas’s economic, social and 
philosophical vision. See, for example, M.J.S. Nestor, Monetary Reform and the Reformers 
(Wellington: Whitcomb and Tombs, 1956), pp. 11-13; A.J. Danks, What Everyone Should 
Know About Social Credit (Christchurch: Caxton Press, 1955), pp. 9-26. See also, Michael 
Sheppard, Social Credit Inside and Out ((Dunedin: Caveman Publications, 1981), p. 63. 
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achieve full production in war and not in peace.3 Later he came to consider 
the questions of poverty amidst plenty, why technological advance should 
increase unemployment rather than leisure, and what constituted an effective 
economic system in modern industrial and agricultural democracies.4   
Douglas hoped that Social Credit would become a popular social 
movement in capitalist democracies with its philosophy and monetary ideas 
adopted by their governments regardless of which party held power. Social 
Credit was to transcend politics and this is why he disapproved of it being 
turned into a party programme. Ballot box politics was not democratic, as 
individuals were more important than the state. The state’s true role was to 
empower individuals to achieve what they desired, to facilitate provision of 
basic necessities and to promote voluntary adoption of a good social code. In 
practice a government should regularly consult elector groups to deliver what 
the people wanted. Douglas regarded this as real democracy.  
Technical experts would administer Social Credit, which could be 
interpreted to mean he advocated a technocratic government. However, 
Douglas took a wide view. Such experts did not have to belong to the 
government but could work with it. Douglas looked for governance that 
incorporated his ideas. Social Credit was a fresh look at the ends of an 
economy in capitalist democracies designed to be reformatory rather than 
revolutionary. It examined what people wanted in their lives and altered the 
economic system so that it happened.5 Therefore it was not a transformation 
to a different type of society. Social Credit was not a socialist, communist or 
even Labour driven society and not fascist either but highly individualistic. 
This is clearly seen in its later political organisation and by the many different 
interpretations of Douglas and how Social Credit would work in practice. 
Douglas himself only claimed to be a guide outlining a vision. He did not give 
his work the status of unvarying principle and how it operated successfully 
was to be delegated to those interested in fleshing out the details.6 
                                                          
3 Zavos, p. 52. For a brief Douglas answer to this question, see C.H. Douglas, Social Credit 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937), pp.15, 16. 
4 Douglas, Social Credit, pp. 108-128. 
5 See New Zealand Social Credit Association (ed.), Addresses by C.H. Douglas (Waiuku: 
W.J. Deed Printing, 1993), pp. 47-66. For a lengthy outline of Douglas philosophy, see 
Douglas, Social Credit, pp. 4-74.  
6 See, for example, Addresses, pp. 59-63, 75, 78, 79.  
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Douglas Social Credit was a contender to replace the deficient laissez 
faire boom and bust economics but capitalist democracies worldwide 
ultimately adopted Keynesian economics rather than another alternative. This 
smoothed the economy through deficit spending thus avoiding the extremes 
of the boom-bust cycle and ‘primed the pump’ to kick-start ailing economies.7 
Its emphasis on full employment worked extremely well in New Zealand until 
the mid-1970s.8 To Douglas full employment was not the point of a modern 
economy, as facilitating job provision conflicted with industry mechanisation. 
Increasing production markedly through labour saving devices also meant 
increased unemployment. The point of an economy was to utilise 
mechanisation to produce what people needed with minimum effort and 
facilitate distribution of goods and services to everyone. Therefore he wanted 
to corporatise national economies and make every citizen a shareholder. This 
solved the problems of unemployment and poverty amidst plenty. Citizens 
could contribute to society in a wider sense by pursuing interests from 
extended leisure without having to spend most of their time in grinding work 
for the bare necessities because everyone would receive a partial or 
completely independent income through a national dividend.9 
In this form the idea has merit if it could be suitably realised but, in 
some speeches, Douglas mixed it in with his monetary reform ideas. In this 
version, the government issues the national dividend to make up the A + B 
theorem gap between costs and prices to provide missing purchasing power 
                                                          
7 In his time, Keynes was as unorthodox as Douglas. Keynes was active in the waning British 
Liberal party and his economic ideas were behind the 1928 ‘Yellow Book’, Britain’s Industrial 
Future. The party used them in its programme, ‘We Can Conquer Unemployment’, and 
thereby hoped to sweep back into power in the 1929 election. G.R. Searle, The Liberal Party: 
Triumph and Disintegration, 1886-1929 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 158, 159. It was 
highly criticised, despite being the only policy of substance and the Liberals failed. David 
Powell, British Politics, 1910-35: The Crisis of the Party System (London: Routledge, 2004), 
pp. 151-153. The Depression forced governments to consider Keynes anew. With U.S. 
support his ideas and those of his U.S. counterpart, White, were widely adopted. The main 
difference was that Keynes advocated a tightly managed economy—possibly to avoid the 
type of economic meltdown that occurred in 2009—while White wanted a more liberal system 
like Douglas. Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 
1997), p. 160. The economics worked and the liberal version became financial orthodoxy for 
the next forty years. William D. Rubenstein, Twentieth Century Britain: A Political History 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 165. 
8 Unemployment was frequently below 1,000. 
9 Douglas, Social Credit, pp. 108, 109, 112. Addresses, pp. 15, 27, 28, 33. A wider view of 
employment would incorporate new categories into a modern economy, giving them 
economic value. Keynesian economics does not preclude this, so the two economic ideas are 
not as far apart as it might first appear. 
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to buy all the goods available.10 Many Social Crediters adopted this 
interpretation. Conventional critics assumed it meant printing money, which is 
inflationary. Douglas admitted that purchasing power could be increased this 
way but with temporary effect because of inflation, which was effectively a tax 
on savings. He made this point many times so, to him, Social Credit did not 
mean simply printing money.11 
 
3.2 Social Credit as Influential Pressure Group 
 
These broad Douglas ideas were espoused in New Zealand Social Credit of 
the early 1930s. While failing to achieve the lofty ambition of a popular social 
movement powerful enough to shape governments, it certainly was a strong 
pressure group outside the party process. The Labour party seemed 
interested in monetary reform along Douglas lines and gained much support 
in rural areas from its monetary policy for farmers with the guaranteed price 
and ideas for insulating the economy against overseas influences. Talk of 
establishing a National Credit Authority and other monetary reforms seemed 
like Social Credit.12  
Gordon Coates, leader of the Reform party, believed in hindsight that 
Social Credit swayed up to 200,000 votes for Labour.13 John A. Lee, Labour 
party propagandist, strategist and MP in 1935, considered that it was ‘the 
corridor’ by which tens of thousands of voters came to Labour.14 Social 
Crediters gave Labour time to reform the monetary system along Douglas 
lines but not without criticism.15 Despite being a significant vote conduit Social 
Credit was not influential enough to ensure that Labour carried out Douglas 
ideas in toto or even give Labour’s monetary policy a Douglas shape. 
                                                          
10 See Addresses, pp. 27-29. 
11 Critics claim that it is effectively the same but, in simply reiterating this rather than 
demonstrating how, they are guilty of presenting an assumption as a conclusion, which does 
not prove anything. For Douglas on the difference between Social Credit and inflation, see 
Addresses, pp. 12, 13, 26. 
12 Miller, p. 17. 
13 Barry Gustafson, The First 50 Years: A History of the New Zealand National Party 
(Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), p. 4. 
14 Keith Sinclair, Walter Nash (Dunedin: Auckland University Press, 1977), p.116. 
15 For details, see Miller, pp.47-55. 
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Initially influenced by Social Credit, Labour certainly was a party of 
monetary reform that righted the economy and allowed the birth of 
comprehensive social welfare in New Zealand. However, division arose 
between those who favoured a cautious Keynesian approach once the main 
economic problems were solved and those wishing to further extend monetary 
reform. Caution won, as the Labour government became increasingly 
reluctant to travel further on the reform road, disappointing its own monetary 
reformers. Most of them were excluded from cabinet, creating ongoing friction 
within the party.16 Monetary reformers in the Labour caucus became an 
increasingly marginalised group of ‘dissidents’ led by John A. Lee. Social 
Credit regarded him more a Douglas Crediter than a socialist.17 Lee himself 
was proud to be a monetary reformer, a ‘genuine social creditor’, but stressed 
that he was not a ‘mystical Douglas Social Credit’ one.18 
Social Credit advocates already existed in parliament.19 Raymond 
Miller identifies several other MPs who were Social Crediters20 and the broad 
strategy of influencing political parties did not prevent individual Social 
Crediters from standing as parliamentary candidates.21 Social Credit in 
Australia contested elections and Alberta elected a Social Credit government 
                                                          
16 For a detailed account, see Sinclair, pp.123-132, 158, 159, 170-174, 190-197; Barry 
Gustafson, From the Cradle to the Grave (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), pp.185, 186, 198-
201; Erik Olssen, John A. Lee (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1977), pp.81-84, 112-
125, 131-143. 
17 Olssen, p.114.  
18 John A. Lee, Simple on a Soapbox (Auckland: Collins, 1963), p. 133. Lee’s charge of 
mysticism arose from Douglas’s writing style lending itself to wide interpretation. Expounded 
ideas seemed like articles of faith rather than obviously lucid or straightforward principles. 
19 Most notably Captain H.M. Rushworth, Country party leader and only MP from 1928 to 
1938 and this party is the only one that fully accepted Social Credit ideas. Clive Tidmarsh, 
‘Puny Political Infant Now a Purposeful Adult’, New Zealand Herald, September 23, 1981, 
section 1, p. 6. Its three candidates in 1935 were Social Crediters. Miller, p. 15. 
20 Including Harry Atmore and A.C.A. Sexton, vice president of the Social Credit Associations. 
Miller, p. 26. Charlie Barrell, Labour candidate for Hamilton in 1935 (and subsequently MP 
until 1943) was elected president of the Hamilton Social Credit Association. Tidmarsh, New 
Zealand Herald, September 23, 1981, section 1, p. 6; Miller, pp. 31, 32. 
21 In keeping with the philosophy against direct political action, they received little Association 
help. Miller, pp.25, 26.  As well as Sexton, an Independent Country party candidate, national 
president of the Social Credit Associations, Colonel S.J.E. Closey stood in Manawatu and 
J.E. Colechin stood in Riccarton, both as Independents. A monetary reform candidate also 
stood in Kaipara. F.C. Jordan stood as a Liberal in Parnell and D.C Davie, a leading Social 
Crediter in the South Island, stood for Labour in Hurunui. Miller, pp. 18, 25, 68, 69. 
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in 1935.22 Major Douglas further muddied the apolitical waters by offering to 
be political adviser to the Alberta government.23  
 Downgraded in voter and party eyes from a social movement to a 
pressure group after 1935, Social Credit’s influence became more limited. 
Members hoped for cracks in the new economic orthodoxy and this presented 
a dilemma. Did they continue to criticise and educate until a popular Social 
Credit movement was reignited or turn it into a political programme and 
demonstrate its viability that way? This dilemma presaged the next phase 
where conflicting ideas led to uncertain action. Many Douglas followers forgot 
the visionary aspect, elevating his ideas into inviolate principles. Later Social 
Credit leader Bruce Beetham called them purists.24 However, Douglas’s 
elliptical writing style and assumption that readers understood the substance 
and context of his points as well as he did made much of it obscure and 
ambiguous. Therefore exactly what his finer detail meant became the source 
of lengthy debate and dispute among Association members.  
There was also the question of what to do with the Douglas vision. 
Purists wanted to implement his ideas exactly as they thought he would but 
other Social Crediters recognised that Douglas prescribed nothing but 
empirically described economic conditions of the time, leaving them free to 
transform his theory into appropriate practice for current circumstances. 
Beetham called them pragmatists.25 Classifying Social Crediters into two 
broad categories was an oversimplification. Beetham admitted that a wide 
range of opinions existed within each category as well as thinkers promoting 
hybrid synthesis.26 Both groups believed in open and public discourse 
                                                          
22 Miller, p. 15. 
23 Zavos, p. 59. 
24 B.C. Beetham, ‘Room at the Top: A Micro-analysis of the Intra-party Politics of the New 
Zealand Social Credit Political League, November 1969-May 1970’, unpublished M. Phil. 
thesis, University of Waikato, 1972, p. 25. 
25 Douglas himself was a pragmatist. For examples, see Addresses, pp. 74, 75, 81. 
26 Beetham, ‘Room at the Top’, pp. 64-66. Douglas claimed to be a modernist scientific 
thinker and rejected some classical ideas such as people deserving their station in life, 
especially the poor and unemployed. Douglas argued that they were not there from moral 
fault but because the monetary system needed overhauling to cope with modern society. 
Therefore moral stigma attached to unemployment benefits meant they were given grudgingly 
because they were not morally free entitlements like superannuation. Douglas, Social Credit, 
pp. 110-117, 122. Purists did not accept Hegelian synthesis as pragmatists did. A synthesis of 
Douglas theory and outside economic concepts, orthodox or otherwise, to successfully 
address modern problems was therefore not Social Credit to purists. It could be argued, then, 
that their thinking was more classical and out of step with Douglas. 
 27
consistent with Douglas individualism. Such conflicts spilled over into the 
political movement. It may have been fine in a freethinking education group 
but blurred the focus of a lobby group and was unsuited to a political 
organisation where outsiders saw only petty squabbling without resolution.    
Endless debate over ends and means became a permanent feature of 
Social Credit.27 Early pragmatists realised that regaining social movement 
status was unlikely. Dwindling influence as a pressure group meant 
continually declining interest in Social Credit. Therefore, as early as 1937 
there were calls for a political party. At the January Social Credit Conference 
unsuccessful attempts were made to form one or endorse Social Credit 
candidates for the next election. A similar call in 1940 added a third option of 
an alliance with John A. Lee’s Democratic Labour (DL).28 
 
3.2.1 Phase One: Uncertain Political Action 
   
Despite the non-political stance, the Social Credit Advisory Board appointed 
Australian Social Credit political activist John H. Hogan as National Organiser 
in 1941. This was not to form a political party but to revive Social Credit as a 
lobby group for the expected election that year. The January 1942 Social 
Credit Conference resolved to set up a separate political organisation, the 
Real Democracy Movement (RDM).29 Adopting this as a political party name 
flew in the face of Douglas’s concept of Real Democracy but was readily 
recognisable as a Social Credit based party to those familiar with his ideas.30  
Going political seemed fine in practice but not in theory and created a 
deep-seated resentment from violating perceived fundamental principles. 
                                                          
27 Douglas disliked this kind of unresolved debate and insisted on working out the ends first, 
then coming to unity on the means. See Addresses, pp. 60, 61, 64, 65. 
28 Miller, pp. 50, 53. Suitable electoral accommodation could not be reached with Lee. Miller, 
p. 54. 
29 For a fuller exposition of this period see Miller, pp. 54-61. For analysis of the 1943 election, 
see J.R.S. Daniels, ‘The General Election of 1943’ (unpublished MA thesis, Victoria University 
of Wellington, 1961). 
30 Social Crediters distrusted and rejected the modern system of government because they 
saw it as basically undemocratic instead of accepting and working with it. This could be 
considered excessively paranoid. However, such mistrust is at the heart of democratic theory, 
which maintains that government should be limited and controlled and also emphasises 
individualism, a central Social Credit ideal. Keith Ovenden, ‘Reaffirming the Anglo-American 
Democratic Ideal’, in J. Stephen Hoadley (ed.), Improving New Zealand’s Democracy 
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Contradictory actions arose in Social Credit’s highly individualistic culture as 
realism clashed with idealism. Hogan seemed to fall foul of this. His full time 
National Organiser position ceased in late 1942 for financial reasons.31 
Raymond Miller rightly observed that this deprived the RDM of its best political 
asset. It contested the 1943 election but, as Miller concluded, it was a half-
hearted political campaign.32 Only eighteen candidates stood, most in 
competition with Lee’s candidates, and most fared badly by comparison. Two 
deposits were retained to offset the failure as a sign of what might have been 
achieved with a proper campaign.33 Two candidates also achieved a solid 
second place including Hogan in Walter Nash’s Hutt electorate, showing that 
he had leadership and charisma much needed by Social Credit, but, with no 
attempt to build on this in 1946, Hogan faded from the political scene.34 
 The RDM experience illustrated the ambivalence that continued to 
feature in Social Credit political activity. Resparking a broad social movement 
was beyond them and lobbying was ineffectual as neither major party was 
interested in Social Credit monetary reform but having to turn to their own 
political programme instead was a distasteful necessity adopted without 
enthusiasm.35 Hampering political effort by ineffective action made it more 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Auckland: New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies, 1979), pp. 18, 23. Social Credit in 
Beetham’s time worked with the system as a pragmatic reality but still did not accept it. 
31 Miller hints at these other underlying reasons but he indicates that the boost Hogan gave to 
Social Credit in members and finances was to lobby in an anticipated 1941 election. Miller, 
pp. 56, 57. This waned when it was deferred, so funds may simply have dried up. 
32 Miller, p. 61. 
33 The RDM saved deposits in Hutt and Wanganui and were only three votes short of another 
in Southern Maori. Miller stated that the RDM lost all its deposits and performed abysmally. 
Miller, p. 61. But the top votes for candidates outside the main parties were: Harry Atmore 
(Independent, unopposed by Labour) 50.8%, P. te H. Jones (Independent Labour) 28.5%, 
Nicolaus (Independent) 23.9%, John A. Lee (DL) 23.3%, J.H. Hogan (RDM) 22.5%, W.E. 
Barnard (Independent, sympathetic to Lee and unopposed by DL ) 22.0%, P.M. Stewart 
(Independent) 18.3%, J.P. Tiako-Barrett (RDM) 16.5%, C. Scrimgeour (Independent, 
sympathetic to Lee and unopposed by DL ) 15.2%, O.R. Marks (RDM) 12.8%, D. Cresswell 
(DL) 12.0%, Frame (DL) 11.3%. All others took less than 10%. Thus in the top twelve third 
party results the RDM had the same number as Lee’s party (three) and Hogan polled nearly 
the same vote as John A. Lee. The RDM also outpolled another third party, the People’s 
Movement, by 50% despite the latter having a third more candidates. 
34 Miller had Hogan standing as an Independent in 1943. Miller, p. 57 (footnote 136). 
However, the New Zealand Herald recorded him as one of the eighteen RDM candidates. In 
the Auckland University’s New Zealand Election Studies 1943 election results summary it is 
noted that their candidates stood as Independents on behalf of the Movement, and this clears 
up the confusion. See <http://www.nzes.org/exec/getdata/NZ_elections_1905-43.xls> 
retrieved on January 28, 2008. 
35 Though influence was dwindling, a Social Credit element persisted in the Labour caucus 
and a larger element in the wider party into the late 1940s pushing for state control of credit. It 
forced Labour to nationalise the Bank of New Zealand in 1945. Michael Bassett and Michael 
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likely to fail, thus reinforcing the futility of such action and psychologically 
preserving adherence to perceived basic Social Credit principles.36 This 
ambivalence created tension throughout Social Credit’s political history, 
plaguing its attempts to set up a well run political machine and creating 
problems for its leaders.  
 
3.2.2 Phase Two: Amateur Political Party 
 
Judith Bassett noted that attempted influence on National in 1949 in light of its 
election slogan to ‘make the Pound go further’ met with a disappointing lack of 
interest.37 Social Credit’s pressure role was without result so made the 
decision to go political again in 1953. This was Social Credit’s next phase: 
amateurish political party. Despite controversy, debate and long gestation,38 a 
political arm was set up with an organisation separate from the Associations. 
Opponents in the movement maintained that Social Credit  
would gradually but inevitably assume the characteristics of a political 
party…[T]he life cycle of any movement follows a predictable pattern: first 
the concept; then the need for power; this demands an organisation, 
which in turn demands money and members; new members flow in 
without any real knowledge of the concept; and, finally, as they rise in 
influence the concept gradually dies...[T]o maintain the purity of the idea, 
therefore, members were required to restrain their political ambitions, 
resist the temptation to centralise or bureaucratise power, and 
concentrate their energies on creating an enlightened elite rather than a 
mass movement.39  
 
This was an issue when Bruce Beetham took over although the Social 
Credit political elite remained true to its ideals. Dissident Social Crediters 
argued that the League had departed from Douglas and did so well before 
                                                                                                                                                                      
King, Tomorrow Comes the Song: A Life of Peter Fraser (Auckland: Penguin, 2000), pp. 276, 
277. Even in 1974 Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk thought that the government should 
control credit. Margaret Hayward, Diary of the Kirk Years (Wellington: Cape Catley/A.H. and 
A.W. Reed, 1981), p. 245. 
36 See, for example, Miller, p. 72. 
37 Bassett, New Zealand Today Part 7, p. 194. See also Zavos, p. 73. 
38 A political arm was proposed before each election in 1949 and 1951, and in 1952. It was 
always rejected. Miller, pp. 69-71. 
39 Miller, p. 73. This is part of Miller’s argument and he sought to show it in the later political 
movement. Systematically educating new members as a condition of advancement would 
have avoided this problem if a suitable programme could have been agreed on. A written test 
for candidates on their Social Credit knowledge was dropped in 1954. Miller, p. 105. 
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Beetham.40 But the concept was dying anyway as the movement waned, so 
going political was a last attempt to preserve and revive Social Credit. A 
British Columbia Social Credit party won power in 195241 and Alberta’s Social 
Credit government was still strong. Social Credit was growing there politically 
and likely to succeed in New Zealand too.  
The political arm elected prominent businessman, Wilfrid Owen as 
president and his strong Christchurch group dominated the executive.42 There 
was no leader as such and Owen used heavy persuasion to establish leader 
and deputy positions but they were to be reconsidered after the election.43 
One important principle established was the independence of Social Credit 
MPs to vote in the House as they pleased except on monetary policy.44 This 
never varied even under Beetham. Because of non-party emphasis, it was a 
Social Credit Political League but, nonetheless, a party in effect. As a 
businessman, Owen appreciated the concept of corporate New Zealand and 
the National Dividend. Unfortunately, in an era of virtually full unemployment, 
emphasis was forced onto the alternate interpretation of filling the Douglas 
‘gap’ apart from a government profit and loss account.45  
Social Credit amateurishness was shown in several ways. First, there 
was only monetary policy without an attempt to turn Social Credit philosophy 
into other policy except in a vague incoherent manner.46 Second, Christchurch 
domination of Social Credit meant the main electoral organisation and thrust 
came from there. So the 1954 campaign did best in the South Island rather 
than in Social Credit’s traditionally strong North Island areas.47 Third, the 
League felt obliged to contest every seat to prove political legitimacy, putting 
                                                          
40 But Douglas was interested in an apolitical mass movement and, by shifting focus to an 
enlightened elite, purist opponents had already departed from a Douglas Social Credit view. 
41 Miller, pp. 69, 81, 90-92. 
42 Interestingly, the Christchurch group threatened to revive a Liberal party in the absence of a 
Social Credit one. Miller, p. 70, 71. 
43 Miller, pp. 104, 108. 
44 Miller, pp. 77, 111. 
45 Miller, p. 110. 
46 Miller, pp. 94-96. Miller claimed that Social Credit’s maxim underlying its policy was that 
anything socially and economically desirable is financially possible and described it as 
optimistic. See Miller, pp. 96, 97. In fact the maxim was that anything socially desirable and 
physically possible should be made financially possible. 
47 Overall the League gained more from National than Labour but this hid cross currents. In 
South Island urban seats Social Credit drew equally from both parties and allowed National to 
keep some of its 1951 gains. The main examples are Christchurch Central, Dunedin Central, 
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great strain on organisation, finances and led to accepting anyone who would 
stand.48 Fourth, Social Crediters expected their message would gain 
overwhelming support as the voters saw the rightness of it. They did not think 
to counter the efforts of the other parties. Fifth, despite winning the largest 
third party vote on debut in New Zealand,49 Social Crediters expected to 
sweep into power as in Alberta and British Columbia with confident 
predictions of winning every seat. This meant they were disappointed with 
their achievement.50 The attitude that success came solely from their own 
effort resulted in a persistent inward focus without learning successful 
organisation or strategy from other parties or understanding how the electoral 
system worked. Finally, there was no united nationwide campaign. Most 
candidates fought their own local battles and personally financed them. Many 
were in debt and the League had exhausted its resources.51 
Social Credit did not disappear from politics like most third parties but 
continued low election results combined with its amateur approach produced 
a culture that locked this in. Local organisations became resigned to not 
winning and were little more than Social Credit political clubs satisfying the 
social and meagre political needs of members. 
However, National worried about League support and set up a Royal 
Commission in 1955 to look into monetary, banking and credit systems, 
including Social Credit’s. The League squandered this opportunity by 
approaching it in its usual individualistic style. Owen took a holiday during the 
Commission’s sitting without coordinating a unified approach to League 
presentations.52 Consequently it received a confused and contradictory 
opinion of Social Credit monetary policy as League witnesses gave their own 
version.53 The Commission condemned its monetary theories and two 
rebuttals of Social Credit were published based on Commission findings, one 
by Canterbury University economist, A.J. Danks, and the other by National’s 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Mornington, Lyttelton and St. Kilda. National retained the latter two. For details of the move to 
a political party and the 1954 election, see Miller, pp. 67-79, 90, 91, 102-114. 
48 Miller, pp. 105, 106. One nomination was not lodged in time. 
49 Its 11.1% was not exceeded until 1984 when the New Zealand party gained 12.3%. 
50 Miller, p. 113. 
51 Miller, pp. 118, 121. 
52 Miller, pp. 118, 138, 139. 
53 See, for example, M.J.S. Nestor, Monetary Reform and the Reformers (Wellington: 
Whitcomb and Tombs, 1956), p. 11. 
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Chief research Officer, M.J.S. Nestor.54 For National the Commission 
demonstrated that Social Credit’s money was well and truly funny.55 All that 
was needed thereafter was a reminder followed by ridicule.56 One finding 
Social Credit attempted to resolve was how debt free money was cancelled57 
but debate on it was still going strong when Beetham joined the movement. 
 
3.2.3 1957 Fallout 
 
In 1957 Social Credit’s support dropped. Some of its 1954 vote was indeed a 
temporary holding pen in transferring votes from National to Labour.58 Social 
Credit was hardest hit in the South Island, especially in urban areas, as its 
support returned to Labour. National criticised the poor vote of Social Credit’s 
leading figures, concluding that it was a spent force.59 National cleverly 
compared votes for Social Credit to the overwhelming votes against but made 
League performance seem much worse than it really was. Social Credit kept 
nearly two-thirds of its 1954 vote and many examples were from South Island 
or North Island urban seats where even the 1954 vote was weak. It had held 
its own in rural seats and increased in some Northland, Waikato and Taranaki 
ones. Thus National dismissed the potential threat in its heartland. 
Social Credit’s reaction was to blame its leadership and the 
‘unorthodoxy’ of the Christchurch group. Again Social Credit looked inward for 
a scapegoat. However, it punished the most vibrant part of its organisation for 
seemingly right reasons but, like National, misunderstood what had 
happened. It took two years for discontent to reach a head but it had surfaced 
before the 1957 election. It was expressed as criticism of Owen and demands 
for power to be redistributed from Christchurch to the North.60 The 1957 
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decline was really due to lack of resources and political inexperience. Social 
Credit did not identify its prior natural constituency, attempt to hold the one it 
gained in 1954 or target new voters.61 Adverse publicity from the Royal 
Commission was not countered,62 internal wrangling continued, and new 
policies were not developed to interest voters.63 
In 1958 only two of the Christchurch group were elected to the 
Executive.64 At the 1959 Conference Owen prepared a statement on credit 
cancellation and made its acceptance a question of confidence in his 
leadership rather than agreeing to form a Technical Committee to deal with it. 
In the uproar the positions of leader and deputy were suspended until the 
issue could be resolved amicably.65 It was the end of the Christchurch group 
and Owen joined the National party.66 Dominion Secretary-Organiser, C.W. 
Elvidge, was now effectively leader and did form a Technical Committee to 
handle thorny theoretical questions. He was responsible for Social Credit’s 
next important leader, Vern Cracknell, joining the League in 1959. By 1962 
Cracknell was president and became leader in 1963.67  
Leader and deputy positions were revived in 1960 but only for the 
election. Non-entity P.H. Matthews was leader and J.B. O’Brien was deputy.68 
The League public relations consultant advised it to make broad policies and 
emphasise benefits, not technicalities. Consequently, Social Credit went from 
6% to 9% during the campaign according to Gallup polls of September, 
                                                          
61 Miller, pp. 154, 155. A public relations firm was hired to address these issues. 
62 Miller, p. 125; R.S. Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966), pp. 299, 300. 
63 Selection wrangles resulted in Independent Social Credit candidates for Marsden, St. Kilda 
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October and November 1960.69 National emphasised the wasted vote and 
claimed that National monetary policy was the same as Social Credit’s, the 
latter backed up by Owen but this failed to detach its campaign gains. In a 
quiet campaign where Social Credit attracted little attention, only Social Credit 
gained, especially in Hobson.70  Cracknell increased his vote by nearly 2,000, 
completely eclipsing the efforts of the leader and deputy. 
 
3.2.4 Phase Three: Semi-professional Party 
 
Cracknell became leader and his attempt to turn Social Credit into a 
professional political organisation was half successful. So Social Credit 
entered its third phase: a semi-professional party. Under Owen the whole 
Christchurch group controlled Social Credit’s direction. Cracknell directed it by 
his own perception of how Douglas’s ideas needed to be politically expressed. 
He possessed great leverage as an accountant and respectable local body 
politician to counter the League’s extremist image on monetary matters71 and 
he was the most likely candidate to win a parliamentary seat. Under Cracknell 
the League gained a central administrative structure and a disciplined political 
organisation with a team emphasis replacing individualism.72 In 1964 the 
leader and deputy positions were made permanent. 
Cracknell believed in incrementalism: a slow thorough building of an 
electoral organisation, a steadily expanding political programme by adopting 
new but consistent policies and increasing voter support in strong electorates 
until they were won. This was not government in a single bound but an 
extended campaign over several elections. League researcher, S.L. Dickson 
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indicated that Social Credit growth tended to take over the support of the 
second party in an electorate whether National or Labour.73 
Raymond Miller’s picture of Cracknell as a cautious conservative 
opposed to Douglasism is overdrawn.74 Miller attributed to Cracknell the views 
about the evils of monopolistic corporate capitalism and moneylenders and 
the virtues and importance of small enterprise capitalism instead of seeing 
them as outgrowths of Social Credit money ideas and importance of the 
individual. Social Credit retained and emphasised these ideas under 
Beetham.75 Certainly Cracknell was cautious. In the debate on whether debt-
free credits were automatically cancelled, Cracknell sided with those who 
believed they were not. Thus huge amounts of debt free money was 
inflationary so Reserve Bank credit creation needed to be judicious, modest 
and, in the first instance, linked to recovery methods such as advances to 
local and central government functions. Purists considered it anti-Douglas as 
they believed in automatic credit cancellation. However, this was a technical 
detail needing to be solved by a Douglas expert because of two contradictory 
ideas coming from the same theory. Cracknell was not anti-Douglas on this 
issue and neither were the many Social Crediters who agreed with him.  
The League was prepared to follow Cracknell as long as he was 
successful and he was more successful than Owen and the Christchurch 
group. In 1963 the League vote was slightly less than that of 1960 but building 
a professional organisation had barely begun.76 Nonetheless, in the Cracknell 
years Social Credit made the best of limited opportunities. Cracknell was an 
able and personable leader. The organisation expanded to half the number of 
Labour branches. Its 7000 members nearly equalled Labour and were 
involved in active fundraising, a later League strength. The Social Credit 
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Guardian was the monthly communication organ. It began advertising 
between elections, a more continuous publicity process. The League’s 
harvest came in late 1966, a surprising campaign development.77 Improving 
the organisation certainly helped Social Credit to its largest vote but a peak 
protest election was also a major component. Social Credit had not 
acknowledged the protest nature of its support and never attempted to 
measure its fluctuations.  
 Austin Mitchell argued that Social Credit became a protest party 
against National in the countryside, giving it an opportunity in Hobson, a seat 
with ‘long-standing discontents’.78 It concentrated resources there in 1966 and 
Cracknell spent most of his time in the seat. He was well respected with local 
body experience that helped offset adverse factors. Despite the wasted vote 
argument not applying, over 40% of Cracknell’s 1963 voters did not support 
him in 1966.79 Volatility notwithstanding, trends in the Hobson vote challenged 
a myth. Social Credit permanently kept 20% from National’s 1954 vote but 
subsequently only increased its further share by 10% or less (5% of the 
overall vote). Although this share was vital as non-voting was low and even,80 
Social Credit largely won by collapsing the Labour vote. Thus Social Credit 
was not an alternative to National but to Labour and S.L. Dickson’s contention 
that Social Credit took over the Opposition party vote was true in Hobson. 
In 1966 it collapsed Hobson’s Labour vote to a degree only matched 
later in Rangitikei and Kaipara. Residual Labour support in other rural seats 
was stubbornly higher but Labour was particularly weak in Hobson. It went 
from twelve branches in 1954 to none in 1961 and only one was active after 
1958. Activists thought that Labour should withdraw in 1960 to give Cracknell 
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a clear run against the new National candidate Logan Sloane.81 This certainly 
would have given Cracknell the seat then and he was only robbed of it on 
special votes in 1963.82 Unlike the rest of the country National voters were 
motivated to vote in Hobson in 1966, as reflected in a high turnout, but its 100 
vote gain in 1966 was offset by further Labour collapse. Many withered 
Labour branches stayed that way in the rest of the Auckland region but 
reformed in Hobson in the late 1960s after supporters realised Cracknell was 
not a de facto Labour MP.83 Sloane was not a popular MP and this also gave 
a small impetus to Cracknell until it was discovered that he was no better. 
Thus many factors, several beyond Social Credit control, came 
together to win Hobson. Even Labour failure to withdraw its candidate and 
Cracknell’s narrow 1963 loss may have helped in a sense. Had he been 
elected in 1960, Cracknell’s inadequacies as MP might have prevented him 
becoming leader thus stopping Social Credit’s professionalisation. Success in 
1963 may have hampered the 1966 advance or, if not, Social Credit might 
have been embarrassed by gaining its best vote while losing its sole MP.  
 
3.2.5 The Failure of Cracknell and Incrementalism 
 
In line with incrementalism and backed with polling data, researcher Dickson 
predicted that the 1966 surge was not a one off but would increase in 1969.84 
In June 1969 the National Research Bureau (NRB) had Social Credit on 
17.6% support but it steadily declined thereafter and Social Credit’s 1969 
campaign was considered a disaster. Cracknell lost his seat and Social 
Credit’s vote dropped to 9%. Bruce Beetham thought that the two main 
problems were lack of aggressive campaigning and serious television 
advertising. He estimated that Social Credit lost 2% from a poor campaign. 
                                                          
81 Barry Gustafson, ‘Labour’s Lost Legions: The Second Labour Government 1957-60 and 
Grassroots Party Membership in the Auckland Region’, New Zealand Journal of History Vol. 
10. No. 2 (October 1976), pp. 154, 155.  
82 In seats where Social Credit was strong, more people voted for it on the day or switched 
during the campaign than originally planned to and so the League usually lost ground on 
special votes. The Greens had the opposite problem. 
83 Gustafson, New Zealand Journal of History Vol. 10. No. 2, pp. 155, 156. This made it 
harder for Social Credit to collapse the Labour vote as much in Bay of Islands in 1978 and 
1981, Hobson’s successor seat. 
84 Dickson, Political Science Vol 21 No. 1, p. 39. For polling figures, see the Appendix. 
 38
The League ignored Dickson’s 1967 warning that it was not holding its 1966 
support or winning young voters, and needed more Labour votes.85  
Social Credit was also subject to third party electoral disadvantages 
beyond its control. 1969 was a squeeze election with voters deciding between 
giving National a fourth term or electing Labour.86 Social Credit would have 
been hard pressed to maintain its 1966 vote let alone increase it especially 
as, once again, it made no attempt to cement gains in place well before the 
election. Gaining Labour voters would be even more difficult. David McCraw’s 
‘holding pen’ and ‘clearing house’ argument87 held true for Social Credit in 
1969 with only an estimated 11% vote even with a good campaign.88  
Cracknell’s performance in the House did leave much to be desired.89 
Miller pointed out that he was temperamentally unsuited for parliamentary life 
and the League gave him no guidance about his role there or how to carry it 
out effectively.90 His solitary existence was exacerbated by Standing Orders 
catering only for two parties, which made it easier to override and ignore 
outsiders. Cracknell’s maiden speech was bumped for urgency on Muldoon’s 
first ‘mini budget’ and he had no one to second motions or support bills.  
David McLaren, Labour’s first MP, was also a solitary member. Despite 
solid prior local body experience and second ballot advantages McLaren was 
not re-elected.91 Cracknell’s Social Credit predecessor, H.M. Rushworth, was 
also uncertain in the House, voting mostly with the government.92 He was, 
however, a popular MP and kept his seat. Cracknell would have done better in 
a small parliamentary team but Social Credit did not possess this luxury. The 
solid, respectable face of Social Credit was unable to be a charismatic 
firebrand at the same time. 
 Television coverage first became important in the 1966 election. Other 
media ignored Social Credit in previous elections but television ‘discovered’ 
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Social Credit and its leader, which made an impact on voters.93 By 1969 
Cracknell was no longer a novelty and his amateur performance became 
detrimental but the League failed him and itself by not using television and 
other campaign publicity in better ways. Despite Cracknell’s political liabilities 
the League had to use him, as he was their leader and sole MP but it made 
no attempt to offset his weak points and showed that Social Credit was not 
fully professional yet. The aftermath of 1969 was not handled well but 
Cracknell believed that he was still the only person who could take Social 
Credit forward. His refusal to stand down or take another role made matters 
worse but, like Beetham later, he saw no one better to succeed him. 
The 1970 Conference blamed Cracknell’s non-aggressive stance in the 
House and during the campaign for the loss. It accused him of not taking 
advice and favouring League administration at the expense of effective 
political action. Blaming Cracknell for League failings was the familiar 
superficial response and would happen to Beetham sixteen years later. 
Cracknell did not help his cause by insisting that Conference elect him and his 
favoured candidates to executive office as a team. Conference rejected this 
ultimatum and John O’Brien replaced him as leader. Cracknell, like Owen 
before him, acrimoniously left Social Credit. Beetham wanted Social Credit to 
make peace with Cracknell as he feared he would join National and stand in 
Hobson as their candidate or as an Independent.94 Some National MPs 
observed that if Cracknell had joined National instead of Social Credit he 
would have been a cabinet minister in the 1970s. Similar comments were 
made about Beetham ten years later. The clear implication was that 
competent Social Crediters were misguided and in the wrong party. 95 
 
3.2.6 An Aborted Fourth Phase: The O’Brien Blunder 
 
After the fallout from 1969, Social Credit finally grew into a fully professional 
party but took nearly a decade to achieve it. A new, charismatic leader and a 
greater political emphasis, including spokespeople, a shadow cabinet, 
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94 Beetham, ‘Room at the Top’, pp. 161, 182, 270, 276, 279. Cracknell did neither. 
95 Beetham, ‘Room at the Top’, p. 276. 
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alternate budgets and measured publicity releases, were good steps.96 
However, events cast doubt on whether John O’Brien was the right person 
despite his charisma and fresh ideas. Journalist Spiro Zavos thought that 
O’Brien was a vibrant leader determined to preach a pure Social Credit 
message. Pragmatists had to hold their nerve and let him hang himself.97 
Raymond Miller said that O’Brien led an unstable coalition of orthodox Social 
Crediters and younger members swept up in liberal political causes he 
espoused. The battle was between purists who followed O’Brien into the New 
Democrats and pragmatic Cracknellites remaining active in Social Credit.98  
Beetham considered O’Brien a mixture of purist and pragmatist initially 
but he shifted into the purist camp. The League executive understood 
O’Brien’s loose cannon tendencies yet believed his aggressive political stance 
was needed. From O’Brien’s assurances to submit his ideas to the executive, 
it believed his energy could be controlled positively to advance the League 
again but O’Brien avoided executive control.99 Beetham did not agree with 
O’Brien’s view that the League’s problems came from an administrative brake 
on political action. He thought that the unresolved purist/pragmatist debate 
was tearing the heart out of the League but most Social Crediters were a 
mixture of both, so it ought to have been flexible enough to compromise.100  
O’Brien did not resolve that debate but joined wider political debate 
with anti-EEC and anti-nuclear testing policies. It may have been a good idea 
but O’Brien approached it as if he already had an influential party rather than 
still building one and Social Credit efforts were regarded as a nuisance. Fresh 
tensions arose within the League as O’Brien increasingly went his own way 
and could not be controlled. He acted as though he already had a sizeable 
parliamentary group that could dictate policy apart from the League.  
Executive belief that it could control O’Brien was too optimistic. He 
waited ten years to become leader and wanted to counter Cracknell 
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incrementalism quickly but did so to excess. O’Brien whole-heartedly believed 
in what he was doing but was like a runaway train. Beetham thought that a 
better balance would have come from allowing O’Brien’s ‘fire-eating’ political 
style under Cracknell’s continued leadership101 but doubts about the 
effectiveness of O’Brien’s style should have acted as a warning. For example, 
O’Brien was a good but not exceptional parliamentary candidate and his 
performance worsened as time went on.102   
From 1953 to 1972 Social Credit had four leaders, none of whom 
resigned willingly and only one without fuss. Owen and Cracknell presented 
the League with ultimatums: Owen on monetary doctrine and Cracknell on his 
executive ‘ticket’. In fairness, both men were forced into that position to some 
extent. The League refused to accept Owen’s updated version of monetary 
ideas as legitimate Social Credit so he made it a matter of confidence. 
Cracknell’s reforms were criticised on the same basis. However, the real 
problem was Cracknell’s ineffective style proven by how easily Conference 
politically outmanoeuvred him on the leadership issue. Had Cracknell been 
elected leader first, he might have reluctantly accepted executive members 
outside his ‘ticket’ but the presidency was deliberately decided first. After his 
nominee failed, Cracknell had to give up the leadership. By insisting on his 
team or nothing, Cracknell violated Social Credit’s principles of democracy 
and individuality and, ironically, ensured that there was no leadership contest. 
Owen’s departure caused fewer problems than Cracknell’s as he was 
not replaced. This was not an option in 1969. Caught between a choice of 
solidly respectable but dull or charismatic but unstable, the League did not 
have an immediate dynamic third alternative. Social Credit had to live with 
misgivings about O’Brien’s shortcomings and try to compensate for them 
because of his charisma and the ease by which he became leader.   
Eighteen months later O’Brien’s political initiatives to revitalise the 
League had not reversed further decline.103 His autocratic actions created 
more internal strains. The League president had resigned twice in three years. 
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Shadow spokesmen resigned or O’Brien sacked them and in early 1972 some 
candidates also resigned.104 In late 1971 Bruce Beetham, Les Hunter and 
George Bryant met to debate forming a new party along updated Social Credit 
lines but decided against it.105 The 1972 Conference became another 
showdown, the second in two years. O’Brien planned to set up his own party if 
he did not get his own way. He thought the membership backed him, 
expecting most of them to defect to his New Democrat party. When most did 
not, O’Brien still fielded candidates for all but one electorate and the party 
persisted into 1973.106  
Only three weeks before Conference, League president Dr. W.A. 
Evans resigned and the Dominion Council elected Beetham president. He 
allowed his name to go forward as a nominee for leader to fill a constitutional 
gap since O’Brien and his deputy Tom Weal had also resigned three weeks 
earlier.107 When an O’Brien walkout was immanent, Beetham approached Les 
Hunter about the leadership. Hunter did not want it so Beetham was elected 
unopposed the next day because he was the only nominee.108  
 
3.3 Rebuilding the Party 
 
3.3.1 Survival 
 
After the 1972 Conference debacle Social Credit had to rebuild or fade away. 
Many commentators predicted the latter and even prominent figures in the 
League thought that O’Brien had destroyed the movement.109 Only six months 
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from an election Social Credit had 3% in opinion polls110 with competition from 
the emerging Values party and the small Liberal Reform party threatening 
support in some rural strongholds. Nobody knew how much damage O’Brien’s 
New Democrats would do to Social Credit’s traditional vote or its organisation. 
Beetham appeared to have become leader to preside over its demise.111  
 Social Credit’s first task was to survive and still be New Zealand’s third 
party after the election. One favourable factor was that those whom Beetham 
trusted in the organisational nucleus around which he intended to rebuild were 
all relatively young. Beetham himself was only 36, the youngest leader of all 
the parties except Values.  Donald Bethune, 44, active in the Waikato became 
League president. Alan Patterson-Kane, 26, from Auckland was vice-
president and later became the highly efficient chairman of the powerful 
Ways, Means and Membership Committee. George Bryant, 34, became 
League publicist responsible for party manifestos and expounding Social 
Credit’s general philosophy. Others who became important leaders later were 
Jeremy Dwyer, 24 in 1972, and Stefan Lipa. One of the most important, Les 
Hunter, 44, was League and pragmatist theoretician responsible for updating 
Douglas and producing financial policy.112  
 Social Credit’s 1972 campaign emphasised Beetham’s youthfulness.113 
Unlike Cracknell in 1969 he was articulate and telegenic, coming across 
powerfully on that medium. He was the type of leader Social Credit wanted 
and needed, combining Cracknell’s sensible thoughtfulness and respectability 
without his indifferent style and O’Brien’s dynamic charisma without his 
rashness or instability. Commentators Ian Templeton and Keith Eunice did not 
write off the League ‘because it has shown in the past that it can bounce back 
from near-extinction’. Unresolved economic issues left room for Social 
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Credit’s monetary ‘panaceas’ to attract new followers and under Beetham with 
a dynamic campaign it could rally strongly. They noted that Beetham attacked 
Labour as he recognised that Social Credit needed to displace Labour 
eventually to become the Opposition.114 With a fresh team behind him 
Beetham made sufficient impact to win the 7% that Hunter thought the 
League would be lucky to get.115 Beetham and his team maintained Social 
Credit’s position as New Zealand’s leading third party. The New Democrats 
and Liberal Reform were minimal electoral threats. Values was a more 
serious contender particularly with growing appeal. Its strength in urban seats, 
particularly the four metropolitan areas, displaced Social Credit for third place 
in 13 of them, some quite strongly.   
Labour won a landslide victory in 1972. Political scientists and 
commentators predicted a close contest and some thought National might 
hold on again. The result was expected to be 45-42 but to whom was 
uncertain.116 The 23 seat win was an FPP distortion with a relatively small 
swing producing a large majority. ‘Labour’s victory in seats gave the party an 
illusion of depth in popular votes which it did not possess’.117 Enough 1969 
Social Credit voters are thought to have gone to Labour in some seats it 
needed to win. Although this helped make Labour vulnerable in fourteen 
seats, National was even more vulnerable in seven of its own. So Labour 
would rule until at least 1978 unless they blundered or had terrible luck.118  
 However, the electoral system and cycle had changed.119 Voters began 
to base support on performance instead of loyalty and changed main parties 
more rapidly or did not vote for them at all. This fourth new electoral cycle 
since 1935 was not as smooth or predictable as the previous three. It took 
several elections to clearly see these changes but third parties had a growing 
vote not seen in forty years.  
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 Social Credit now had to work out its prospects and strategy. It had to 
refocus its aim to become the main Opposition by displacing Labour. Instead 
the League concentrated on positioning itself to maximise support and put 
much effort into a comprehensive policy. Its 1975 manifesto contained at least 
a third more of expanded policy that the League hoped would be a vote 
winner and boost membership. Miller estimated that Social Credit’s 
membership was under 2,000 by 1975, up from the 700 in 1972 but nowhere 
near the 20,000 targeted for.120 Miller claimed that Social Credit filched many 
of its other policies from other parties as it was only unique in its financial 
ideas.121 However, it would be more true to say that the Social Credit 
Executive spent the time between 1972 and 1975 working out what Social 
Credit philosophy looked like as a coherent modern political programme.122 
The financial policy was always only a means to desired social ends and 
clearly stated as such in the manifesto.123  
 Although the new leaders and executive provided revitalised direction 
and effort, the same was not true of the members at large. From extreme 
demoralisation most seemed content to let Beetham fight for Social Credit. 
After so many setbacks how could he achieve anything different? 
Reorganising and reviving electorate branches only really began in 1976.124  
 Meanwhile Social Credit still had to fight the 1975 election. Opinion 
polls in the first half of 1975 had Social Credit support lower than 1972 on 5%, 
level or slightly behind Values. After July Social Credit regained the lead, 
because Values fell away slightly, and slowly improved over September and 
during the campaign but ended with its third worst electoral performance.125 
7.4% of the vote disappointingly failed as an advance but Social Credit found 
some consolation. Values advance was slight and it did not displace Social 
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Credit as New Zealand’s third party.126 While Values remained strong in urban 
areas, it was not simply a matter of Values taking from Social Credit because 
another factor was the destination of deserting Labour voters. National took 
62% of them but Social Credit picked up 20% to Values’ 15%.127 Social Credit 
gained fewer former Labour votes in urban areas where Values maintained or 
increased support because Values replaced its 1972 National leaning middle 
class votes with Labour leaning ones.128 Values overtook Social Credit in 
thirty seats, twenty-eight of them urban, but interplay between them was more 
complex. Social Credit increased its vote in sixteen other seats to keep ahead 
of Values and even in many seats where Values pushed it into fourth. Despite 
this improvement Social Credit’s vote declined further from 1972 in thirty-one 
seats including four rural ones where it might have been expected to do 
better. So Social Credit improved in some urban and provincial seats and not 
others. It failed to advance significantly in rural areas but held firm in the face 
of a massive swing to National. Beetham increased his own vote by over half 
in Rangitikei, the only seat to swing away from National and Social Credit’s 
sole victory prospect in 1978. 
 Social Credit’s more liberal policies were not rewarded with support 
from the newly eligible or younger voter. In a survey it only gained 6.9% of 
newly eligible voters compared to 17.5% for Values.129 Some policies such as 
homosexual law reform or the right to abortion did not sit well with Social 
Credit’s philosophy based on Christian morality and many members and 
candidates were uncomfortable with them but others like environmental 
concerns and ethnic rights were not problematic.130 Liberal policy was not 
properly integrated into Social Credit’s vision. In this instance Miller was right 
in saying it was a blatant and disjointed attempt to gain votes.  
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3.3.2 Reorganisation and a Lucky By-election 
 
However, the League’s policy efforts had clarified its political position and 
direction but it was still wedded to a decentralised semi-professional 
organisation.131 Main publicist George Bryant took action. He convened a 
think tank a month before Social Credit’s 1976 Conference to analyse its lack 
of progress. Then he sprung a background paper on delegates entitled: 
‘Wanted! The New Zealand Social Credit Political League, Dead or Alive’. The 
booklet’s twenty-eight recommendations for action were debated and 
adopted. First came the need for viable electorate branches. Twenty-six of 
them were completely inactive and another twenty-five were only semi-active. 
Then came increased membership—his target was 10,000, professional 
fundraising, trained and active canvassers, a new and effective image, and 
integrated and coordinated organisation from the Dominion Council and the 
political executive down to regional groupings and electorate branches.  
 Initially Beetham was furious but the shock treatment worked. Bryant 
was running for the League presidency and he thought his tactics might have 
worked against him but he was still elected. Goals for the first twelve months 
included making ten branches election ready, restarting ten dead ones and 
organising a petition on proportional representation. The political executive 
included Beetham, Bryant, deputy leader Hunter, Nevern McConachy, Lipa 
who succeeded Bryant as president, and former leader Cracknell. Dwyer 
joined them in 1977 when he replaced Hunter as deputy leader.132 Paid 
organisers were put in the four top seats eighteen months before the 1978 
election. McConachy and Lipa toured branches to convince them to set 
membership and fundraising targets. The overall target was a 16% vote and 
at least one seat in 1978 rising to 22% and enough seats to hold the balance 
of power in 1981. Social Credit reintroduced a mid-term publicity campaign 
from September to November 1977 because they realised that third parties 
lost momentum by vanishing off the media radar and this gained 200 new 
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members.133 Thus development began of Social Credit’s best organisational 
machine, one to rival that of the main parties. 
 Opinion polls showed increased Social Credit popularity. By the end of 
1976 it was on 9% but stuck there throughout 1977. This was only the same 
as 1969 and hardly the huge breakthrough looked for. The only bright spot 
was that Values, very close behind Social Credit in mid-1976, fell back to 
5%.134 Then came the death of Sir Roy Jack, Rangitikei’s MP, on Christmas 
Day 1977. The by-election timing was perfect, coming on the heels of the 
publicity campaign. Rangitikei was Social Credit’s prime target and the 
League had already been working on it for eighteen months with top organiser 
Henry Raynel appointed full-time in mid-1977. Membership was about 1,000 
and Beetham had toured the electorate in October.135  
 Factors beyond Social Credit’s control also worked in its favour. Rising 
freezing-works costs and export trading woes reducing farm incomes made a 
farmer protest vote against National more likely.136 National also had selection 
problems. Neighbouring Ruahine was abolished by the 1977 boundary 
changes and with Jack’s planned retirement, its MP, Les Gandar was 
selected to contest it. However, the by-election had to be held on the old 
boundaries and he could not be selected without another by-election in his 
own seat. This could have been resolved by selecting him for Manawatu and 
choosing a strong and permanent Rangitikei candidate but a temporary one 
was decided on for fear that any other action would show Beetham was a 
threat.137 This clumsy arrangement made Beetham the strongest contender 
by far, especially as he had given up the Hamilton mayoralty two months 
earlier, so he was already a full-time candidate. National and Labour colluded 
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to ensure that National retained the seat, a tactic seen as ganging up on the 
underdog to preserve major party monopoly in parliament. Their strategy did 
not work and Beetham won the seat comfortably. 
 
3.3.3 Organising for the 1978 Election 
 
Even if Beetham had not won, publicity surrounding the by-election gave 
Social Credit more support. In January 1978, a month before the by-election, 
media publicity increased opinion poll support for the League by almost 
50%—from 9% to 13%—and in March Social Credit’s rating was at 22%. 
Support more than doubled in four months but it slid back to 16% in 
September.138 The pattern is worthy of note. Social Credit took more from 
Labour than National, a result confirmed by its own canvassers. When the 
League was at 22%, Labour had declined to 31%. Labour bounced back but 
not to its 1977 heights. National was not expected to lose as it was about as 
far ahead of Labour as it had been in 1975 four months from the election. 
Nevertheless Social Credit took encouragement from the polls despite the 
mid-year slide. Its loyalty rate for retaining 1975 voters was above 80%, one 
in five new voters were intending to vote for it and it had the largest slice of 
the 1975 non-vote now intending to vote.139 This was something not achieved 
before. Characteristically, Beetham now raised the vote target to 20%. At the 
August Conference Social Credit set new seat targets: to retain Rangitikei and 
win Bay of Islands, Kaipara and Hastings. 
 Targeting Hastings was a test of Social Credit’s emphasis on building 
up an electorate organisation to a winning position. Hastings had a very good 
candidate, deputy leader Dwyer, and a good branch with a strong organiser 
and growing membership. It was not a seat of traditional strength as it was 
only 78th out of 87 seats in 1972 with about half the average Social Credit 
vote. When Dwyer first contested it in 1975 he raised it to 21st with an above 
average 8.9% vote. Furthermore it was a long time marginal. This made it a 
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long shot and, in a television political broadcast the night before the 1978 
election when Beetham boldly announced that Dwyer would join him in 
parliament, his body language clearly showed that he thought so too. Dwyer 
did not win but he split the vote, taking 26%. Hastings was now 10th out of 92 
for Social Credit and Dwyer was in a strong position to win in 1981. Hastings 
and Rangitikei demonstrated that with strong candidates and organisations 
third parties could do well even under an adverse electoral system. 
 Bryant estimated that Social Credit went into the 1978 election with 
15,000 members but the $300,000 target for funds was $100,000 short and 
hampered its campaign effort. Beetham had to hold Rangitikei on its new 
boundaries that excluded former support and included much of the old 
Ruahine electorate where Social Credit was weak.140 He was also up against 
Education Minister Les Gandar, a more formidable opponent. Even factoring 
the increased by-election support into the new boundaries left him 600 votes 
worse off than in 1975.141 
Social Credit’s campaign slogan was ‘Give Us a Fair Go’, asking for a 
huge protest against the main parties to put it in parliament with several seats. 
It took the definition of protest beyond the narrow concept of a wasted vote, 
suggesting that continued support of failed main parties was the true waste 
and hoped to gain from both of them. A Heylen poll showed Social Credit at 
19.5% during the campaign. This suggested that voters normally supporting 
Labour thought of going for the League instead. Many went back to Labour to 
try to oust National but the League picked up National votes to replace 
them.142 National voters either voted Social Credit in protest or, in several 
rural seats, stayed home. Consequently Social Credit had less support in 
Labour seats and was relatively strong in National ones. It threatened to win 
several143 but could realistically take only one Labour seat, Hastings. This 
support configuration caused problems for Social Credit later. 
Nonetheless three years of organisational shake up and benefits from 
the Rangitikei by-election took it from its third lowest election result to its 
highest. Despite voter cross currents the League gained 16.1% of the vote, its 
                                                          
140 James in Penniman, p. 158. 
141 Target ’81 (1980), p. 39. See also McRobie and Roberts, Election ’78, p. 60. 
142 James in Penniman, p. 160. 
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original target, and totally eclipsed Values, which lost half its support. Social 
Credit beat it everywhere and Values maintained its vote only in a handful of 
seats.144 The League was second in eleven seats145 and better positioned to 
win more than in 1966. Social Credit had at least a quarter of the vote in 
twelve seats and could possibly win half a dozen or more of them whereas it 
only could win two at best after 1966. And Beetham held Rangitikei easily. 
Despite boundary changes and National’s Education Minister, he doubled his 
majority with nearly 53% of the vote. Compared to the by-election it was an 
anti-climax.146 In its four target seats Social Credit advanced least in the Bay 
of Islands because of a weaker and lesser known local candidate but all four 
seats were possible successes for 1981.  
Beetham and his team had successfully rebuilt the League. It was no 
longer a disreputable ‘funny money’ party and voters now considered it a 
serious alternative. All Social Credit needed was a reasonable number of 
seats in parliament but this was to prove hard to achieve. Branch 
organisations staying ineffective in many electorates were part of the reason. 
 
3.4 New Blood and the Old Guard 
 
While the main area of dispute in Social Credit can be portrayed as an 
endless battle between purists and pragmatists, this was of more concern to 
the movement’s political elites and became less of an issue as Social Credit 
was rebuilt. Undoubtedly some members would have worried about how well 
the modern League conformed to the Douglas ideal but by 1981 the problem 
in branches was not doctrinal purity but how established members coped with 
the influx of new members.  
 In 1975 the League executive authorised an Australian fund-raising 
company, Compton and Associates, to survey its members nationwide. Its 
                                                                                                                                                                      
143 Most notably Kaipara, Bay of Islands, Hauraki, Tauranga, Waitotara and Whangarei.  
144 Values came closest to beating Social Credit in Porirua where its vote held up from 1975. 
It also held up in Eden, Fendalton, Island Bay, Wellington Central, and was relatively high in 
Remuera. Ironically, Values only increased its vote (but not its percentage) in Rangitikei. 
145 Bay of Islands, Hauraki, Kaimai, Kaipara, Matamata, Taranaki, Tauranga, Waipa, 
Waitotara, Northern Maori and Western Maori. 
146 Bryant, Beetham, p. 102. Social Credit essentially had to re-fight the by-election. Its aim to 
modestly increase Beetham’s majority by 200 assumed Labour support at the by-election 
level and a small National increase. See Target ’81 (1980), p. 39.  
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report revealed that members suffered from ‘failure’ syndrome. Most had a 
small party mentality and some did not want Social Credit to become big for 
fear of losing their influence.147 Most branches resigned themselves to a 
permanently small vote percentage and only organised to find a candidate 
and wage a token campaign. Therefore most electorates came a poor third 
and second was beyond them, let alone a win. Stuart Dickson’s analysis for 
1969 using an 18% nationwide vote only gave Social Credit two wins and 
seven second placings.148 At least 90% of local electorate organisations, then, 
had no real winning prospects. 
 As Michael Sheppard experienced in Dunedin North, a newcomer 
could achieve a vital and active role at branch level very quickly, and even 
rise rapidly in the national organisation. Sheppard was offered the branch 
presidency on the way to his first meeting and was then selected as electorate 
candidate.149 After Social Credit’s initial South Island success in 1954, 
branches languished especially after 1972. With serious reorganisation only 
occurring from 1976 it was not surprising that weak South Island branches in 
1978 latched onto anyone who showed keenness and Dunedin North was 
typical.150  Sheppard also noted that 
 
folk who carried the Socred torch for so many years were…decent, 
humble and softly-spoken individuals whose very humility and 
consideration for others made them unsuitable for the rough and tumble 
of successful politics…[T]he rise in Socred's popularity has been matched 
by a progressive supplanting, and indeed forcing out, of this “Old Guard” 
by newcomers of a very different political outlook.151   
 
Tension between newcomers and the Old Guard was not due to 
ruthless replacement as Sheppard claimed. Newcomers were not defeatist 
like older members and wanted to build branches up for a possibility to win. 
Older members in some electorates had kept the organisation ticking along. 
Membership was tiny and branches active but only tokenly political. Apart 
from election year campaigns, time was spent maintaining organisational 
                                                          
147 Bryant, Beetham, p. 51. 
148 Dickson, Political Science Vol 21 No. 1, p. 39. 
149 Michael Sheppard, Social Credit Inside and Out (Dunedin: Caveman Press, 1981), pp. 12-
16. 
150 The three Dunedin city branches had only a combined membership of 150 out of 21,000 
nationwide by 1980. Target ‘81 (1980), p. 29. 
151 Sheppard, p. 17. 
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forms and fundraising with perhaps a newsletter. New members were 
welcome but not actively sought. Social Credit information was available but 
lacked a hard sell. Branches operated as political clubs whose value to 
members was primarily social.  
Between 1978 and 1981 a marked increase in interest in Social Credit 
resulted in new members across the board. The 1977 mid-term advertising 
brought in more but, apart from electorates like Hastings with several hundred 
active members by the 1978 election, many electorates had less than twenty 
and some were only semi-active. Targets were set and even the weakest 
Category 4 electorates were asked to achieve one hundred members by the 
end of 1979.152 This influx of new blood swamped old members many of 
whom could not run a professional electorate organisation and saw nothing 
wrong with amateur ways. Naturally they occupied the important positions and 
wanted to keep them for their social status. Newcomers with fresh 
organisational vision wanted to see capable people in branch positions and 
were often frustrated by the Old Guard’s refusal to change or step down. Not 
all the Old Guard were incompetent or refused to embrace positive change 
but many had seen Social Credit through the lean times and became 
aggrieved at being replaced once it gathered support. They did not 
themselves as below par and gained sympathy as their social network and 
status was disrupted. Many liked being big fish in a small pond and were 
dismayed as it grew larger and more professional. 
 
3.4.1 Illustrating the Difficulties 
 
Eden Social Credit is a good example of the processes and problems 
involved. As a Category 4 electorate, its membership nearly doubled between 
mid-1980 and mid-1981.153 Prior to that Social Credit ambled along, organised 
by the same few people over many years. Its below average electoral support 
                                                          
152 Target ‘81 (1980), p. 24. This target was revised to 150 members by August 1981 and 200 
by election day. Target ‘81 (1981), p. 13. 
153 From 79 to 154. Target ‘81 (1980), p. 27; Target ‘81 (1981), p. 16. 
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rose and fell with Social Credit’s nationwide fortunes. Having more than 
trebled its 1975 total in 1978,154 Eden then gained a new infusion of members.  
Eden selected its candidate early and this created the first tension 
between the Old Guard and new members. Branch president Arthur Drabble 
put his name forward as did newer member Alan Scott, by far the better 
candidate. Scott only won narrowly, showing that significant branch numbers 
considered loyalty to ambitious long-standing members above obvious 
political ability.155 Drabble was an excellent fundraiser156 and reasonable 
president most of the time but a liability as a candidate. Had he been chosen, 
making headway in the seat would have been severely hampered.157  
Scott took his responsibility seriously as team leader in the branch,158 
gathering around him a group committed to significant political progress that 
operated outside normal branch channels to some extent. Thus two 
overlapping processes existed, an amalgam of professional and amateur with 
Scott as the main driving force. Most official branch positions continued under 
traditional tenure but a newcomer became campaign manager and chaired 
meetings in the president’s absence.159 Scott’s dual process was a pragmatic 
attempt to keep older members happy and occupied while he by-passed them 
where necessary to get things done. The Old Guard resented it as they had 
less control over affairs while the new blood wanted older members in lesser 
positions more suited to ability and thought many of them were dead wood. 
Tensions arose over branch organisation and how political activities should be 
funded rather than doctrinal issues. Social Credit monetary ideas were widely 
                                                          
154 From its lowest 2.6% to 9.2%. 
155 It was done in 1980 and the Old Guard possibly held the selection early to enhance 
Drabble’s chances before new members became fully active and swamped his core support. 
156 Candidate’s Report to Social Credit Eden Branch AGM, Febuary 11, 1981, p. 2. Copy in 
author’s possession.  
157 As president, he took a two month holiday in the middle of election year and is likely to 
have done the same as candidate. See N.Z. Social Credit Eden Branch meeting minutes from 
March to June 1981. Copies in author’s possession. 
158 See Target ‘81 (1980), p. 24. 
159 N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch Newsletter, April 1981, p. 1. Of twelve 
executive positions, newcomers held three only because none of the Old Guard contested 
them. In an election between an old hand and newcomer for Treasurer, the old hand won but 
the newcomer was subsequently elected unopposed as branch fundraiser. Minutes of the 
N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch AGM, February 11, 1981, copy in author’s 
possession. Scott, newcomer and candidate, was automatically on the executive. One new 
and one old hand were co-opted; neither were necessary. Minutes of the N.Z. Social Credit 
Political League Eden Branch meeting, February 25, 1981, copy in author’s possession. Thus 
the fifteen member branch committee had five newcomers. 
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discussed and non-compulsory evenings on Douglas’s theories held for 
interested new members. 
Prior to Scott’s involvement the weakest points were publicity and 
membership recruitment160 and sub-committees proposed ideas to improve it. 
Most older members saw no need for the extra activity and only reluctantly 
adopted them without intending to be actively involved. Some allowed new 
ideas and were wholehearted if successful but critical if not. One idea was to 
set up a sub-branch in May 1981 to stimulate member involvement. It was the 
first time the branch had enough members for one but none of the five vice 
presidents wanted to run it.161 Without solid executive backing the sub-branch 
failed and put in permanent recess in October. Scott castigated the vice 
presidents for their lack of involvement.162 While no further sub-branches were 
set up, there was agreement between older and newer members that in 
principle they could be.163 
A new member proposed a political survey. Small membership 
numbers made it impossible to effectively canvass the electorate, so a 
letterbox poll was conducted during June 1981 offering a prize draw for voter 
response to important issues with an invitation to join Social Credit and 
donate to the campaign. Erroneously believed to be self-funding, the initiative 
gave invaluable publicity, eliciting comment in local newspapers, the New 
Zealand Herald, Auckland Star and even the National Business Review.164 
National and Labour accused Eden Social Credit of treating but this 
                                                          
160 Long time Eden Social Credit stalwart Hugh Webber had Social Credit information in his 
Balmoral shop but did not prominently display or regularly replenish it. When the author 
enquired about membership in early 1980, he had nothing to give him. Instead of providing 
people to contact, he asked him to come back. This amateurishness was offputting. Alan 
Scott later told the author that this was fairly typical of how the branch was run. 
161 Minutes of the N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch meeting, April 8, 1981, p. 
2; Candidate’s letter to Eden Valley Social Credit Sub-Branch Committee, May 18, 1981, 
copies in author’s possession; N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch Newsletter, 
May 1981, p. 1. Having five vice presidents, one as an honorary position to accommodate 
Webber, and sending four delegates to West Region meetings shows that the Old Guard still 
treated Eden Social Credit as a political club. Minutes of the N.Z. Social Credit Political 
League Eden Branch, June 10, 1981, p. 2. Copy in author’s possession. The new 1982 
executive reduced vice presidents to two and sent only one delegate to West Region 
meetings. N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch Newsletter, March 1981, p. 1.   
162 Minutes of the N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch meeting, September 9, 
1981, p. 2 and October 14, 1981, p. 2. Copies in author’s possession.  
163 Minutes of the N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch meeting, August 12, 1981, 
p. 1. Copy in author’s possession. 
164 National Business Review, August 3, 1981, p. 37. 
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outrageous reaction only generated more publicity. Voter support and 
electorate issues were identified and thirty new members gained. The Old 
Guard ignored these benefits and complained about cost, making the 
fundraising sub-committee responsible for overspending despite increased 
donations more than covering the excess and earlier accepting that the 
printing budget was a low estimate. The survey proposer personally carried 
the prize cost but thought it would have achieved more with extra time and 
publicity. He was reimbursed later that year. The last opposition came with a 
suggested refusal to pay half the printing costs outstanding. This needed the 
Chairman’s ruling to ensure payment.165 
 Stung by the political survey, the Old Guard baulked at a large 
publicity and fundraising dinner to be held at Auckland Teacher’s Training 
College. Despite earlier authorising arrangements, they criticised the 
fundraising sub-committee for doing so and called a special meeting. The 
sub-committee’s actions were upheld by one vote but a motion that the 
branch bore costs was lost by one. Both motions came from newer members 
and each group bloc voted. The deadlock broke only when an executive 
member agreed to underwrite expenses.166 The function succeeded and the 
branch profited only because the underwriter also agreed to donate proceeds. 
Old Guard caution could have lost much needed funds and publicity.  
With increased activity, the burden on executive members was greater. 
The long serving secretary complained about the extra work and became a 
bottleneck. When it was explained that this was inevitable in a growing 
branch, she responded by taking longer or ignoring tasks altogether and only 
did what she considered important.167 Complaints did not improve her 
performance nor did she resign.168  
                                                          
165 Minutes of the N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch meeting, April 8, 1981, p. 
1, June 10, 1981, p. 1, July 8, 1981, p. 2, September 9, 1981, p. 2 and October 14, 1981, p. 
2. Copies in author’s possession. 
166 Minutes of the N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch meeting, June 10, 1981 
and Branch Special Committee Meeting, June 14, 1981, pp. 1, 3. Copy in author’s 
possession. Voting differences were caused by abstentions. 
167 She refused to type the survey results and failed to produce most sub-committee and sub-
branch reports that were infrequent anyway. Branch minutes suffered from omitted discussion 
points. She coped by sometimes typing up meeting minutes in batches. Some increased 
workload came from unnecessary Old Guard calls for special meetings.  
168 Most complaints came from newer members and she felt they were unwarranted.  
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Despite these strains Eden branch continued to raise funds, attract 
members and work towards its finest election campaign effort169 but continued 
tension was obvious between the two groups. Tim Leitch drew attention to it. 
 
As a new member attracted by your promotional survey…I might be 
deterred by obvious internal divisions… Presently there appears (sic) to 
be two factions…the senior element (the old guard as it were) who have 
been giving Social Credit dedicated support for many years…[and] a 
newer, younger and very energetic element… Neither element has 
wholeheartedly accepted the other. Of the senior element…[d]oes 
this…new interest not show the success of your effort?… [C]hannel this 
new energy… It may be that this will be in…different ways than you 
visualise… To the younger element…immediate acceptance of your new 
ideas cannot be expected… Reasoned promotion…accompanied by… 
demonstration of their success will allow…the fullest co-operation of 
everyone. You will also receive…guidance from experienced hands… 
[Like] the natural analogy of family…which involves growing pains and the 
need to adapt to change…a measure of tolerance and acceptance is 
necessary for any working relationship to achieve success.170 
 
Leitch was right but he was unaware of ongoing stubborn opposition 
from many of the ‘older element’ who refused to adapt and infighting 
continued, sapping energy better spent on campaigning. Alan Scott obliquely 
criticised them in a circular letter, ‘Aussie Malcolm [Eden’s MP] was…saying 
that there is no sign of a Social Credit organisation in Eden…but he can get 
away with it because there is some truth in it.’171 Sick of criticism, Election Day 
Organiser, Martin Spratt, offered his resignation in September followed by that 
of the Treasurer when it was accepted.172  
The 1982 AGM completely changed the executive. Leitch was elected 
branch president and only two old hands survived onto the slim ten member 
                                                          
169 Alan Scott took 16.1% of the vote and Eden moved from 22nd out of 22 Auckland 
electorates to 19th and from 82nd out of 92 to 60th for Social Credit nationwide. N.Z. Social 
Credit Political League Eden Branch Newsletter, March 1982, p. 3. 
170 T.P. Leitch, Address to Eden Social Credit Branch meeting, n.d. [22 July 1981], copy in 
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171 Letter from Alan Scott to Eden Social Credit Committee members, October 14, 1981, copy 
in author’s possession. 
172 Minutes of the N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch meeting, September 9, 
1981, p. 1, and October 14, 1981, p. 1. Copies in author’s possession. Both were old hands 
but Spratt wanted change and growth. He stood in Grey Lynn for the New Democrats in 1972 
polling a paltry 63 votes. When asked about it he merely said it did not pay to be a rebel. He 
continued to work for the branch. Campaign manager, Phil Ker, nearly resigned. The branch 
would have lost a trained economist able to explain Social Credit ideas in economic terms. 
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committee.173 The former secretary was particularly upset and took it 
personally. Being secretary was a large part of her social life, and her 
rejection created resentment in the Old Guard who thought newcomers 
unfairly pushed her out. Recent members thought they had been patient for 
long enough over marginal competence and clear obstruction of branch 
progress. The Old Guard in Eden was hardly the Michael Sheppard picture of 
humility and consideration for others. 
Failing to keep new members after 1981 was not always from waning 
interest. Eden Social Credit’s excellent new secretary was subsequently lost 
through a job transfer,174 candidate Scott moved to Franklin for a teaching 
position, and there were other comings and goings175 but the branch 
remained vibrant until the 1984 election. Social Credit’s decline was 
disastrous in Eden where its vote slumped to 2.5%.176 After that Old Guard 
remnants resumed control and Arthur Drabble was selected as Democrat 
candidate in 1987. It seemed harmless enough as there was no chance of 
winning regardless of the candidate but Eden was still deemed to be marginal. 
Drabble appeared on a television election special to speak for Democrat 
policy. His abysmal performance did not win votes and he only got 1.8%.177 
Eden Social Credit’s experience in 1984 reflects the party’s later 
nationwide experience. While new members were maintained and politically 
active, the 1984 reverse meant they departed or became inactive in many 
electorates. Vote decline in most places was not as savage as Eden’s and in 
stronger electorates like Waitotara where it was relatively slight the effect was 
delayed until 1987. Success in attracting a new type of member and 
professional way of conducting branch politics destroyed the old Social Credit 
amateur political clubs but new members’ political impatience meant they 
                                                          
173 N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch Newsletter, March 1982, p. 2. Spratt was 
one and the other was a woman who occasionally volunteered to be West Region delegate. 
174 See N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch Newsletter, July 1982, p. 2. 
175 See, for example, Socreden: Eden Branch Newsletter, December 1982, p. 2 and May, 
1983, p. 2. 
176 Candidate Ken Harris stood in Otahuhu in 1978 and 1981, gaining reasonable votes. 
177 Despite only having half the time as National or Labour to answer each question (90 
seconds), he usually failed to use it all and clearly embarrassed branch members in the 
audience. It is a measure of Democrat desperation in 1990 that he became Onehunga 
candidate. He took less than half his 1987 vote (0.8%), coming bottom of the poll. Even the 
breakaway Social Credit party out polled him. 
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lacked the will to ride out electoral setbacks. Social Credit had trouble 
retaining them after 1984.  
In one sense, then, Social Credit was ruined by its own success. 
However, even had the old way of doing things persisted, Social Credit would 
not have survived. Its death may have been more prolonged but the political 
landscape had changed. Even where the Old Guard regained branch control, 
a permanent protest vote for its candidates no longer existed. There were 
other and better third party choices. Although Social Credit’s branch 
professionalism ultimately failed, and despite tension created between the Old 
Guard and new blood, its attempt was the only option.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Social Credit’s nature as a visionary philosophy enabled it to adapt to 
changing political circumstances. When it failed as a popular movement and 
then as a pressure group, it needed to contest elections as a party or fade 
away. The League was fortunate to be able to learn its political lessons slowly 
as the electoral system gave it enough continued votes to go through the 
process of transforming itself from an amateur party to a fully professional 
one. This had to percolate from the top down to electorate branch 
organisations which could no longer be run as amateur ‘political clubs’ for 
members as there was no longer a guaranteed supply of voters to sustain 
them. After 1978, when Social Credit seemed poised to make long awaited 
progress, resistance to change from older members was the final block to 
complete professionalisation but operating as a professional organisation at 
every level was the only chance for a breakthrough.  
 The next chapter discusses the centrality of Beetham’s leadership to 
Social Credit success and the one after that looks at its breakthrough attempt.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Bruce Beetham  
 
Bruce Beetham was crucial to Social Credit’s revival. This chapter covers his 
involvement with Social Credit from the time he first joined to his last political 
days. It charts his leadership years in Social Credit’s reascendency, his time 
in parliament, his leadership during party decline, and what happened after he 
was replaced. It also examines his beliefs, motivation and drive, including the 
vexed question of whether he really accepted Social Credit philosophy. 
 
4.1 Early Involvement 
  
Bruce Beetham was clearly Social Credit’s most successful leader. He led the 
League until it became a party in 1982 but was leader of its successor the 
Democrats for less than a year when Neil Morrison replaced him. In all he was 
leader for fourteen years, far longer than anyone else.1 He took over at Social 
Credit’s lowest point, turned it into a professional party and led it to the 
highest support for any third party since 1935.  
 In Beetham, Social Credit finally found the leader they needed. He was 
solid and respectable like Vern Cracknell but also had charisma and political 
ability like John O’Brien without the instability, although there were complaints 
that he was equally as autocratic at times.2 A frequent question throughout his 
career asked what he was doing in Social Credit at all.3 Beetham’s personal 
popularity far outstripped the League’s until 1978. It only waned after that and 
his Rangitikei vote was always well above Social Credit’s average. Like 
Cracknell before him, National claimed that Beetham could have become a 
Cabinet minister if he had joined them.4 
So why did he join the League and persist with it? Beetham told the 
story many times.5 Initially Beetham claimed not to be very interested in 
                                                          
1 Vern Cracknell was leader for six years from 1963 to 1969 and Wilfred Owen for five years 
from 1953 to 1958. 
2 N.Z. Listener, April 25, 1981, p. 36; Bryant, Beetham, p. 37; Miller, pp. 431, 432. 
3 See, for example, Zavos, p. 144 and Bryant, Beetham, p. 49. 
4 Zavos, p. 144. 
5 Bryant, Beetham, pp. 13-34: Zavros, pp. 135-151; Miller, 280-287.  
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politics. Because he grew up in a Labour household, he voted Labour twice 
but also voted National and described himself as a swinging voter.6 He lived 
in Hamilton and worked as a history lecturer at Hamilton Teachers College. 
This was a comfortable but increasingly unchallenging life and, despite his 
theoretical background in politics, he was not a member of a political party let 
alone one like Social Credit.7 Prior to the 1969 elections a group of students 
wanted an unbiased article on Social Credit for the student newspaper. 
Beetham helped research it and became interested in League ideas. The 
turning point for him came in a heated discussion with two university 
economics lecturers. He took the Social Credit point of view and, after three 
weeks of debate, argued himself into Social Credit. This whetted his political 
appetite but he thoroughly researched the League’s beliefs, policies and 
prospects before joining shortly before the election but, from the questions he 
asked at election meetings, it seemed he was already convinced.8 
 Beetham’s rise in Social Credit was meteoric. Little more than two and 
a half years after joining he was leader, a year faster than Cracknell. Their 
paths were similar in that they impressed the organisation with their abilities. 
Beetham was prized for his analysis and suggestions for organisational 
change. While Cracknell was an able man, the League needed to be more 
politically aggressive. Therefore Beetham cautiously supported O’Brien as 
leader although well aware that he was too individualistic and volatile.9 
 He was active in the Waikato Region and went to the 1970 Conference 
as a delegate. Later that year he convened the Research Committee and 
made extensive submissions to the Technical Committee. Reluctantly he 
allowed his name to go forward as one of four League vice presidents in 1971 
and was elected. But Social Credit was falling apart around him. Rejecting the 
idea of a new party, as he wanted one that was monetarily reformist, Beetham 
chose to work from within and this helped him.10 Without the strains the 
League was under, he was unlikely to have become president then leader so 
early as he was the only one left with strong recognised ability who wanted 
                                                          
6 Zavos, p. 140; Bryant, Beetham, p. 19. He may have told it this way to place himself in the 
centre. 
7 Zavos, pp. 142, 143. 
8 Bryant, Beetham, pp. 19, 20. 
9 Beetham, ‘Room at the Top’, pp. 6, 11. 
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the positions. If O’Brien had not self destructed there would have been no 
opportunity until at least 1973 and only if the League had performed badly in 
the 1972 election. Social Credit’s performance was not critical for Beetham. 
As long as he clawed back enough support for Social Credit to survive and 
have something to build on, his position was secure. 
 Beetham’s political career was something of an enigma. Once the 
tinderbox of political interest ignited, he threw himself wholeheartedly into it. 
Social Credit thrived under his leadership even though it took four more years 
to begin proper professionalisation and forging the League into a major party 
ultimately failed. Yet Beetham claimed that he was not politically ambitious. If 
he were, he said, he would have joined a main party and, once elected Mayor 
of Hamilton, would not have given it up for the uncertainty of a parliamentary 
seat. With Social Credit on 30% in opinion polls at the beginning of 1981, 
Beetham becoming Prime Minister seemed on the political horizon but he still 
did not see himself in the role. Instead he regarded himself as the League’s 
John the Baptist, paving the way for the one to come.11 
 Beetham broadly believed in Social Credit principles. He thought they 
were flexible enough to cope with changed political circumstances and could 
be clothed in modern political policies. Douglas’s empirical economic 
descriptions could be updated for modern economic conditions. Keynesian 
economics radically altered economic approaches in western capitalist 
democracies so the landscape was quite different to that prior to the 
Depression. Keynes took economics part of the way but some of Douglas’s 
analysis still remained valid and needed translating into modern economic 
policy to complete the journey. Part of Beetham’s task as he saw it was for the 
League to do this. He also wanted to make Social Credit into a well-organised 
dynamic political group capable of attracting committed new members and an 
increasing share of voter support.12 
 Both tasks were feasible and irresistibly appealed to his motivation and 
drive. It was not the normal and safe route to satisfy political ambition but 
working his way through the ranks of a major party or in local politics did not 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 Bryant, Beetham, pp. 25, 27, 29, 30. 
11 Zavos, pp. 144, 145; Bryant, Beetham, p. 80; N.Z. Listener, April 25, 1981, p. 34. 
12 Some of these themes are outlined in his thesis, ‘Room at the Top.’ 
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provide the sufficient challenge that Social Credit did and to take it on he had 
to believe in it. In that sense, then, Beetham was not politically ambitious and 
meant what he said. However, attempting to revive a seemingly moribund 
political group shows political ambition of the first order. He was undoubtedly 
proud of the way he turned Social Credit around and often pointed to taking 
the League from 1% in the polls to 30% as a measure of his success.13 His 
team gave him invaluable support and he never claimed to have done it on his 
own. Nonetheless under his leadership political goals of membership, 
fundraising and building an effective party organisation had largely been met 
so that by 1981 Social Credit could lay claim to possessing the most effective 
political machine in the country.14  
 Beetham was dynamic, youthful and telegenic, an asset to any party. 
He set goals for the party and raised them as soon as he thought they could 
be exceeded. The pressure on him was enormous. He had to lead a party 
without the normal resources available to main parties, to work towards his 
own election, keep the League in the public eye without a parliamentary 
platform and ensure that updated Social Credit became a coherent policy 
platform attractive to voters. Once in parliament he alone carried the 
aspirations of over a quarter of a million voters in an arena largely hostile to 
the views he represented and a system not geared to cope with third parties, 
all with one researcher and secretary. He had electorate duties to perform 
and, as a political drawcard, was in demand for interviews and for speaking. 
This escalated after East Coast Bays where every Social Credit branch 
wanted him to speak to help boost their chances in the 1981 election. For 
much of the time from the end of 1980 to the election he was a more popular 
choice for Prime Minister than the Labour leader. His opinion was sought on a 
range of topics, much of it defending Social Credit views from sceptical 
questioning. A lesser man would have crumbled under such a burden or given 
it away. Beetham thrived on it and added to his already numerous 
responsibilities by running for the Hamilton mayoralty in 1976 because he was 
                                                          
13 See for example NZ Listener, April 25, 1981, p. 37; Star Weekender, December 20, 1980, 
p. 5. The tale grew in the telling. When Beetham became leader Social Credit’s poll rating 
was 3% between May and September 1972. Beetham noted after the election that the 
League gained 7% instead of the 2-3% support indicated by polls. Edwards, Right Out, pp. 
74, 190. In 1980 and thereafter it was 1%. 
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determined to gain political experience through the opportunities presented to 
him. Even so, with the burdens of political life and a crumbling marriage, he 
almost had a nervous breakdown in 197815 and had a heart attack in 
December 198216 that was kept quiet by League officials. 
 
4.2 Beetham’s Character and Beliefs 
 
The last assault on his political reputation both within the League and outside 
was that he did not really believe in Social Credit at all but used it as a 
pragmatic vehicle for political power. This view presented Social Credit ideas 
as nonsense and implied that Beetham recognised them as such. How else 
could it be explained that a sensible and capable man was wedded to such a 
movement? By 1981 his main complaint was that despite his many utterances 
he was still not taken seriously. In an interview he said: 
 
And do you think that all the accumulated statements over nine years, that 
all the speeches I’ve made, the thousands upon thousands of words that 
I’ve uttered, the thousands of words that have been printed, that all of it is 
dreams and visions? Nothing concrete?…[P]oliticians shouldn’t have 
visions…have ideals? Therefore politicians should be pragmatic seekers 
after power? They should just fiddle with the system in an effort to make it 
better?…A lot of people think I’m a realist and I think I’m a realist…a 
mixture of an idealist and a pragmatic and practical politician.17 
 
This summed up his position: a pragmatic idealist. From this he believed a 
consensus position could be built up on contentious issues such as his 
compromise position on the Springbok tour by allowing the team to come but 
not holding test matches if it was not chosen solely on ability.18 This led to the 
charge that he was vague, trying to be all things to all people to win their 
votes19 because he insisted on occupying a reasoned middle position and 
following the old Social Credit idea of determining what voters wanted and 
governing to give it to them. Beetham was socially conservative on moral 
issues and he later publicly opposed his own party’s policy on liberalising 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 Miller, p. 357. 
15 Bryant, Beetham, p. 107. 
16 Miller, p. 391. 
17 NZ Listener, April 25, 1981, pp. 35-37. 
18 Bryant, Beetham, p. 40. 
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abortion and homosexuality.20 If he were simply a power seeker then the 
pragmatic approach would have been to keep silent on these matters. 
  There were similarities between Beetham and Prime Minister Rob 
Muldoon. Both were intelligent, and driven with little interest outside politics. 
While Beetham was not aggressive or divisive, neither he nor Muldoon 
suffered fools gladly and both could be mistakenly described as transactional 
leaders rather than moral ones but for different reasons. A moral leader is one 
seeking to inspire change by appealing to unselfish values and redefines 
aspirations and needs in a way that provokes action, thus taking a long-term 
view of change. A transactional leader manages the status quo and bargains 
for votes by appealing to short-term needs and wants with strategies to match. 
Immediate goals are more important than a long-term vision and votes are 
sought to gain and hold power. Transactional leaders are political mangers 
and manipulate public opinion.21  
Beetham could fit into either definition depending on which side of his 
character was focussed on. If it was the idealist then Beetham was a moral 
leader taking a long view and wanting to see Social Credit ideas become 
reality.22 This readily explains his insistence on not wanting power for its own 
sake and apparent willingness to pass the leadership on once his usefulness 
was up; not the talk of a transactional leader. If the focus was on his 
pragmatism he seemed to have a transactional style but this assumes that he 
was there to use Social Credit for his own power ends and turned it into 
something completely different. Restructuring the League was done to make 
Social Credit ideas relevant to modern voters and for an effective organisation. 
This looks transactional but was simply a practical means to the visionary end. 
Beetham led this change extremely well but to make it transactional means 
that his protestations about not desiring power for its own sake were 
hypocritical and cynically self-serving.23 However, his point that if he really 
                                                                                                                                                                      
19 See Tom Scott’s humorous take on it. Tom Scott, Ten Years Inside (Christchurch: 
Whitcoulls Publishers, 1985), pp. 88, 89.  
20 Bryant, Beetham, p. 99. See also the New Zealand Herald, July 4, 1984, section 1, p. 3. 
21 Barry Gustafson, His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 2000), p. 4. These definitions are based on the work of James McGregor Burns. 
22 Spiro Zavos takes this view in his book on Social Credit, Crusade. 
23 Miller’s thesis takes this view but he had to explain Beetham’s later stance against diluting 
Social Credit as a reversion to a traditionalist position. As a moral leader his position is 
entirely consistent. 
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wanted political power for its own sake he would have joined a major party or 
remained mayor of Hamilton demolished this idea. He had a Social Credit 
vision far greater than just tinkering with the system and a medium to long-
term plan to achieve it. This gave him a moral leadership style. 
 Dianne Davis analysed Beetham’s political operational code and 
identified 28 core beliefs. Social Credit concepts were embedded in many of 
them although some were based on the difficulty of third party existence and 
progress under FPP.24 Hence politics was a lonely existence and he had to 
find support wherever he could. This included conciliation and cooperation 
with political opponents. He was a political optimist tempered with realism. 
Political risk could be reduced through adequate preparation but Beetham 
overdid this risk averse approach. Party leaders had to be good at strategy 
and tactics but his long deliberations failed to capitalise on immediate 
situations because his timing arose from careful planning more than instinct. 
These beliefs were clearly reflected in effective Social Credit organisation. 
Whether he brought the beliefs to the organisation or derived them from it is 
less clear but it was part of his nature to be deliberative rather than 
spontaneous, and conciliation and cooperation were hallmarks of his 
parliamentary approach.  
The impact of Social Credit is seen in his belief that a new humanitarian 
society was needed to replace socialism and economic control by a financial 
elite. The party system had produced executive rule and a toothless 
parliament, which tapped into the old Social Credit distrust of party. Financial 
reform was essential to successful politics and New Zealand’s internal 
structures needed altering to divert money into production rather than 
speculation, a prescient statement in the light of the 1987 sharemarket crash. 
From this came bilateral trade agreements based on a type of barter with 
countries unable to trade by conventional means. Beetham’s most direct 
acknowledgment of Social Credit was the reiteration that what was physically 
possible and socially and environmentally desirable, ought to be financially 
feasible and money should be only a mechanism. Beetham’s sole change was 
adding an environmentally friendly aspect. 
                                                          
24 Dianne R. Davis, ‘The “Operational Code” of Bruce Craig Beetham’, Political Science Vol. 
32 No. 1 (1980), pp. 1-17. This section is based on her findings. 
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While his belief in humanitarianism originated with his parent’s 
acceptance of Savage’s first Labour government, Beetham linked it to Social 
Credit monetary reform as Labour had abandoned that when it was now most 
needed. Beetham accepted the non-political basis of Social Credit philosophy 
by implying that had Labour retained it there would be no need for his efforts. 
He further emphasised this in stating that if the other parties adopted practical 
Social Credit policies he would depart from politics. The context was that 
politicians implemented ideas, not just wielded power and political leadership 
inspired and united the people in common goals. This was a moral leadership 
stance and long standing Social Credit idea. Beetham believed that a single 
person’s ability to profoundly influence history was overrated. Aware of his 
own abilities and image, he regarded them as a League asset and not for his 
own personal advantage.  
John Henderson analysed the leadership of Muldoon and Rowling on 
active-passive, positive-negative scales and it is a shame he did not include 
Beetham for contrast.25 While some of Beetham’s statements can be 
construed as the passive-negative attribute of the reluctant politician, he was 
only initially reluctant. His non-aggressive consensus style suggests a 
passive-positive orientation but he was also an achiever who made rational 
and altruistic decisions not based on personal need. He knew exactly what he 
wanted to do and this made him more an active-positive leader.26 Although 
Beetham was realist enough to accept that he might not achieve his aims, 
setbacks did not deter him and he never stopped trying. 
 Beetham did not assume he was destined for high office in the League, 
happy to serve in any useful capacity. He never lobbied for leadership. Even 
when it was likely that he would become leader he deferred to Les Hunter and 
to his electorate committee. Only when Hunter did not want it and after 
seeking committee agreement did he let his name go forward. He also did not 
assume he was candidate material. The Rangitikei committee headhunted him 
and it took twelve months to persuade him, as he thought the electorate was 
                                                          
25 It was another example of how third parties were ignored even in academic studies.  
26 Gustafson, His Way, p. 11. See also John Henderson, ‘Muldoon and Rowling: A 
Preliminary Analysis of Contrasting Personalities’, Political Science Vol. 32 No. 1 (1980), pp. 
26-46. 
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too far from Hamilton. In turn they wondered if leading Social Credit would 
hamper him being an effective electorate MP.27  
Tension between the two roles may have later contributed to his defeat 
but his reluctance to be a candidate prevented him building an electoral base 
where he was better known. A Hamilton seat or a nearby rural choice of 
Waikato, Piako or Coromandel might have given Beetham a better personal 
following with a winning cushion in a close fight. Initially his fame as leader 
helped him in Rangitikei along with a run of extraordinary political luck. 
Boundary changes gave him a relatively weak opponent in Sir Roy Jack and 
he was ready to take advantage of the by-election brought about by Jack’s 
death. National helped by putting up a temporary and, therefore, continued 
weak opponent. Once Beetham became their MP Rangitikei voters were only 
too happy to keep him and in retrospect the 1978 election outcome was a 
foregone conclusion. 
 
4.3 Beetham in Parliament 
 
Beetham’s good fortune continued after he entered parliament. His election as 
underdog against the main party giants brought welcome publicity for Social 
Credit and an opportunity to capitalise on it. Far more at ease in parliament 
than Cracknell, Beetham was determined to make an impact. He faced the 
same isolation but drew on Cracknell’s experience. Standing Orders presumed 
a two-party system and, like Cracknell, Beetham had to rely on someone from 
the main parties to second any motion he put forward and even if successful 
could be subsequently ignored. Party whips granted leave to speak, arranged 
speaking order in debates and approved bill introduction, questions and 
notices of motion. These procedures developed at a time of third party 
absence from the House. Beetham’s presence was awkward, creating 
procedural difficulties when speakers were called. He did not suffer the 
indignity of having his maiden speech deferred, as Cracknell’s was, but 
members continually castigated him for reading his speeches. Beetham 
wanted to be on the Standing Orders Committee to make changes and his 
                                                          
27 Bryant, Beetham, pp. 33, 34. 
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exclusion made him call parliament a ‘cosy two-party club’.28 However, he was 
not isolated for long. Soon after the 1978 Session began, Island Bay’s MP J.G. 
O’Brien joined him. O’Brien resigned from Labour after being deselected for 
his seat and, when National MP Gavin Downie was similarly dumped as 
Pakuranga candidate later that year, there were three of them.29 This made 
parliamentary life more tolerable. Beetham was better off than Cracknell too in 
not having to share an office or a secretary but his status as a third party 
leader went unrecognised and he had to fight for a front row bench.30  
Although parliamentary procedure hampered him, Beetham did not feel 
muzzled and after some adjustment he was accommodated. The main issue 
was that he was not part of government or Opposition so neither wanted to 
give way for him. A motion to make him an additional member of Select 
Committees lapsed but the government forced through a motion so that he 
replaced an Opposition member on the Statutes Revision Committee. 
Beetham circumvented reliance on Labour for speaking rights by persistently 
insisting that he be recognised directly by the speaker. His record for the 1978 
Session was 26 notices of motion, 30 questions to Ministers (plus 15 
supplementary ones), 25 speeches and five Private Members’ Bills. One was 
pure Social Credit in seeking to vest money creation with the Crown including 
a New Zealand Balance Sheet to equate the money supply with total goods 
and services. It also included providing trading credits for exchange with 
willing trading partners. Another Bill sought third party representation on the 
Representation Commission for all parties gaining more than 5% of the vote.31 
None of his Bills made headway but he was far more effective in the House 
than Cracknell. 
O’Brien and Downie contested the 1978 election as Independents but 
failed to retain their seats and Beetham was again alone in the House until 
Matt Rata resigned from Labour during the 1979 Session. With his backing 
Beetham moved that an MP be allowed to make motions without a seconder. 
                                                          
28 John E. Martin, The House: New Zealand’s House of Representatives, 1854-2004 
(Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2004), pp. 221, 264, 284, 286; Bryant, Beetham, pp. 110, 
111. 
29 Martin, p. 285; Bryant, Beetham, p. 111. 
30 Bryant, Beetham, pp. 112, 149. Muldoon wanted Beetham treated as an ordinary 
Opposition backbencher and not a party leader but partially relented later. Gustafson, His 
Way, p. 257. 
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In the division the main parties combined to defeat it.32 Beetham was alone 
again after Rata was defeated in his by-election bid in June 1980 but only until 
September when Garry Knapp joined him as Social Credit’s second MP. 
Procedural life then became much easier and Beetham no longer carried the 
Social Credit burden on his own, either in the House or privately, as he 
remarried in December 1980. However, the toll it took was noticeable. 
  
In the 1975 campaign…he was a bouncing, blond-haired history lecturer-
cum-politician. But six more years of one-man-banding has greyed the 
hair, and put…bags under once sparkling blue eyes.33 
 
 
4.4 Balance of Responsibility and the Clyde Dam 
 
He was keen to see a number of Social Credit MPs in the House. They would 
hold the ‘balance of responsibility’ if neither main party won outright and use it 
to restore decision making to parliament by voting on issues according to 
merit. Beetham preferred that term to ‘balance of power’, as it was a 
responsible use of voter trust and not a blatant grab for power.34 Social Credit 
was not forming a coalition with either main party and its MPs would abstain in 
confidence votes.35 He took Rob Muldoon to task for threatening another 
election after three months if Social Credit held the balance by saying that 
National did not have the constitutional right to do so and this showed abuse 
of power instead of democratic responsibility.36 The 1981 result frustrated 
Beetham’s hope and a larger team might have brought a better balance in the 
debate over the Clyde dam proposal. 
Beetham’s justification in switching from being against Clyde to 
supporting it was that the government would get the dam anyway one way or 
another. Social Credit’s agreement gave extra benefits for the people of Otago 
                                                                                                                                                                      
31 Bryant, Beetham, pp. 115-117, 120, 121. 
32 Bryant, Beetham, p. 150.  
33 New Zealand Times, November 8, 1981, p. 6 
34 New Zealand Times, November 8, 1981, p. 6; Bruce Beetham, ‘A New Society’, in George 
Bryant (ed.), A New Society: What the Socreds Want (Palmerston North: Orion Publishing, 
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Credit Political League, The Little Green Socred Book (Palmerston North: Orion Publishing, 
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35 Social Credit Guardian, April 1982, p. 3. 
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and protection of employment affecting 600 families. Consideration for people 
took precedence over preserving the law and he was prepared to put 
confidence in his leadership on the line over his decision.37 Fortunately for 
Beetham nobody challenged him and the Clyde decision was an 
uncharacteristic political blunder. He tried to partially retrieve it by attempting a 
strong Social Credit challenge in Otago in 1984, including spending time in the 
South Island as part of the election campaign.38 While the party gained a 
comparatively respectable vote there it was not a seat winner and Beetham 
should have used his time elsewhere. 
The League debated a name change at the same time as the Clyde 
controversy. Beetham wanted one well before he became leader because of 
negative associations the Social Credit name had to voters. Now that it was 
respectable the need was less and, although he outlined reasons for change 
and suggested possible alternatives, mainly to stop Labour using them, it was 
a lukewarm push. The strongest point he made was dropping the ‘League’ part 
because of implied association with the anti-Semitic League of Rights.39 When 
the issue came up again in 1985 Beetham was strongly in favour of the 
Democrat name provided that Social Credit principles and monetary reform 
were preserved through creating a Social Credit Institute. He regretted not 
making the change in 1982.40 Party president Lipa opposed change as it 
removed a unique point of difference from other parties41 and Beetham later 
agreed with him. 
Social Credit stipulated that MPs agree only on monetary policy and 
were theoretically free on how they voted on anything else. Beetham and 
Knapp differed on many issues especially moral ones but also on political 
reform.42  Beetham, for example, was anti-abortion but Knapp held a more 
                                                                                                                                                                      
36 Social Credit Guardian, April 1981, pp. 1, 3. 
37 Social Credit Guardian, August 1982, pp. 4, 6-8, 11. 
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liberal view.43 Despite this they worked well together in parliament and voted 
as a unit.44 After 1981 National only had a majority of one over Labour and 
Social Credit combined and Beetham attacked the practice of pairing where 
government members were ‘paired’ with Labour members who abstained from 
voting in divisions in their absence. He saw it as an artificial means of 
preserving National’s single party government and continuing executive 
control. Labour was passing up an opportunity to return decision making to 
parliament. His attack was seen as misguided.45  
Beetham and Knapp initially abstained on questions of confidence but 
after National duped them on the Clyde decision they actively voted against 
the government. With several National MPs willing to cross the floor on various 
issues parliament gained the potential to make some decisions despite 
pairing. This was enhanced when two Labour MPs, John Kirk and Brian 
MacDonell, went Independent in 1983. They formed an alliance with Beetham 
and Knapp and were called the ‘Gang of Four’. However, Kirk and MacDonell 
supported National in votes of confidence. On other issues the government 
was sometimes defeated and sometimes saved.46 The ‘Gang of Four’ ended 
when only Knapp remained undefeated in 1984. 
 
4.5 Last Days 
 
After the 1984 snap election, although Beetham had been leader for 12 years, 
he was held in such high regard that the party still wanted him as leader 
despite losing Rangitikei. In theory not having an electorate should have made 
his job easier but the loss of a parliamentary platform was a blow. Changing 
the party name to Democrat did not rescue it from electoral doldrums and 
                                                          
43 Their opposing views happily corresponded with electorate views. Frank Gill’s 
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Beetham was asked to step down. This was Social Credit’s old tactic of 
blaming its leader for its woes. Beetham was indirectly accused of damaging 
the party by opposing a move to a catch-all party in 1982 although this was 
hardly a unilateral decision on his part. 
Beetham conformed to history by refusing to step down. This seemed 
like clinging to power for power’s sake but when Beetham looked around with 
his John the Baptist eyes he saw no suitable Messiah to replace him. Jeremy 
Dwyer had long gone and Beetham thought that Knapp had scant regard for 
Social Credit philosophy and monetary ideas. Knapp’s behaviour in 
threatening to resign his seat if the party did not change to suit him or if 
Beetham did not go demonstrated unwillingness to patiently work in the party 
for long-term change. No one else of suitable mana existed although it was 
clear that the Democrats were considering Neil Morrison. However, Beetham’s 
squabble over the leadership cost him credibility.47  
His magic had deserted him. He no longer appealed to the electorate 
as in his heyday and it was no longer a matter of persisting and rebuilding 
under his leadership as his failed attempt to launch a renewed Social Credit 
party in 1990 showed. Beetham had been leader for fourteen years, outlasting 
three National leaders and two Labour ones.48 The Democrats still respected 
him by not putting up candidates against him or his wife Beverley even though 
he did not seek electoral accommodation with them. Unlike Cracknell, 
Beetham did allow the leadership contest to go to a vote. After his defeat he 
stayed with the party and attempted to win back Rangitikei. Morrison paid him 
tribute just before the 1987 election and Beetham said he had no intention of 
quitting49 but eventually followed the O’Brien route in forming his own 
breakaway party with as little success. 
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It was a sad end to a remarkable career. Beetham’s drive and 
singlemindedness took Social Credit from an electoral dog pound to effective 
political machine. Without him it would have descended back to an amateur 
political club destined to slowly wither. He could not quite give Social Credit 
the push needed for enduring parliamentary success but he did ensure that it 
and he had a place in New Zealand political history and he helped transform 
the face of third party politics. A reporter described his main quality. ‘There’s 
that feel of slight fanaticism about him which is really only dedication taken to 
the degree that most of us wouldn’t countenance in our own lives.’ His ex-wife 
Raewyn said, ‘He’s an unusual man. He really is. There are very few men who 
are totally dedicated. He always has been.’ The reporter captured Beetham’s 
own words: 
I also have a vision of what is possible in the country,…a conviction about 
the way it can be achieved, and a burning desire…to make a significant 
contribution towards the achievement of that objective. I would like, when 
I’ve had my three score years and ten, to look back and say: “I helped 
achieve some major or significant reform in the history of New Zealand or, 
at the very least, I tried; I gave it everything I had.” 50 
 
Beetham’s last political act shortly before he died was entirely in this vein, a 
final but unsuccessful attempt to win back Rangitikei as an Independent in the 
1996 election. 
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 76
 77
Chapter Five 
 
Trying for a Breakthrough  
 
This chapter examines the years from 1978 to 1981, the most successful for 
Social Credit, in three parts. The first covers the League’s efforts to capitalise 
on its 1978 success. It charts Social Credit’s by-election efforts and further 
organisational refinements. An analysis is also made of attacks on Social 
Credit monetary ideas in New Zealand and Canada and the myths that grew 
up around them. The second outlines internal Social Credit choices that made 
success harder to achieve. The final section examines the structure of Social 
Credit support leading up to the 1981 election and analyses the outcome to 
see why the expected breakthrough did not occur.  
 
5.1 Working Towards the 1981 Election 
 
5.1.1 Targets and By-elections 
 
After the 1978 election Social Credit built on its successful formula. The 
Beetham-Dwyer Foundation was set up to raise a million dollars for the 1981 
election and had 60% of it by August 1980.1 Jeremy Dwyer became full time 
League organiser in 1979 after Hastings branch organiser Chris Gedge turned 
it down. Stefan Lipa became its first full time president later that year. Target 
’81, a campaign strategy book published in 1979, designated target seats 
arranged in four categories, promoted networking through regional groups 
and building up weak branches while further growing strong ones. It outlined 
fundraising methods, Beetham-Dwyer financial targets, regional levies and 
local efforts. This built on the Target ’78 programme and was revised in 1980 
and 1981 incorporating updated membership, funds and targets. A thousand 
members per electorate were considered necessary to win and fewer made it 
doubtful.2 The League now set its sights on 26% of the vote and projected 
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percentages were given for each electorate.3 Reports on by-elections were 
run highlighting success and glossing over failure. The last edition reported 
comprehensively on the East Coast Bays by-election with similar emphasis.4 
  Social Credit’s first test was the Christchurch Central by-election. Until 
Rangitikei, it had performed indifferently in by-elections without contesting 
them all. Social Credit decided to displace National the same way it displaced 
Labour in National seats and this required a strong candidate. Terry Heffernan 
had performed well in Sydenham and replaced the League’s 1978 
Christchurch Central candidate who was pressured to stand aside. Deputy 
leader Dwyer oversaw the campaign and a team of 100 canvassed a third of 
the electorate, uncovering 1,000 Social Credit voters. Social Credit courted 
protest votes and tapped into South Island interests. This effort pushed 
National into third place.5  
Geoff Skene, who examined this by-election, observed that Social 
Credit gained working class voters and National ones switched to Social 
Credit instead of Labour. However, turnout of only 38% indicated a huge non-
vote rather than a groundswell to Social Credit. He concluded that the League 
had learned to contest by-elections more effectively and that major party 
attachments were weak as the main parties only ran a token campaign. If they 
failed to actively retain voter loyalty, however, Social Credit could do better. 
He noted that Social Credit was unlikely to replicate this at a general election 
as it pooled resources from ten electorates and good candidates like 
Heffernan were hard to come by.6 However, electorates within regions pooled 
their resources in the 1981 election for publicity and other common activities, 
thus partly replicating the effect. 
There was no steady rise for Social Credit after the 1978 election. The 
New Zealand Herald NRB poll showed an initial increase to 22% but this 
drifted down to 19%. After the Christchurch Central by-election there was a 
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6 Skene, Political Science Vol. 32 No. 2 , pp. 140, 141. 
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recovery to 21% but by mid-1980 it was back to 19%.7 The Heylen poll 
showed a similar pattern8 and it was like that after 1975. Social Credit planned 
another mid-term publicity campaign to attract new members. Although official 
membership stood at 21,000 by August 1980, Lipa admitted at Conference 
that 12,000 was the true figure, 3,000 down on the previous election.9 A new 
drive was needed. 
National helped at this point by appointing Minister Frank Gill 
ambassador to Washington, creating a by-election in East Coast Bays. Gill 
was unpopular and one of several National MPs opposed by National 
Alternative candidates in 1978.10 With a strong showing by Social Credit’s 
personable candidate, Garry Knapp, Gill won with only a third of the vote.11 
This electorate was thirteenth on Social Credit’s priority list but ripe for a win if 
it could take most of the National Alternative vote and some of Labour’s.12 
Knapp’s campaign committee wanted him in at least such a strong second 
place that he could win in 1981. There were similarities to Rangitikei. Top 
organiser Henry Raynel moved near East Coast Bays after that by-election for 
family reasons and was already working on a winning organisation by 1981. 
The electorate was split into five zones with fundraising and membership 
drives in each sub-branch. Again Social Credit was more ready than the other 
parties and brought in organisers from around the country.13 
The organising committee was Raynel, local Ray Wilkins, and Trevor 
Barnard seconded from Eden. Other organisers came from Hastings, Kaipara, 
Hauraki, Rangitikei, Wellington, and the South Island. They developed a two-
pronged approach: visibility and canvassing, saturating the electorate with 
billboards, flyers, meetings, car parades and flags to show that the League 
was everywhere. Knapp towed around a broken down car with ‘NZ the way 
                                                          
7 See, for example, the January NRB poll published in the New Zealand Herald, February 16, 
1981, section 1, p.1. See also the Appendix. 
8 League support was around 18% throughout 1979, rose to 23% after the by-election, then 
was 16-20% in the first half of 1980. Figures from the October 1980 Heylen poll. 
9 Target ’81 (1980), p. 29; Miller, pp. 353, 354. 
10 East Coast Bays polled highest for them at 16.6%. 
11 Knapp won 20% and Gill took 5,000 less than his 1975 vote. 
12 Target ’81 (1980), p. 34. Gilbert James, Social Credit’s Onehunga president pointed out to 
his boss, who lived in the electorate and had voted National Alternative, that the two votes 
together would have been enough to defeat Gill in 1978. Conversation with author, August 
1980. 
13 National Business Review, August 3, 1981, p. 40. 
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you’ve got it’ printed on the side to represent the economy under National. 
East Coast Bays was completely canvassed to identify firm Social Credit 
voters. Possibles and probables were worked on a second time. Their effort 
culminated in 500 election day workers including 170 telephonists, 200 cars 
for transport and 80 scrutineers.14 
Social Credit realised it was onto something big when Knapp gathered 
a crowd of over 900 at his campaign opening on August 415 but National and 
the media ignored it. Labour failed to discredit the League with a pamphlet 
outlining Major Douglas’s later anti-Semitic views.16 National expected free 
market candidate Don Brash to bring back disaffected supporters yet Prime 
Minister Rob Muldoon announced a 25% increase in harbour bridge tolls five 
days before the by-election that swayed further National voters to switch. The 
National Alternative vote did not return and Social Credit also gained a third of 
Labour’s 1978 vote.17 Social Credit’s planned strong second became a win 
and another MP in the House. Knapp introduced a Private Member’s Bill to 
abolish the tolls five weeks after he was elected to underscore the discontent. 
It was not passed as the government voted against it.18 
National blamed Muldoon’s abrasive style. The defeat caused 
simmering discontent in the party to boil over, leading to an attempt to oust 
Muldoon in October. The Prime Minister defused it and it failed because 
deputy leader Talboys was not ambitious for the top job.19 This very public 
disarray had little effect on National’s support. The Heylen poll taken a month 
after the by-election recorded a 10% jump for Social Credit but Labour 
support plummeted instead. The November NRB poll put the League on 31% 
                                                          
14 Target ’81 (1981), pp. 8-10. Raymond Miller identified 430 workers including 120 on phones 
and 200 transporters compared to National’s 80. Miller, p. 357. 
15 Target ’81 (1981), p. 7. Social Credit claimed it was a record for a New Zealand by-election. 
16 Miller, p. 360. 
17 National Business Review, August 3, 1981, p. 40. Radio coverage reported booth results in 
candidate alphabetical order, which just happened to be National, Labour then Social Credit. 
When the first six booth total was announced, it seemed that Social Credit had come third 
until the figure was heard. 
18 Social Credit Guardian, November 1980, p. 12. 
19 Stephen Levine and Alan McRobie, From Muldoon to Lange: New Zealand Elections in the 
1980s (Christchurch: MC Enterprises, 2002), pp. 18-22. 
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to Labour’s 30%.20 This provoked a Labour leadership crisis and on 
December 12 Bill Rowling survived David Lange’s challenge by one vote.21  
Thanks to National calling an unnecessary by-election, the pattern of 
increased Social Credit support of three years earlier repeated itself at a 
higher level. An explosion of media interest following it gave the League a 
concentrated dose of publicity. Social Credit was now a serious contender 
and speculation on how many seats it could win kept publicity going. Initially 
media attention was favourable but gradually became critical. The main 
parties launched attacks as they realised the Social Credit threat was too big 
to ignore and neither wanted it to keep its new gains. 
 
5.1.2 Attacks on Social Credit Monetary Ideas 
 
Frequent demands were for explanation of Social Credit financial policies. 
Beetham wanted to avoid ceaseless and confusing debate that might provoke 
damaging internal arguments. He believed that focussing on benefits rather 
than mechanisms was what voters needed to hear—selling the sizzle rather 
than the steak, in Raynel terms—but he was not averse to expounding detail. 
However, this put him in a cleft stick. If he refused to explain the mechanics 
on the sound basis that National or Labour financial policies did not require a 
detailed lecture on economics, the media took him to task. If he tried to 
explain at length it became too complicated and he was asked to simply 
explain the benefits.22 From this arose added accusations that Social Credit 
had no real financial policies or no idea how to implement them and that a 
‘pure’ form of Social Credit existed from which Beetham and his team had 
departed because of electoral expediency.23 
National published a pamphlet on ‘The Myth of Social Credit’24 as 
attacks on Social Credit’s monetary policy intensified. The pamphlet claimed 
that Social Credit was the same as printing money—‘Socred’s magic printing 
press’—and therefore was inflationary. Reference to the 1956 Commission 
                                                          
20 Heylen’s November poll had Social Credit at 25.3% but Labour was still low on 32.2%. 
21 New Zealand Herald, December 13, 1981, section 1, p.1. 
22 NZ Listener, April 25, 1981, p. 35. 
23 Miller’s thesis takes this view. 
24 Miller, p. 368. 
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disproving Social Credit was made without exhibiting its findings and ridicule 
used. Everybody knew that Social Credit was ‘funny money’ so there was no 
need to show why. Although Social Credit did not acquit itself well in 1956, a 
document known as the Kelliher Report later analysed the Commission’s 
findings. It was widely circulated to Social Credit members prior to the 1981 
election and used to counter some of the criticisms.25 
National’s often inaccurate interpretation of Social Credit policy was 
emotive and sarcastic instead of factual and rational, and backfired in several 
ways. First, a new generation of voters, unaware of the Commission’s 
findings, did not automatically accept that Social Credit was ‘funny money’ 
promoted by a group of cranks. Ridicule meant that Social Credit seriously 
threatened National. Second, if National could not accurately rebut Social 
Credit policies, maybe they were valid after all and, moreover, raised 
questions about what was inaccurate in National’s own policy. Third, it gave 
continued attention to the League. 
An article in the New Zealand Economist described such tactics as ‘the 
anti-Social Credit myth’ which was: 
that Social Credit policy depends upon the propagation of something 
called “funny money” which is always and necessarily hyper-inflationary 
…[and]…the presumption that uninformed and fallacious reasoning about 
the monetary system is not to be found except in Social Credit 
arguments.26 
 
It discovered that Social Credit had monetary policy in line with its philosophy 
of protecting small business and the individual, the antithesis of National’s 
‘think big’ policy. However, it dismissed the Social Credit idea of faults in the 
current monetary system and its Keynesian description of the policy gave 
ammunition to those who thought that what Beetham offered was not really 
Social Credit.27 Yet it answered the common criticism that no economist 
accepted Social Credit ideas. Economists were already in the League. Eden 
Social Credit’s campaign manager, Phil Ker, for example, taught economics at 
                                                          
25 Sir Henry Kelliher, Monetary Policy (n.p., May 1966). Copy in author’s possession. 
26 John Zanetti and David Sheppard, ‘Keynes Will Win on 28 November’, The New Zealand 
Economist, November 1981, p. 7. A series of three articles on Social Credit monetary ideas in 
the National Business Review from August 17 to August 31 by W.E. Christie illustrates this 
point perfectly.  
27 Zanetti and Sheppard, pp. 6, 7. 
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Auckland Technical Institute28 and happily explained financial policy in simple 
economic terms at campaign meetings.29 
 Another attack implied that Social Credit was uncertain in its monetary 
policy. In a New Zealand Herald interview, finance spokesman Les Hunter 
said that he did not know exactly how Social Credit was going to implement a 
tax expenditure policy. This was interpreted to mean that he had no idea what 
he was doing and having several options was seen as a bad thing.30 The 
League plan to reduce inflation through inflation proof bonds re-lent at low 
interest was not attacked as a drain on treasury funds but as proof that Social 
Crediters did not understand inflation or the monetary system. The policy was 
a short-term solution to attract people to invest and bring inflation down 
quickly. Payments were to be a mixture of tax incentives and interest and the 
bonds had a minimum two-year term. Funds would be diverted into production 
and not consumption, further reducing inflationary pressure. Extra production 
would offset some of the cost. The League was perfectly well aware that if it 
did not work within three years it would be abandoned. Les Hunter pointed out 
that National already had inflation proof bonds, which Labour proposed to 
stop, yet only Social Credit’s scheme was criticised.31 
 
5.1.3 The Canadian Experience 
 
Debate also centred on whether Social Credit had really been tried in Canada.  
The premises were that either it had not worked or the Canadian federal 
government constitutionally prevented it in provincial Alberta and British 
Columbia. These ‘Social Credit’ governments, then, were really Conservative 
or another party in disguise. Beetham and Nevern McConachy, the Campaign 
Committee convenor and Kaipara candidate went to British Columbia in early 
1980 to foster greater links between the two Social Credit groups and learn 
                                                          
28 Now Auckland University of Technology. 
29 Renowned economist Brian Easton also thought that Social Credit could work and Beetham 
quoted him but the counterargument was that it could only work by creating undesirable 
bureaucracy. Zavos, p. 22. 
30 New Zealand Herald, November 26, 1981, section 1, p. 24. 
31 Social Credit Guardian, September-October 1981, p. 2; ‘Socred Firmly Committed to 
Financial Reform’, New Zealand Herald, March 28, 1981, section 1, p. 6. To be fair Labour’s 
main concern was the cost of on-lending at only 3%. 
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more successful campaign strategies. They discovered that Social Credit was 
re-elected in 1975 by emphasising its four core principles.32 These were that: 
the individual is the most important factor in organised society…, 
democratic government in organised society is to secure for the people 
the results they want from the management of their public affairs…, [plus] 
security within freedom [as m]aterial security alone is not enough, [and] 
whatever is physically possible and desirable and morally right should be 
made financially possible. 
 
To this was added the aims of responsible open government, hearing the 
voice of small business, and a sustainable economy.33 Apart from the latter 
aims, these were all Douglas ideas. New Zealand Social Credit also added 
concern for small business to its policy but it was a natural outgrowth of 
emphasis on the individual and opposing monopolistic, soulless corporations. 
The executive director of Social Credit in British Columbia, Hugh Harris 
reiterated these principles when he visited New Zealand in early 1981 and 
added a non-Keynesian idea by stating that a government should not run large 
fiscal deficits.34  
 Peter Wilkinson, a National MP in danger of losing his Kaipara seat to 
Social Credit went to both Canadian provinces. He indeed sought to show they 
were really orthodox conservative governments following policies similar to 
National’s. His articles and public statements therefore cannot be seen as 
non-partisan or objective. Wilkinson claimed that Alberta was prevented from 
introducing Social Credit and what they did introduce did not work, echoing 
both views at the same time. He did concede that a government credit 
agency—he called it a quasi-banking system—succeeded in forcing down 
interest rates and prevented foreclosures in the aftermath of the Depression, 
similar to the way Social Credit proposed to deal with inflation in New Zealand. 
Otherwise the Albertan Social Credit government was saved by prosperity 
gained from natural resources and the onset of World War Two. 35 
 His main points about the British Columbia Social Credit government 
were likewise. It was financially orthodox, had huge natural resources and 
                                                          
32 Target ’81 (1980), pp. 4, 5. 
33 <http://www.bcsocialcredit.bc.ca> retrieved on November 9, 2009. Alberta’s Social Credit 
party ran on exactly the same principles. See <http://www.socialcredit.com/principles3.htm> 
retrieved on November 9, 2009.  
34 New Zealand Herald, February 6, 1981, section 1, p. 12. 
35 New Zealand Herald, February 2, 1981, section 1, p. 14. 
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welcomed foreign investment. Therefore it was Social Credit in name only to 
attract both Liberal and Conservative voters. He doubted that Social Credit in 
New Zealand could claim affinity with its fiscal direction any more than 
National could, yet the thrust of his article was the similarities between them 
and National’s proposals.36 Beetham claimed that the British Columbia 
government was doing the exact opposite of Muldoon’s financial policy by 
channelling government funds into productive enterprises and expanding the 
tax base. Consequently it had the highest standard of living in the world.37 
Graham Lea, a British Columbia New Democrat MP, went further than 
Wilkinson claiming that Social Credit in that province was now only a vehicle 
for a Liberal and Conservative party coalition who liked to ‘think big’ with no 
place for ‘old-line Major Douglas Crediters’. His observation was that such 
Social Crediters and, by implication their beliefs, were a large proportion of 
New Zealand Social Credit.38  
 Harris denied this view. His New Zealand Herald article seemed to 
make him pro-Conservative but he did point out that the central tenet of Social 
Credit was to have its philosophy accepted by a government regardless of 
which party it was, a belief originating with Douglas. Although Social Credit 
was no longer Alberta’s government, its principles were continued by the 
Progressive Conservatives.39 In one Auckland meeting with Social Credit 
branches he reiterated that its philosophy was more than political with its focus 
on individual enterprise and not big business or big labour. He explained 
Social Credit’s origins in British Columbia. By the late 1940s, despite huge 
natural resources, the province was bankrupt under a Liberal and 
Conservative coalition. W.A.C. Bennett became an Independent and looked at 
all parties but was impressed by the way Alberta became prosperous under 
Social Credit so he became a Social Credit man. After winning a landslide in 
1953 Bennett devised updated fiscal policies based on Social Credit principles 
but not the old Douglasism of the Depression, much the same type of 
modernisation undertaken by Beetham and Hunter. Under these principles 
                                                          
36 New Zealand Herald, February 3, 1981, section 1, p. 16. 
37 NZ Listener, April, 25, 1981, p. 36. 
38 New Zealand Herald, March 14, 1981, section 1, p. 12. The article neglected to mention 
that Liberal and Conservative candidates contested elections. 
39 New Zealand Herald, February 6, 1981, section 1, p. 12. 
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British Columbia went from bankruptcy to prosperity. When the New 
Democrats based their expanded social welfare policies on this they took a 
huge surplus to an even larger deficit during their time in office between 1972 
and 1975, a similar result to that under Labour in New Zealand.40 
 Richard Hockey, treasurer of British Columbia Young Socreds, 
explained further. In the 1930s Alberta was technically bankrupt. Social Credit 
offered economic expansion to benefit the people not the banking system. To 
this end they only borrowed for projects that paid off debt. These projects and 
their earnings became the people’s property and the basis of the Alberta 
Heritage Fund used for Albertan development, an indirect form of a National 
Dividend allowed by the federal constitution. Much of the newly discovered oil 
and other natural resource earnings were channelled into it because they were 
publicly and not privately owned. This was so successful that the incoming 
Progressive Conservative government agreed not to tamper with it.41 The 
British Columbia Social Credit government created an Investment Corporation 
along similar lines in 1975.42 
 In this light it is easy to see why Harris seemed pro-Conservative and 
why W.A.C. Bennett found Social Credit so attractive. Despite both provinces 
possessing huge natural resources, Alberta thrived under Social Credit ideas 
while British Columbia did not under strictly orthodox and conservative 
economic thinking. After the New Democrat blowout, Social Credit returned to 
power facing the same kind of financial problems as New Zealand. It offered 
no easy solutions but clearly handled them better than National did as it 
governed until 1991. Therefore Social Credit offered something other than just 
the orthodox conservative policies claimed by Wilkinson, and, unsurprisingly, 
he failed to mention the Heritage Fund or the Investment Corporation and how 
they flowed out of Social Credit philosophy. 
 With all the different political opinions, it is unlikely that voters gained a 
true picture of Social Credit in Canada. Facts emerging clearly were that 
                                                          
40 Notes by the author from an Auckland meeting on February 2, 1981 with Harris (n.d. 
[1981]). Harris claimed that a half billion surplus was turned into a three quarter billion deficit. 
Hockey quoting official figures gives a quarter billion surplus and a half billion deficit. National 
Business Review, August 10, 1981, p. 8. 
41 Richard Hockey, ‘British Columbia…the Socred Version’, National Business Review, 
August 10, 1981, p. 8. 
42 Social Credit Guardian, March 1981, p. 5. 
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provincial Social Credit governments were long lived, produced positive 
benefits and could adapt to produce them under conditions where a full Social 
Credit programme was not possible. This suited Social Credit pragmatists. 
Naturally its political foes had to demonstrate that this was not really Social 
Credit. Even if this was not convincing, another angle was to show that it was 
yesterday’s policy. Social Credit had gone in Alberta and was on its way out in 
British Columbia.43  
 This contradictory approach was also used on New Zealand Social 
Credit. Either it was not really Social Credit and just a naked grab for power by 
using the name with policies of a completely different nature44 or it was an old 
unworkable ‘pure’ Douglas Social Credit but it was not allowed to be an 
updated Social Credit. Evidence for an old style view came from the existence 
of ‘pure’ Douglasites in the movement, ignoring the fact that Social Credit’s 
entire history was one of adapting and updating. This was like criticising 
Labour for abandoning doctrinaire socialism and then claiming it was still the 
same because some vocal members still existed bemoaning the fact. In this 
respect Canadian Social Credit and the New Zealand movement had exactly 
the same experience. Neither was Social Credit because it was presumed that 
their original ideas were invalid and could not be updated. Consequently their 
true natures were never properly explored.45  
 
5.1.4 The Structure of Social Credit Support 
 
If such attacks cost Social Credit support, they also kept publicity going 
throughout election year. However, a structural problem with its support made 
it susceptible to raiding, it was drawing from the wrong major party. If Social 
Credit had gained National support after East Coast Bays, it would have 
indicated voter confidence in Labour to win. Social Credit could have won rural 
                                                          
43 See for example A.J. Papprill’s letter in the National Business Review, September 6, 1981, 
p. 8. However, British Columbia Social Credit won the next two elections with increasing 
majorities. See <http://www.nodice.ca/elections/britishcolumbia/results> retrieved November 
9, 2009. National could not portray a supposedly conservative and financially orthodox ‘think 
big’ government as on its way out but Labour could. 
44 Raymond Miller takes this view. See Miller, p. 370. 
45 This is a prime example where Social Credit’s maxim that good political ideas should 
transcend party was true. Party views obscured the political ideas instead of revealing them. 
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National seats if a government defeat was likely. National could not have 
survived a twin threat from Social Credit and Labour in its marginals.  
 By the end of January 1981 Social Credit’s position seemed good. It 
was ahead of Labour in the polls, number one amongst 18 to 24 year olds, 
and the top party in Auckland46 but this was its high point. The electoral 
situation gave an opportunity for Social Credit then. NRB poll figures also 
showed an overall 4% swing to National47 but Labour had lost more ground in 
Auckland. This meant that National would keep all its marginals and possibly 
win another eight Labour seats. Even with losses to Social Credit, National 
could actually increase its majority.48 National party analysis gave it 53 seats, 
Labour 35, and Social Credit four. Labour believed it could gain five National 
seats but worried about losing one to National and two to Social Credit.49 
National gloomily thought it could lose five more seats to Social Credit in the 
Auckland region alone.50 In this volatile mix the League needed to persuade 
National voters that winning National seats would not imperil the government 
and Labour ones that Labour could not win the election. Switching back was 
likely to keep National in without giving Social Credit the balance of power.51  
Yet the party support configuration meant that both Social Credit and 
Labour also had to fight a two front war. Labour had to regain lost support from 
Social Credit and win National seats. Social Credit had to keep Labour 
support, displace Labour in other National seats to win them, and take 
National support to win rural seats. Social Credit could not win Labour seats 
directly except Hastings and possibly Waitakere, so it needed to increase in 
                                                          
46 November 1980 NRB poll published in the New Zealand Herald, December 9, 1981, section 
1, p. 1. Social Credit had 39% in Auckland. 
47 Labour had lost 10% of the vote since 1978 and National 2%. 
48 Seats that National could take off Labour on a 4% swing were Western Hutt, Hastings, 
Taupo and Lyttelton plus Onehunga, Roskill, Papatoetoe and Waitakere in Auckland. Social 
Credit could win eleven National seats without defeating the government, so if Social Credit 
won Kaipara, Bay of Islands, Hauraki and Waitotara, National would still increase its majority 
by four. See the electoral pendulum, Auckland Star, November 25, 1981, p. 24. 
49 R.G. Wallace, ‘A Year of Imponderables Faces Parties’, New Zealand Herald, February 21,  
1981, section 1, p. 6. National’s analysis gave them Onehunga, Taupo and Western Hutt but 
not Waitakere. Social Credit would win Bay of Islands and Kaipara from National, keep 
Rangitikei but lose East Coast Bays, and take Hastings from Labour. Labour thought it would 
win Marlborough, New Plymouth and Gisborne, and possibly Miramar and Wellington Central. 
It would lose Roskill to National, and Hastings and Waitakere to Social Credit.  
50 R.G. Wallace, ‘National Faces Fight on Two Fronts’, New Zealand Herald, December 6, 
1980, section 1, p. 6. The seats were Bay of Islands, Whangarei, Kaipara, Helensville and 
Pakuranga. East Coast Bays would not be regained. 
51 Points made by the author in a report to the Eden Social Credit committee in early 1981. 
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Labour seats to win some in 1984. It did not want a close fight between 
National and Labour squeezing its own support. The dilemma for Labour 
voters was whether to switch to Social Credit or stay with Labour in the hope 
of ousting National.  
In Auckland increased Social Credit support was seen even in a 
traditional marginal like Eden. At the beginning of the year the Labour vote 
seemed to collapse to 30%, allowing Social Credit an optimistic hope of 
second place, and in May a New Zealand Herald report cautiously predicted a 
strong National win.52 Eden Social Credit thought that National’s majority might 
go over 2000, possibly giving the League 4000 votes and a shot at winning in 
198453 as a branch survey in June found up to 23% support for Social Credit.54 
Eden slowly moved back to marginality however and a follow-up Herald article 
in October predicted a close race.55 An angry letter from Social Credit argued 
for a far larger National majority.56 Its candidate was unhappy about having his 
support squeezed through a self-fulfilling prophecy but the League had the 
same problem nationwide. The article proved extremely accurate and National 
held Eden by the predicted 100 votes. Social Credit siphoned off enough 
Labour votes to prevent its win and this mirrored the overall election result.57 
 
5.1.5 Party Tactical Choices and Missteps 
 
Most National marginals were provincial seats and it wooed them with the 
‘think big’ energy projects and favourable opinion from allowing the Springbok 
rugby tour. It also hoped to win back East Coast Bays and made an $80,000 
                                                          
52 ‘Blue Flowers Bloom in Marginal Eden’, New Zealand Herald, May 5, 1981, section 1, p. 20. 
53 Letter from candidate Alan Scott to Eden Social Credit Committee members, October 14, 
1981, copy in author’s possession. This would give National a 10% lead over Labour and 
20% to Social Credit. 
54 Eden Social Credit Branch Newsletter, September 1981, p. 4. 
55 ‘Eden Heading for a Tense Finish’, New Zealand Herald, October 9, 1981, section 1, p. 18. 
56 Letter from Alan Scott to the New Zealand Herald, October 9, 1981, copy in author’s 
possession. 
57 National finally won by 117 votes with a 1.3% swing to Labour, short of the 1.7% needed. 
Labour chose an openly gay candidate, which may have scared off enough voters to prevent 
the win. In street meetings he had defend his sexuality giving him less time to promote Labour 
policy. See the Auckland Star, November 25, 1981, p. 21 and National Business Review, 
August 3, 1981, p. 37. 
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attempt to defeat Beetham.58 Knapp hoped that disgruntlement with National 
would help him hang on. He implemented the old Social Credit idea of an 
electors association to ascertain his electorate’s wishes. From this he adopted 
a pro-tour stance.59 
 The main parties put up candidates in all electorates. Neither Social 
Credit nor Labour withdrew candidates in seats where their presence might 
give it to National. On the contrary, Labour put strong candidates and 
resources into some hopeless seats instead of concentrating on key 
marginals. One example was Beetham’s seat. Unlike 1978 Labour resourced 
a strong candidate for almost the whole of election year with a full-time 
helper.60 Beetham saw this as further proof of National and Labour’s ‘cosy two 
party club’ maintaining its duopoly. Labour had a more attractive candidate in 
Kaipara too leading to Social Credit claims of a deal with National to keep the 
League out.61 There was no direct collusion. Labour wanted to keep its last 
voters in strong Social Credit seats rather than see it locked into permanent 
tactical League support. Some influence in all electorates was essential, 
especially rurally, to avoid the perception that Labour was only an urban party 
and trigger further loss. Contesting every seat and insisting on support 
everywhere at an undefined acceptable level contributed to Labour’s defeat. 
The heady rise in the polls led to every Social Credit branch thinking it 
could pull off another East Coast Bays.62 There was no thought of withdrawing 
anywhere. Many seats were unwinnable and the executive compromised by 
having four categories of electorate but this became meaningless when 61 
seats were now category one—well up from the 21 in 197963—and 28 were 
                                                          
58 National Business Review, November  9, 1981, p. 43; Social Credit Guardian, August 1981, 
pp. 1, 3.  
59 National Business Review, August 3, 1981, p. 40. Beetham attempted one in Rangitikei but 
it failed as he lacked time to put into it but he held ad hoc meetings to sound out particular 
issues. Bryant, Beetham, p. 130. Beetham was also pro-tour arguing that Muldoon had to 
preserve New Zealander’s democratic freedom. Gustafson, His Way, p. 315. 
60 National Business Review, November  9, 1981, pp. 42, 43. 
61 Auckland Star, November 25, 1981, p. 21. Labour did the same in Kaimai and Tauranga to 
blunt Social Credit progress. See National Business Review, November 16, 1981, p. 35. 
However, Bay of Islands had a weaker candidate as the former strong 1978 one, Maurice 
Penney, contested the more winnable Whangarei. 
62 At a meeting to organise regionally coordinated campaign elements, the author asked 
Auckland West Region chairman, John Body, how many electorate branches could 
realistically win. He replied that 92 of them thought they could. 
63 Zavos, p. 156. 
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priority.64 Like Labour, Social Credit’s resources were stretched further than 
necessary but for the exact opposite reason. Social Credit success diluted its 
attempt to win more seats. 
Social Credit could have helped by withdrawing in Labour’s key 
marginals but there was no benefit without Labour returning the favour. 
Beetham offered Labour such an arrangement in 1977. Labour considered it 
and leader Bill Rowling met several times with Beetham. A Labour faction 
worked against the scheme and, when Beetham said that Labour needed an 
accommodation more than Social Credit did, they dropped the idea.65 Rowling 
also secretly discussed a possible electoral alliance with Beetham several 
times before the 1981 election although Labour’s deputy leader publicly 
opposed it.66 Again nothing came of it. Social Credit was less interested as 
they were taking Labour support and this would have worked against 
maximising its vote but a limited accommodation would have gained both of 
them more seats and defeated National.  
There were two other accommodation possibilities but Social Credit did 
not consider them despite its avowed intent to introduce co-operation into New 
Zealand politics instead of the normal confrontation. First, it did not attempt an 
alliance with Matiu Rata, former Maori Affairs minister in Kirk’s third Labour 
government. Concerned that Labour took Maori support for granted, he formed 
his own party Mana Motuhake in April 1980 and also resigned from his 
Northern Maori seat. Beetham co-operated in parliament with Rata until his by-
election defeat in June 1980.  
Social Credit was never strongly organised in Maori seats67 but did 
remarkably well there to begin with. A strong candidate came second in 
Eastern Maori in 1960 but he defected to National in 1963. It usually polled 
relatively well in Northern Maori and came second there in 1978 and in 
Western Maori but neither were likely wins. In the 1980 Northern Maori by-
election Social Credit came a poor third behind Rata, keeping only 60% of its 
1978 vote. Instead of seeing this as a reality check Social Credit dismissively 
                                                          
64 Target ’81 (1981), pp. 18, 22. To be fair, four electorates were top priority and another nine 
were allocated extra resources. 
65 Bryant, Beetham, pp. 87-93; Zavos, pp. 43, 44. 
66 Gustafson, His Way, p. 320. 
67 It failed to contest Western Maori in 1954 and 1963. 
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referred to the contest as ‘a family fight between Matt Rata and the Labour 
Party’.68 In August 1980 half the Maori seats were category two and half 
category three but lacked membership figures, and the rating was based on 
the 1978 vote. A year later all were category three except Western Maori, still 
without membership figures, on category four.69 An alliance with Mana 
Motuhake, then, would have given Social Credit a vehicle into Maoridom and it 
could have assisted Rata’s organisation instead of struggling with its own. The 
League failed to augment Rata’s small winning chance by competing with him. 
Far more serious was Social Credit not withdrawing for Nelson 
Independent Mel Courtney. Like Rata, Courtney fell out with Labour and left its 
caucus in March 1981 to sit as an Independent. In July he decided to contest 
Nelson. A Labour party poll put him in fourth place just behind Social Credit 
but this was before his declaration to stand and he believed he could win.70 
Nelson was predicted to stay Labour but National might possibly sneak in if 
Courtney siphoned off enough Labour votes. National party members thought 
of not putting up a candidate and supporting Courtney as he was close to 
National party thinking but were overruled by Dominion Headquarters. The 
Social Credit candidate conceded he had little hope but did not withdraw and 
urge supporters to back Courtney.71 Admittedly Courtney’s challenge seemed 
to be fading close to the election72 but the National vote collapsed and Social 
Credit barely held its 1978 vote. If either had not stood a candidate, Courtney 
would have taken the seat off Labour. 
 
5.2 Selection Problems and Carpetbagging 
 
Social Credit also did not help itself with some internal decisions over 
candidates. It wanted candidates to offer themselves for a minimum of three 
years and for nine if successfully elected to maintain continuity.73 High calibre 
candidates should keep standing in the same electorate to build a profile and 
                                                          
68 Target ’81 (1980), p. 47. 
69 Target ’81 (1980), p. 29; Target ’81 (1981), p. 17. The other three had a combined total of 
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70 New Zealand Herald, August 14, 1981, section 1, p. 3. 
71 National Business Review, October 26, 1981, p. 43. 
72 National Business Review, November 23, 1981, p. 42. 
73 Target ‘81 (1980), p. 23. 
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strong campaign team. Circumstances did not always allow this. The very 
able 1981 Eden Social Credit candidate, Alan Scott, was a teacher and 
electoral rules classified him as a public servant. Therefore he could not stand 
unless he resigned at least three months before an election. This was hard on 
someone with a young family and he only did it because a property developer 
on the committee hired him for that period. He was keen to stand for Eden 
again in 1984 but the only teaching position he could get quickly was at St. 
Stephen’s College, Pukekohe and he was selected for Franklin. 
 Many strong candidates from 1978 wanted to stand again but two of 
the most charismatic ones in the South Island decided not to. Richard Connell 
in Awarua had polled nearly a quarter of the vote and he took his chances of 
winning in 1981 seriously. He withdrew rather than subject his family to the 
stresses of parliamentary life.74 Selwyn Stevens, who polled nearly 20% in 
Waitaki, also withdrew to become a Christian minister. As Social Credit had 
not been strong in the South Island since 1954, this was a severe blow in two 
opportunities. Social Credit’s Awarua vote increased by a meagre 0.5% in 
1981 and Waitaki dropped by 6%. 
 Stevens’ case illustrated the tension between strong Christian belief 
and political action. Social Credit’s Christian morality attracted evangelicals 
who became active members. However, when the party was strong enough 
for full time political action, it created a re-think amongst some. Stevens 
decided this was a less worthy goal than a directly Christian vocation. Another 
was Chris ‘Curly’ Gedge, a good organiser in the Hastings electorate. When 
Beetham asked him to be his paid full time campaign manger, Gedge turned it 
down to be a church pastor.75 Deputy leader, Dwyer took the position.76 One 
evangelical Christian without such conflict was George Bryant, compiler of 
Social Credit manifestos from 1972 to 1987, twice candidate, and League 
president from 1976 to 1979.77 
 Dwyer ran foul of League morality in a different way. He withdrew his 
candidacy for Hastings in July 1981 for ‘personal reasons’. Under this bland 
                                                          
74 New Zealand Listener, April 25, 1981, p. 38. 
75 Conversation with the author in January, 1979. Gedge remained active in Hastings. 
76 Miller, p. 348. 
77 Christian businessman, Peter Love, ran Omega Communications, one of the League’s 
main advertising agencies for the 1981 campaign. 
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pronouncement was the fact that Dwyer had left his wife for another woman. 
As he was the spokesman for the family, this was considered hypocritical and 
pressure was put on him to stand down. The League’s approach was 
inconsistent as Beetham’s marriage had earlier broken down from political 
pressures and he remarried in December 1980. There was no talk of him 
resigning as Rangitikei MP.  
 It would have been better to give Dwyer another policy area and give 
family affairs to someone else rather than force him to withdraw.78 League 
action cost it an excellent candidate and all chances to win Hastings, a 
marginal provincial electorate usually held by the governing party. Dwyer built 
up a large personal following and in 1978 drew votes evenly from National 
and Labour to come a strong third on 26%. Opinion polls prior to his 
withdrawal showed a genuine three-way contest that he had every chance of 
winning as his support was holding despite Social Credit’s nationwide 
leakage. The partial collapse in Social Credit’s vote after Dwyer’s withdrawal 
strengthened Labour’s hold in 1981, showing that lost support favoured 
Labour. Thus the only winnable category one Labour electorate,79 there solely 
because of Dwyer’s popularity and hard work done for him, was lost.  
Whangarei was another provincial marginal and, like Hastings, Social 
Credit took 26% in 1978. Unlike Hastings, it was a National seat with a strong 
majority but the sitting member was dumped and gave an opportunity to 
capitalise on National’s selection wrangles in a similar way to Pakuranga later 
on. Social Credit, however, had a selection wrangle of its own. The previous 
candidate, Joyce Ryan, with local body experience as Whangarei’s deputy 
mayor wanted to stand again. Her campaign manger from 1978, Bill Fraser, 
with political ambitions of his own, won selection but this created unrest. The 
dispute came to Beetham’s attention but he refused to be involved in a local 
democratic decision. He should have intervened and favoured Ryan who had 
the better chance and more local support.80 Social Credit needed unity and 
                                                          
78 That he had been married for less than three years and sacrificed his early married life in 
League interests may have contributed to the breakdown. Social Credit Guardian, November 
1980, p. 7. It was not the end of Dwyer’s political career as he later became the mayor of 
Hastings. 
79 See Target ‘81 (1980), pp. 27-29. 
80 Ryan was re-elected deputy mayor in 1980 and topped the poll again with an increased 
vote. Social Credit Guardian, November 1980, p. 9. 
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continuity. Fraser should have heeded the campaign committee’s admonition: 
‘We can’t afford the luxury of internal wrangles’.81 The fallout was a desultory 
increase, barely a tenth of what Social Credit needed to win.82 
Another issue was League promoted carpetbagging. Understandably 
the League wanted its most prominent candidates elected and have them in 
electorates with the best chance. Most were in category one electorates 
already, and helped make them that way, but four candidates in lower 
categories were wanted in category one. Three of them were shifted. Finance 
spokesman, Les Hunter, previously stood in Ruahine and Manawatu. As his 
was a key role, he was selected for Bay of Islands, the most winnable seat 
after Kaipara.83  
Hunter’s was the most controversial shift. Local branches preferred a 
local candidate and felt that Hunter was foisted on them.84 Bay of Islands also 
had a remnant of ‘Douglas purists’85 who disliked what they saw as the 
modern watered down version of Social Credit and particularly disliked 
Hunter, the chief author of the revisionist position. Because of this perceived 
sell-out they did not heed the League’s call to avoid internal disputes and put 
up a ‘real’ Social Credit candidate which hampered Hunter’s chances.86  
Although the alternative scored a little over a hundred votes, it probably 
scared off at least twice that. 
Many League members considered Hunter a staunch defender of 
Douglas and himself an effective bulwark against watering down Social Credit 
principles. Hunter was a Douglas ‘technician’ in the modern party to help 
translate the Social Credit vision into current circumstances. The ‘purist’ 
reaction in the north simply confused the wider party.  
David Howes, industrial relations spokesman, moved to Helensville in 
1981. He had stood in category three Roskill in 1978 and swapped with Chris 
Lynch, a far more personable candidate. Lynch took a creditable 23% in 
Helensville in 1978. He did not dispute the move for the good of the League 
                                                          
81 Target ‘81 (1980), p. 17. 
82 Fraser took 27.5%. 
83 Target ‘81, (1981), p. 23. 
84 Eden Social Credit candidate Alan Scott thought that if Hunter was any good he ought to 
have won Manawatu. Scott, however, tended to regard most electorates as winnable with a 
strong candidate. 
85 Beetham’s description. 
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but was unhappy about losing a chance to be elected himself.87 Lynch would 
have done better in Helensville than Howes. He had a larger personal vote, 
perhaps enough for a close three-way race and narrow win. Both Howes and 
Hunter added 6% more to their electorate vote in 1981. Patricia Wojcik, 
another League spokeswoman, stood again in Waitakere and the continuity 
gave her 9%. This was a 50% increase compared to a quarter for Howes and 
less than 20% for Hunter. For these two the carpetbag effect cost votes.88 
The only candidate for whom shifting worked was Terry Heffernan, 
League high flyer in Christchurch. He almost trebled Social Credit’s vote in 
Sydenham in 1978 and doubled it in the 1979 Christchurch Central by-
election. He could have gone to Waitaki or Awarua but was selected for the 
old Social Credit stronghold of Wanganui and took another 13.5% over 1978, 
a 70% increase. As in Christchurch Central, he pushed National into third 
place in a seat it had won only nine years earlier. 
 Neil Morrison chose to stay in his category three Pakuranga seat but it 
was eighteenth on the priority list anyway, only one behind Helensville.89 
Ironically, by staying put, Morrison eventually became Social Credit’s fourth 
elected MP. 
 
5.3 The 1981 Election 
 
5.3.1 Polls and Policy 
 
Throughout election year Social Credit slid inexorably in polls from 31% to 22-
23% by August.90 Voters seemed convinced that voting Labour was the only 
way to oust National. However, the Springbok tour not only shored up 
National support in provincial marginals but also distracted from the economic 
situation. Afterwards nearly three months remained for scrutiny but National 
tried to turn the bitter aftermath into an ongoing law and order issue.91 
                                                                                                                                                                      
86 See Miller, pp. 370-372. 
87 Conversation between Lynch and the author during the 1981 campaign. 
88 It does not explain the whole difference as Wojcik stood in a Labour seat and the other two 
were National so the two elections effect comes into play. This is discussed in the next part. 
89 Target ‘81 (1981), p. 23. 
90 National Business Review, October 19, 1981, p. 30. See also the Appendix. 
91 National Business Review, September 14, 1981, p. 9; Scott, Ten Years Inside, pp. 96, 97. 
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Beetham urged that people not be sidetracked from the deep economic 
problems or by National’s subsequent stance.92 Social Crediters were glad the 
tour was over and wanted to focus on more important issues.93  
 The annual Conference in August was a showpiece to demonstrate 
Social Credit’s professional polish and gain publicity to reverse falling support. 
Columnist Tom Scott humorously observed that ‘Social Credit conferences 
have lost, probably forever, the image of being a psychiatric ward on a four-
day outing.’ With Dwyer gone a new deputy leader had to be chosen and this 
proved to be a close race between Garry Knapp and Nevern McConachy, 
which Knapp won.94 Social Credit put a twist on its previous campaign slogan 
of ‘give us a go’ with ‘give New Zealand a go with Social Credit.’ 
 September showed a poll rebound to 25%. Political commentator Colin 
James noted that this was the spring pattern for the last four years and put the 
League on target for 26% and to take two to six seats off National.95 At the 
beginning of October the tide seemed to be coming back in. After East Coast 
Bays Social Credit spoke of a ‘quiet revolution’ in New Zealand politics where, 
after years of trying, it seemed on the verge of unprecedented breakthrough96 
but was this really true? In April the Heylen pollsters surveyed voter opinion 
differently. They suspected soft Social Credit support and their findings 
confirmed it. Only 15.5% of eligible voters were firmly Social Credit, a little 
over half those intending to vote for it. Main party support was also 
surprisingly as soft with only half their intended vote firmly committed. 
However, half of all voters were seriously considering supporting Social Credit 
compared to 46.5% for National and 40.5% for Labour.97 The ‘quiet revolution’ 
was continuing at that stage and voter intention was volatile enough for Social 
Credit to potentially capture more support. Despite this possibility reasserting 
itself in September, by November the League was back down to 22%. 
                                                          
92 Social Credit Guardian, August 1981, p. 3. 
93 See, for example, Eden Social Credit Branch Newsletter, October 1981, p. 1. Copy in 
author’s possession. 
94 Scott, Ten Years Inside, pp. 98, 99. 
95 Colin James, ‘Springtime—Springboard for Socred Bounceback’, National Business 
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 In response to demands for policy in understandable language98 Social 
Credit produced a series of short policy papers and ‘A Child’s Guide to 
Wealth’, an explanation of its financial policy in children’s book format. The 
latter was then criticised for oversimplifying economic processes. It also 
released a full manifesto. So policy abounded for those interested but Social 
Credit needed to spark the election campaign. One issue that generated 
excited internal debate was another variation on the National Dividend based 
on the policy of encouraging worker shareholdings. This would provide 
additional income to salaries and wages and reduce industrial conflict by 
giving workers an incentive for companies to do well and a voice with 
management. When this was coupled with low interest loans for business and 
the creation of an industry development fund as in Alberta, it gave the 
opportunity to develop specialised high-tech industries with huge export 
earning potential. This Social Credit version of National’s ‘think big’ policy was 
seen as the way for New Zealand to regain its former high standard of living 
but was never fleshed out for voter consideration. However, electorate 
organisations were as ready as they could be and, although short of the $1 
million target, there was still a general campaign budget of $300,000 plus 
$4,000 per electorate, the maximum allowed.99 Membership climbed towards 
30,000 but was short of the revised 45,000 target.100 
 
5.3.2 1981 Campaign and Outcome 
 
The official election campaign was regarded as dull.101 Beetham fulfilled his 
dream to open Social Credit’s campaign at the Founder’s Theatre in Hamilton 
but that speech and his overall effort were solid rather than spectacular. A 
New Zealand Herald reporter noted that at times Beetham’s audience was 
‘willing to be captured, but has not been finally wooed’ and his biggest 
drawcard was that a huge Social Credit protest vote would pull the main 
                                                          
98 See for example, Tony Garnier and Stephen Levine, Election ’81: An End to Muldoonism? 
(Auckland: Methuen, 1981), p. 98. 
99 Target ’81 (1981), pp. 20, 21. 
100 Target ’81 (1981), pp. 39, 40. Figures to mid-August. By the end of August membership 
was at 27,000 and another 2,000 were added in September and October. By the end of 1981 
membership was at 35,000. Social Credit Guardian, May 1982, p. 7. 
101 Levine and McRobie, From Muldoon to Lange, p. 42. 
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parties back into line.102 Needing a large amount of time to campaign in their 
own electorates to ensure re-election hampered Beetham and Knapp. Their 
itinerary included several days in the South Island covering areas where the 
League expected to do well.103 In hindsight this time would have been better 
spent in the upper part of the North Island, particularly Northland and 
Auckland. Beetham also did not need as much time as he invested in his own 
electorate but he took National’s challenge seriously and it successfully 
pinned him down more than he wanted.  
Social Credit acknowledged that its 26% target was beyond them and 
estimated support at 23% but still expected to win its target seats.104 Unlike 
the 1978 campaign when a shift back to Labour from Social Credit was 
compensated by a National top-up, this time it did not happen. Predictions 
varied from a hung parliament to a large Labour victory but many 
commentators thought Labour would win narrowly.105 The ‘two elections’ 
theory surmised that there might be swings to and against the government in 
different types of seat. 
 The 1981 result pleased nobody. Although Social Credit increased its 
overall vote by 5%, it failed in its top targets. So the League emerged with 
only the two seats it had beforehand, a bitter disappointment. Labour also 
failed to become the government. It took four seats off National but lost 
one.106 Labour’s anti-tour stance and National’s ‘think big’ projects in Taranaki 
and Southland with the Marsden Point refinery expansion kept it five key 
provincial marginals.107 This allowed National to govern with the narrowest 
majority. Thus the electorate indicated continuing disapproval of both main 
parties but stopped short of a hung parliament. 
Although the overall picture suggested a squeeze with voters returning 
to Labour and staying with National, the reality was more complicated. Fear of 
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losing rural seats to Social Credit in a close electoral battle kept those 
National voters in line. Supporters who stayed home in 1978 cast votes in 
1981 in Kaipara, Bay of Islands and Hauraki; seats Social Credit counted on 
winning. Social Credit’s vote increased in all target rural seats by 1,000 to 
2,000 votes, including many National ones, but returning supporters held 
National’s vote steady or increased it. This kept it ahead in Kaipara and Bay 
of Islands and denied the League two extra seats.108 Labour's vote did not 
collapse completely because it worked hard to maintain it and this helped 
National to win. This also occurred in other rural hopefuls and in Tauranga.109 
Social Credit did not reduce the Labour vote in Bay of Islands as much as 
Cracknell did in the 1966 Hobson equivalent. That would have regained the 
seat and collapsing the Labour vote would have won other seats too.110 
However, tactical voting is hard to achieve especially in rural seats where 
Labour supporters always knew their votes were wasted. Therefore a 
stubborn core always voted Labour in the same way people always voted 
Social Credit. Long-term tactical support was equally hard to maintain, as 
there was a tendency for the ‘protest‘ component to revert to a main party 
even when actively courted.111  
At the beginning of the campaign Bay of Islands and Waipa voters 
intended putting Social Credit in but changed their minds by election day,112 
                                                          
108 Social Credit’s vote in Kaipara only increased by 800 but would have been enough for 
victory if the National vote had remained steady.   
109 Waitotara, Waipa, Matamata, Waikato and Taranaki. Only in King Country was there 
significant Labour collapse. 
110 Labour took 13.5% in Bay of Islands with a stronger electorate organisation compared to 
7.4% in 1966. Reducing Labour’s vote to 7% would have also given the League Pakuranga, 
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Pakuranga, Papakura, Waikato, Rangitikei, King Country, Taranaki, Porirua and Sydenham. 
In Wanganui more National supporters did so.  
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showing that voter volatility persisted through the campaign.113 These factors 
prevented the breakthrough Social Credit looked for. Likewise a Social Credit 
increase in National-Labour marginals prevented a Labour victory. National 
won the two front electoral war—just, but this was not immediately obvious. 
On election night Labour held Gisborne and National’s hold on Taupo was 
precarious. It seemed that Social Credit had its balance of responsibility after 
all but a corrected counting error let National win Gisborne and special votes 
put it beyond doubt. Once a judicial recount confirmed the Taupo result, 
National had its majority although this was challenged through an electoral 
petition and not resolved in National’s favour until April 1982.114 
 
5.3.3 Analysing the Result 
 
The ‘two elections’ theory was confirmed.115 There were swings to Labour 
where Social Credit was not expected to do well and vice versa. This ought to 
have been enough to defeat National but there was actually a 0.3% overall 
swing to the government, not from increased confidence in it but because 
Labour fell further. Swings to National in provincial seats offset swings against 
it in the cities. Only in metropolitan electorates was there a swing to Labour 
but too small to win. All other electorate types swung to National.116 
Social Credit also had a below average swing in its top five seats, 
enough for it to keep Rangitikei and East Coast Bays but not win the 
others.117 In the next twelve hopefuls its vote rise averaged 5.2% with an 8% 
                                                          
113 This also showed up in National-Labour marginals where the original intent was to keep 
National in or bring it closer to winning in Labour ones, and in a few seats the shift was the 
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Hunua (intended Labour win by a bigger margin), Rotorua (intended Labour win but National 
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115 National Business Review, December 7, 1981, p. 25; Levine and McRobie, From Muldoon 
to Lange, p. 62.  
116 Levine and McRobie, From Muldoon to Lange, p. 66.  
117 There was a small swing against Social Credit in the two seats it held and in Kaipara. 
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swing against Labour.118 Social Credit also did better in safer seats. In the 
nine most marginal seats it only increased by 1% and in other marginals it 
was 2.5%. In fairly safe National and safe Labour seats it was 5.5-6.0% and in 
safe National seats just over 4% but it also had a huge 6.7% rise in Auckland 
seats. Thus Social Credit did slightly better in Labour seats but increased 
most in seats it could not win. This was attributed to Social Credit being 
untried so it was safe to register a protest vote against the main parties in 
these electorates.119 Equally, however, because the election was seen as 
close, the squeeze factor occurred in marginal seats.120 Therefore Social 
Credit kept some of its gains from Labour in seats not at risk and in Auckland.  
Although 1981 became a standstill election, confirming National in 
office one last time, it came about from many electoral factors cancelling each 
other out. The Springbok tour helped National in the provinces but not in the 
cities. Muldoon’s leadership style and policies retained and lost National 
votes. Splitting the anti-Muldoon vote kept him in.121 Perception of Labour as 
a weak and non-viable alternative and National’s failure to solve New 
Zealand’s economic woes were also self-cancelling. Social Credit raiding of 
Labour support and its partial return helped the standstill effect. Alan McRobie 
considered that the mean of the Labour-National two-party swings at 0.04% to 
Labour was a better measure of change and confirmed that the election was a 
standstill one.122 National voters coming out of non-voting in rural seats 
cancelled Social Credit gains there and the conservative nature of the New 
Zealand voter prevented a huge and uniform swing to give the League its 
hoped for breakthrough. Of those who finally opted for a main party vote, 
nearly a quarter seriously considered voting Social Credit during the 
campaign.123 
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A poll at the beginning of the campaign showed that Social Credit was 
seen as united, would govern in New Zealander’s interests, could be trusted, 
had the right leadership, would unite the country and was in tune with 
people’s aspirations. The only negative was that its economic policies would 
not improve the standard of living but neither would those of the main parties. 
The League had the most positive party image with Labour next but voters did 
not vote for it. National had a completely negative party image, completely out 
of touch with New Zealanders. Yet National was returned as government, one 
of the most ironic outcomes of the election.124 
After the election a Social Crediter observed, ‘I would not be at all 
surprised if Social Credit got the blame for splitting the vote and producing a 
“spoiler-effect” ’.125 Labour used this to discourage people from supporting 
Social Credit after 1978. But ‘spoiler’ results were becoming too common. 
Governments had been elected with less then 40% twice in a row, something 
last occurring in 1928 and 1919, a feature of the 1920s three party period. 
Historian and Labour MP, Michael Bassett immediately wrote a book about 
electoral politics of the time and implied that continued support for Social 
Credit could produce another period of three party instability. He believed that 
Social Credit had indeed played a spoiler role preventing Labour victories.126   
Many agreed that votes for Social Credit had distorted the result but did 
not realise that such distortions could occur under FPP without a third party. 
National won more seats than Labour, not from Social Credit interference but 
from National’s vote distribution compared to Labour’s in both elections.127 
Although Labour polled more than National overall, votes piled up in safer 
seats where they did no good128 and fell short in marginals it needed to win. 
National managed an effective spread of support that maximised its seats with 
fewer votes. 
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5.3.4 Failure or Success? 
 
Social Credit’s performance has usually been labelled a failure because the 
criterion was a significant breakthrough in seats. McRobie noted that two 
seats ‘were small recompense for the effort it had made, particularly when set 
against a 20.7% share of the total vote.’ Thus it ‘was grossly 
underrepresented in the new parliament.’129 In the setting of the rigid two-
party system prevailing after 1935 Social Credit was New Zealand’s most 
successful third party. Its 1981 vote has never been bettered, nor its 
proportion of the third party vote. Despite Mana Motuhake, the remnant of the 
Values party and strong Independent bids,130 Social Credit won 93% of the 
third party vote in a time of fragmentation. It had a presence in parliament for 
twelve years during a time hostile to third parties and no other third party 
exceeded its two seat haul.131  
As well as permanently detaching around 20% of the vote from the 
main parties, it changed voting patterns in another way. Professor Robert 
Chapman saw that, once the two-party system was fully in place by 1931 and 
the baseline vote for each party established in each category of seat, the vote 
shifted in them according to the rise and fall of the party vote nationwide.132 It 
did not apply to the Maori electorates and third parties could distort it, which 
could be used to track Social Credit’s changing profile.133 Support for the 
League in 1978 and 1981 had so distorted parallelism that nationwide support 
for the main parties was no longer reflected in seat categories but led to a ‘two 
elections’ profile instead. However, parallelism was what Social Credit 
needed. Les Hunter presumed that the League drew its support across the 
board and therefore was more uniform than either National or Labour.134 Thus 
                                                          
129 Levine and McRobie, From Muldoon to Lange, p. 67. 
130 Mel Courtney in Nelson and Aubrey Begg in Wallace. Begg took 13.4% of the vote. 
131 The Alliance and New Zealand First gained two apiece in 1993 but each party leader had 
the advantage of defending a seat from incumbency. Social Credit won its seats from scratch.  
132 He called this Parallelism. For his detailed analysis of it, see Robert Chapman, ‘The 
Response to Labour and the Question of Parallelism of Opinion, 1928-1960’, in Robert 
Chapman and Keith Sinclair (eds.), Studies of a Small Democracy: Essays in Honour of Willis 
Airey (Auckland: Blackwood and Janet Paul, 1963), pp. 221-252.  
133 Chapman in Chapman and Sinclair, pp. 234, 235, 238, 239, 249-251. 
134 L.W. Hunter, Better Democracy: The Case for Electoral Reform (Tauranga: New Guardian 
Publishing, 1979), p.11. 
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a uniform swing building on previous results would have piled up votes in the 
few seats it needed and given the League its breakthrough. ‘Protest’ voting in 
safe seats and the squeeze factor effectively smoothed Social Credit’s vote 
nationwide, not the type of uniformity it wanted. This raised the vote threshold 
to win seats and left it where it already was.135  
Despite the disappointment of only two seats, Social Credit drew 
comfort from its second placing in eighteen seats, including four Labour ones, 
and a strong third in six more.136 The League increased its vote in all seats 
but eleven,137 a good springboard for 1984. Social Credit was still determined 
to succeed under FPP despite its disadvantages. Using Hunter’s observation 
about the large amounts of votes needed to elect Social Credit MPs 
compared to National ones,138 Eden candidate, Alan Scott, calculated how the 
number of seats for Social Credit increased rapidly as the vote percentage 
went above 25%.139 This demonstrated that the system eventually would work 
in its favour but Social Credit’s real challenge in the days ahead was not how 
to gain more votes but to hold what it had. 
                                                          
135 The same effect occurred for the Liberal/Social Democrat Alliance in Britain in 1983. 
Although it took only 2% less of the vote than British Labour, its support was more uniform. 
The British Labour party, having an uneven spread of votes, consequently won nine times as 
many seats. 
136 Bay of Islands, Kaipara, Pakuranga, Papakura, Hauraki, Kaimai, Tauranga, Waikato, 
Matamata, Waipa, King Country, Taranaki, Waitotara, Wallace, plus the Labour seats of 
Mangere, Wanganui, Porirua and Sydenham. Its strong third placings were in Whangarei, 
Albany, Helensville, Waitakere, West Coast and Otago. It only came fourth in two seats, 
Nelson because of Courtney and Eastern Maori. Mana Motukake came second in all the 
Maori seats but Social Credit pushed National into fourth place in three of them. 
137 Hastings, Rangitikei, Horowhenua, Waitaki, Clutha and Eastern Maori. In Kaimai, 
Wellington Central, Nelson, Northern Maori and Southern Maori more votes were cast but the 
percentage was lower. 
138 Hunter, Better Democracy, p. 1. 
139 Alan Scott, ‘Voting Patterns Give Big Hope For More Seats’, Social Credit Guardian, 
December 1982, p. 12. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Decline of Social Credit 
 
This chapter charts the decline of Social Credit. The first part covers 1982 and 
1983 as Social Credit struggled to maintain its progress. It includes an 
examination of the Clyde dam issue and how much it damaged the party. The 
second part is about the impact of Labour’s revival, the emergence of the New 
Zealand party and the 1984 snap election. Included is an analysis of that 
election. The last part outlines Social Credit’s terminal decline after 1984. It 
examines what happened to the party and includes a short analysis of the 
1987 election. It concludes by answering why it could not recover as it had 
done in the past and with a brief history of events after 1987.  
 
6.1 Post 1981   
 
Social Credit’s fear after the 1981 election was Muldoon making good his 
threat of another early one to resolve parliamentary uncertainty.1 A confidence 
vote in parliament should decide whether a government survived but a 
government could call a new election at any time.2 National risked 
antagonising voters by having another one so soon. Labour governed 
successfully with only a majority of two from 1957 to 1960 but Muldoon had 
several backbenchers willing to cross the floor on some issues.3 With Social 
Credit abstaining on confidence issues bolstering his majority, Muldoon did 
not call an early election. Social Credit said it welcomed one to increase its 
representation sooner but wanted to minimise a vote squeeze in the event, so 
it concentrated on maintaining membership levels, organisational readiness 
                                                          
1 See, for example letter from Eden Social Credit candidate Alan Scott to Eden Branch 
members, December 14, 1981. Copy in author’s possession. 
2 New Zealand Herald, November 30, 1981, section 1, p. 6. Early elections had been called in 
Britain to resolve hung parliaments in 1910 and 1974. Several months elapsed before the 
next election and in 1910 the deadlock was not resolved. Rubenstein, pp. 43, 308, 309. 
3 Chiefly Derek Quigley, Mike Minogue and Marilyn Waring. 
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and quickly raising campaign funds.4 As the likelihood receded, an intensive 
fundraising drive to raise $2 million by 1984 was only launched at the 1982 
August Conference but by the end of September $325,000 was pledged.5 
Social Credit also wanted early membership and fundraising drives because 
both activities in an election year detracted from campaigning and might have 
cost it support in 1981. Both drives were to be completed by the end of 1983.6  
 National’s economic woes continued with inflation remaining high and it 
introduced an unpopular wage and price freeze in June 1982 that ran until 
February 1984.7 Social Credit criticised ‘think big’ for cost and viability, 
wanting renewable resources developed and channelled into small and 
medium business ventures. At the same time Beetham pledged a wise use of 
the balance of responsibility.8 The second aluminium smelter part of ‘think big’ 
was abandoned when major consortium partner Aluisse pulled out and put in 
doubt the need for a high dam at Clyde. Social Credit failed to gain political 
traction on these issues and also opposed Closer Economic Relations with 
Australia but this was neither popular nor sensible.9 Social Credit comments 
on the economy were overshadowed by the Clyde dam political blunder.  
 
6.1.1 The Clyde Dam 
 
Hydro-electric development of the Clutha River was never opposed by anyone 
but government plans for it were. National’s 1968 proposals would have 
inundated all the Cromwell basin and Clutha Valley. In 1972 National favoured 
a low dam but it was only low compared to the previous scheme. Labour’s 
plan of six dams in 1975 was to proceed regardless of protest. After National 
won in 1975 its new scheme involved one less dam by constructing a high 
dam at Clyde. This would save $40 million, generate more power and be 
                                                          
4 Social Credit Guardian, April 1982, p. 3 and July 1982, p. 9. Emphasis on membership 
renewal came straight after the election. See Social Credit Guardian, December 1981, p. 4. 
5 Social Credit Guardian, October-November 1982, p. 1. 
6 Social Credit Guardian, May 1982, p. 7. This was endorsed by Eden Social Credit. Eden 
Social Credit Branch Newsletter, March 1982, p. 3. 
7 Levine and McRobie, From Muldoon to Lange, p. 112. It did artificially reduce inflation and 
removed it as a major issue for the 1984 election. See the New Zealand Herald, July 7, 1984, 
section 1, p. 12. 
8 Social Credit Guardian, April 1982, pp. 1, 3. 
9 See, for example, the Social Credit Guardian, June 1982, p. 3 and ‘Socred Out of Step in 
CER Debate’, New Zealand Herald, December 4, 1982, section 1, p. 5. 
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finished four years earlier but would flood more land. In December 1977 water 
rights were granted to build it but National had already begun preliminary 
work. Electricity forecasting showed an oversupply with a recommended delay 
in commissioning the dam until 1991 but the proposed second smelter at 
Aramoana brought the date forward to 1989. After appeals the water right was 
rescinded, as the dam was not needed without a smelter. National wanted the 
high dam anyway and prepared a parliamentary empowering act to override 
the decision. The government treated legal procedures as formalities to be 
ignored, so it effectively trampled on legal rights in a dictatorial and 
undemocratic manner. Labour was going to act in a similar way in 1975.10 
 As National MP Mike Minogue intended to vote against the act, the 
government had no majority. Labour, under union pressure to support the 
dam, proposed a low dam. One Labour MP11 favoured the legislation and was 
amenable to pressure but Social Credit liked the low dam idea and opposed 
the ‘gross violation of the judicial and legislative processes.’12 However, 
Beetham and Knapp reconsidered their position and with two League 
spokespeople13 visited the area to discuss concerns with affected locals. They 
then believed that the government would override the judiciary by an Order in 
Council if the empowering act failed. It was better for parliament to make the 
decision rather than the government executive and Social Credit could gain 
concessions from National for its support. Beetham and Knapp did not want to 
see 600 families unemployed if work was halted. They did want guarantees 
on electricity pricing and an irrigation scheme for the area, and thought that 
extra power from Clyde forestalled the possibility of a nuclear power plant.14  
Social Credit agreed to support the dam on July 13. Dam opponents 
could continue with legal avenues but dam work continued, as Beetham and 
Knapp would support empowering legislation if needed. They wanted further 
concessions to satisfy Social Credit members annoyed at the policy reversal 
but Muldoon refused. He pressured them to continue, as they would look 
                                                          
10 This paragraph is a summary of Michael Bagge, ‘Dams Dividing Democracy: Conflict on the 
Clutha River’ in Tony Ballantyne and Judith A. Bennett, Landscape/Community: Perspectives 
From New Zealand History (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2005), pp. 117-132. 
11 Brian MacDonell who was later deselected for his Dunedin seat and joined Social Credit in 
the House as part of the ‘gang of four’. 
12 Social Credit Guardian, June 1982, p. 1. 
13 Environmental spokeswoman Pat Wojcik and Terry Heffernan. 
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foolish if they backed down. The Social Credit MPs capitulated and signed 
what was already agreed, believing they could successfully justify it. Muldoon 
then publicly stated that there was nothing in the agreement the government 
was not already going to do. In late August the dam could not go ahead 
without empowering legislation which was duly passed with Social Credit 
support. Having been hoodwinked by Muldoon Social Credit actively opposed 
the government after November.15 
 Social Credit failed to uphold a principled position or respect for legal 
processes. It lost the ability to attack both main parties on the issue as Labour 
was equally as vulnerable on its historical dealings over Clyde. Despite 
attempts to smooth things over with supporters there was a backlash with 
resignations that were publicised and damaging. Beetham was accused of 
acting hastily and without wide consultation. Although he obtained Social 
Credit executive approval many members thought the issue should have been 
held over to the August Conference and decided there.16 Beetham further 
undermined his position when he reneged on responsibly using the balance of 
power by voting on confidence issues. 
 Social Credit’s attempt to maintain a principled position was 
unconvincing and Clyde caused political damage. However, although the 
League lost support, it was not the fatal blow that some commentators 
ascribe.17 This appears to be based on the inexorable slide in the Heylen poll 
from mid-1982 onwards. Yet this did not begin until October, three months 
after Social Credit signed the agreement and over a month after the 
empowering act was passed.18 The New Zealand Herald NRB poll told a 
different story. Social Credit had slowly slipped since the 1981 election but at 
the end of July in the midst of the debate support perversely went up again, 
undoubtedly from generated publicity.19 In November Social Credit support 
was 18% only one point below its May rating. Beetham’s rating as preferred 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 Social Credit Guardian, August 1982, pp. 6-8. 
15 Gustafson, His Way, pp. 331-333. 
16 Miller, pp. 381, 382. 
17 For example, Miller, pp. 382, 383. Noted historian Michael King took this view. See Michael 
King, The Penguin History of New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin, 2003), pp. 444, 445. 
18 See Levine and McRobie, From Muldoon to Lange, p. 119. 
19 The NRB poll was conducted from July 31 to August 4. New Zealand Herald, September 4, 
1982, section 1, p. 1. Social Credit had 21% support. See also the Appendix. 
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Prime Minister did not change between May and November.20 Three things 
that did contribute to Social Credit decline were failure to spark interest in its 
policy, Labour looking credible after David Lange became leader,21 and the 
emerging New Zealand party. Social Credit also had no by-elections in 
winnable seats to refocus attention upon it.22 
 
6.1.2 The Name Change Issue 
 
Social Credit debated about its future internally prior to the August 1982 
Conference and included possibly changing its name to gather wider support. 
Knapp wanted a name to reflect a wide centre catch-all party to attract 
prominent dissidents rejected by the main parties.23 He backed the New 
Zealand Democrat name, also put forward by Beetham, who additionally 
suggested Social Democrat and the New Zealand party. Beetham keenly 
wanted a name change ten years earlier but was lukewarm now and Social 
Credit’s president thought a name change removed a unique point of 
difference from other parties.24 The membership ultimately shared this opinion 
and the only change was from Political League to party. However, the 
indicative membership poll for change had a very low turnout, showing that 
most members were unconcerned about the issue. Names voted on at 
Conference were Social Democrat, Democrat and Social Credit. There was 
some poll support for New Zealand party but it was not included.25  
Party direction and the name should have been more widely debated 
and perhaps deferred to the 1983 Conference.26 A more generic name 
implying a wider policy was adopted in 1985 but millionaire businessman Bob 
                                                          
20 New Zealand Herald, July 7, 1984, Section 1, p. 12. 
21 This provoked the real decline or, if one had occurred, prevented a recovery. Rowling 
stepped down as Labour leader at the same time the November 1982 NRB poll was released 
and this was the last time Social Credit support was that high. Until this time the party’s loyalty 
figures were around 82%, which also does not show any significant erosion. New Zealand 
Herald, December 18, 1982, section 1, p. 1. 
22 The next by-election after East Coast Bays was not until 1985. 
23 Miller, p. 387. Knapp identified Derek Quingley, Roger Douglas, Len Bayliss, Tony Neary, 
Justice Peter Mahon and Gordon Dryden as possibilities to recruit. Considering the problems 
that Gordon Dryden later gave the New Zealand party and the schisms Roger Douglas 
caused Labour, it was perhaps as just well that he did not succeed.  
24 Social Credit Guardian, July 1982, pp. 1, 6, 7. 
25 Social Credit Guardian, August 1982, p. 1 and September 1982, p. 1.  
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Jones and his followers took the widest and most patriotic name, the New 
Zealand party. There was no doubt about their political direction and the 
implication that it was good for the country was always there. Social Credit 
using the New Zealand party name was simply an extension of the 1981 
campaign slogan and this was missing from the debate. Understandably the 
leadership were reluctant for wider discussion through fear of creating division 
but this did not make the issue go away, although it could be argued that the 
later name change indicated a measure of desperation not existing earlier.  
 
6.2 Labour, the New Zealand Party and the 1984 Snap Election 
 
When David Lange became Labour leader in February 1983 Social Credit lost 
half its support, declining to 8-10%. Labour now seemed a viable alternative 
government and soared in the polls. Its honeymoon lasted until September 
when both Labour and Social Credit faced the New Zealand party, formed in 
August.27 Social Credit had clawed back a little support but then slid to 5% 
after the new party emerged and was just coming up again when Muldoon 
called a snap election. These three blows at six monthly intervals prevented a 
significant recovery. Social Credit had started to woo back support when the 
next event lost it more and the snap election sealed its fate. 
 When the New Zealand party registered in the polls, Labour support 
dropped drastically for six months before steadily climbing again. Perversely, 
National trended slowly up from the 1981 election to near the end of 1983 
when it also dropped sharply but was ahead of Labour until the leadership 
change. The New Zealand party gained rapidly between the end of 1983 and 
the beginning of 1984 but peaked at 18% and was dropping by April.  
Bob Jones often claimed that party support was drawn from National.28 
While it is likely that most of its voters were formerly National, it did not follow 
that they would vote National in the absence of a New Zealand party 
alternative. In fact the New Zealand party took initial support from Labour and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
26 Registration of proposed options beforehand including the New Zealand party name would 
have stopped Bob Jones from using it. 
27 The poll information for this analysis is in Levine and McRobie, From Muldoon to Lange, p. 
119 and the New Zealand Herald, July 7, 1984, section 1, p. 12. See also the Appendix. 
28 See, for example, the Dominion, July 16, 1984, p. 5; Daily News, September 3, 1984, p. 3. 
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then from National. Labour followed a similar pattern to Social Credit in that its 
support began recovering after six months of competition with the New 
Zealand party. It is possible that National’s support may have recovered 
somewhat closer to November if subject to the same pattern. The Heylen Poll 
showed that, indeed, National support bottomed out halfway through the 
campaign and was rising. Therefore, on the trends, an election in July was at 
the worst time for National.29  
 Muldoon called the snap election in mid-June and he reasoned that a 
campaign of only four weeks gave opposition parties little time to prepare.30 
Neither Social Credit nor the New Zealand party had all its candidates in place 
and the New Zealand party had yet to choose a deputy leader and finalise its 
manifesto.31 Labour decided its policies in a hurry and chose Roger Douglas’s 
free market economic ones. Labour had been leaning in this direction but it 
had not been debated properly in the wider party and was resisted in some 
quarters.32 The snap election produced a party unity that was more apparent 
than real. An election at the normal time with prior debates over free market 
policies would have caused rifts in Labour that National could have exploited. 
Bob Jones was galvanised into action by the short time available and he later 
confessed that if he had to carry the burden of the party until November he 
might have abandoned it. National was forced to campaign on its record, as it 
had not yet developed new policies. On June 13 the party executive 
calculated that it needed at least twelve weeks to build up its organisation and 
planned for a November election. There was no talk of a snap election and 
the party at large thought a later election gave them a better chance.33  
 
 
                                                          
29 The National caucus opinion was that the party’s position would only worsen if the election 
were later. Gustafson, His Way, p. 371. While the NRB poll seemed to support this view the 
Heylen one did not. Muldoon later said that National would not have lost by as much in 
November. New Zealand Herald, July 28, 1983, section 1, p. 3. 
30 Gustafson, His Way, p. 375. 
31 Social Credit Guardian, July-August 1984, pp. 1, 9; Josephine Grierson, The Hell of It: Early 
Days in the New Zealand Party (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1985), p. 97. 
32 King, p. 491. 
33 Gustafson, His Way, pp. 341, 342, 368-370. Gustafson notes on p. 373 that Keith Allen’s 
death a week after the election is likely to have precipitated an early election anyway, as he 
still would have been Tauranga’s MP. However, a later campaign would have given more time 
to strengthen National’s organisation and develop new policies. 
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6.2.1 The New Zealand Party 
 
The New Zealand party began as a Bob Jones protest against the National 
party’s policy direction. He intended standing against Ohariu National MP 
Hugh Templeton and hoped his intervention in a safe seat allowed Labour to 
win and teach National a lesson for straying from its philosophy. Many like-
minded people wanted to go further and start a party to do the same thing 
nationwide. So it began as a negative anti-National party with Jones driving it 
and initially developing its ideas. Its motto, ‘Freedom and Prosperity’, would 
have fitted Social Credit and its philosophy. Many of Social Credit’s principles 
were espoused by the New Zealand party such as individual freedom and 
initiative, self determination, private enterprise, private property, and 
economic policies leading to fewer economic controls so that businesses 
could thrive but the means to achieve them were quite different.34 Social 
Credit stood for the small owner-operator ‘in a world of big business, big 
unions and big government’ but it also wanted devolution of political decision-
making and individual enterprise with monetary reform to help it compete.35  
The enormous task of organising a party almost caused Jones to pull 
out until Muldoon called it a hoax36 but it was not. It became more than an 
anti-National protest and rapidly developed into a neo-liberal party espousing 
strong free market economic policies, striking a chord with a section of voters 
that meant it had to be taken seriously.37 This potentially damaged National 
most as it should have already taken up this philosophy as Thatcher did in 
Britain but Muldoon objected to the uncaring damage this did to the ordinary 
citizen so he resisted it. Jones claimed that New Zealand party intervention 
defeated National and forced Labour into free market policies.38 However, 
Labour’s adoption of them was not determined by the New Zealand party but 
from election time pressure to choose an economic policy quickly. 
                                                          
34 Peter Aimer, ‘The rise of Neo-Liberalism and Right Wing Protest Parties in Scandinavia and 
New Zealand: The Progress Parties and the New Zealand Party’, Political Science Vol. 40 No. 
2 (1988), p. 3. 
35 James, The Quiet Revolution, pp. 112, 113. 
36 Grierson, pp. 4, 5. 
37 See, for example, Stephen Levine, ‘They’re in Tune With the Voters’, New Zealand Times, 
January 8, 1984, p. 9. 
38 New Zealand Times, June 16, 1985, p. 3. 
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 The New Zealand party made one major political blunder from Jones’ 
impetuosity. Without consulting his economics committee, Jones compiled 
alternate budget figures to illustrate party economic policy. These contained 
serious errors and were discovered before publication but broadcaster 
Gordon Dryden used them to discredit Jones and further his own position. In 
the resulting public spat in May 1984 Dryden was rejected as Tamaki 
candidate and left the party.39 Beetham pointed out the budget errors during 
the campaign but this did not affect New Zealand party popularity.40 
 
6.2.2 The 1984 Snap Election 
 
Exciting and fresh, the New Zealand party had huge media attention during 
the campaign, making it harder for Social Credit to gain publicity for its 
policies.41 Social Credit was also conservative in its policy approach to try and 
win back support, so lacked bold initiatives to capture new voters’ 
imaginations.42 The snap election also caught it by surprise. Since the 
government survived despite active Social Credit opposition, it was expected 
to last until November. The party had raised $1.5 million of its $2 million target 
and its organisation was in reasonable shape to campaign. However, Social 
Credit had lost some of its better 1981 candidates. This left significant gaps 
and candidates of dubious quality came from hasty selections.43 
 Beetham’s speeches struck a better balance between policy exposition 
and rousing the audience but he did not have the impact of Bob Jones and 
                                                          
39 Grierson, pp. 72-85. The party was glad to be rid of him, as his overreaching ambition was 
a liability. The aftermath would partly explain support decline in June opinion polls. See, for 
example, Daily News, June 21, 1984, p. 1. 
40 See, for example, New Zealand Herald, July 13, 1984, section 1, p. 5. 
41 For a summing up of media attention, see the Dominion, July 13, 1984, p. 4. 
42 Miller, pp. 391, 402; James, The Quiet Revolution pp. 123, 124. The worker shareholding 
idea found its way into the 1984 policy but was not linked to low interest business loans or a 
development fund. See New Zealand Times, July 1, 1984, p. 16.  
43 Nevern McConachy did not recontest Kaipara but remained head of the campaign 
committee. His replacement, Bill Campbell, was also strong but not as well known. David 
Howes did not stand again in West Auckland (Helensville’s 1984 equivalent), Ross Doughty 
did not recontest Manawatu, and Estelle Brittain did not follow up her strong second in 
Porirua. Doug Conway did not contest Kaimai for a third time and his replacement Vic Haines, 
a former mayor of Te Kuiti and Labour candidate in the 1950s, was too old at 73. New 
Zealand Herald, July 4, 1984, section 1, p. 5. All replacements except Campbell failed 
abysmally. 
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struggled for a spark until the end of the campaign.44 He spent far less time in 
Rangitikei and his campaign tour included several days in the South Island 
that would have been better invested in shoring up his own support. Knapp 
spent most of his time in his marginal electorate although it was much safer 
than it seemed. 
 As in 1981 National was under siege in both urban and rural seats. The 
New Zealand party expected to siphon off National votes, enhancing Labour 
victories in the cities but it wanted more than a Muldoon defeat and sought to 
maximise its support. Jones compared attendance figures and, as his 
meetings numbered thousands to Beetham’s hundreds or less, concluded that 
Social Credit was a spent force. He attacked Beetham and Social Credit 
constantly as he realised that Social Credit was his main rival for disaffected 
National and anti-National voters.45 The New Zealand party destroyed Social 
Credit as a third party and largely ruined its chances of more parliamentary 
seats.46 It challenged Social Credit in areas of traditional strength and Jones 
claimed that the New Zealand party would win ten to twelve seats including 
Bay of Islands and Tauranga.47 
 Jones based this on party canvassing and audience size. As he had 
larger crowds than Muldoon and many National electorate committee and 
ordinary members deserted to join his party, he overestimated party support.48 
He complained that the press ascribed the size of his meetings solely to 
entertainment value and ignored the serious New Zealand party message, an 
                                                          
44 New Zealand Herald, June 29, section 1, p. 4; New Zealand Times, June 24, 1984, p. 19; 
Dominion, July 13, 1984, p. 4. 
45 Grierson, pp. 109, 114, 115, 117; Fyfe and Manson, pp. 24, 28, 48, 49, 55, 85, 98, 107, 
131-133; The Dominion, July 13, p. 4. 
46 Political columnist Tom Scott showed in a cartoon that Jones’ ‘clowning around’ had 
already destroyed Social Credit and posed a threat to the main parties. Scott, Ten Years 
Inside, p. 151. 
47 Fyfe and Manson, pp. 23,  78. He also expected to win Pakuranga but his candidate, 
Josephine Grierson, realised that Social Credit’s effort would keep her out. Grierson, p. 97. 
On the eve of the election Jones claimed up to twenty seats. New Zealand Herald, July 13, 
section 1, p. 5. These were grandiose predictions similar to Social Credit’s in its early days. 
48 Social Credit also had wholesale defections from National in rural electorates in 1981. It 
decimated the Otorohanga National party branch in 1981 as one example. The New Zealand 
party prize catch was Phillipa Muldoon, the Prime Minister’s daughter-in-law. New Zealand 
Herald, June 22, 1984, section 1, p. 3.  
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attitude that Beetham had no sympathy for as he considered it got far more 
publicity than Social Credit.49  
 Broadcasting time was the only issue the two parties agreed on. They 
complained about the extra time given to National and Labour.50 Otherwise 
they competed against each other. There was no electoral accommodation 
and Social Credit continued to run candidates in Maori seats, against Mel 
Courtney who stood again in Nelson, and against Independent Brian 
MacDonell in Dunedin West even though he was a party ally in parliament.51 
 Despite the New Zealand party and reduced support Social Credit 
hoped to hold its seats and win more because of much higher support in 
targeted seats than polls showed and pleaded for tactical voting in National 
seats.52 In Rangitikei, Wanganui and Waitotara a Social Credit pamphlet 
pointed out that it had a combined vote ahead of National and Labour in 1981 
and an increased vote there would put three Social Crediters in the House.53 
Although it seemed clear that Labour would romp home, Social Credit also 
hoped for the balance of power.54  
 
6.2.3 Outcome and Analysis 
 
Labour won as expected. National slumped to its lowest vote since the party 
began and Social Credit to its fourth lowest, failing to increase its vote 
anywhere except East Coast Bays. It lost less ground in target seats but only 
                                                          
49 New Zealand Herald, July 3, 1984, section 1, p. 3; Fyfe and Manson, pp. 61, 62, 64, 65. 
Jones added to this impression by openly admitting to outrageous statements for effect. The 
Dominion, July 13, p. 4. 
50 National and Labour had 115 minutes of allocated radio and television time compared to 80 
minutes for Social Credit and 50 for the New Zealand party. Jones also complained about 
receiving less time than Social Credit. Values, contesting 29 seats, was allocated radio time in 
these electorates but no television time. New Zealand Herald, June 22, 1984, section 1, p. 3; 
Daily News, June 21, 1984, p. 3. In 1981 Social Credit had equal time with the main parties. 
51 John Kirk, the other member of the ‘gang of four’ and Sydenham MP, contested Miramar as 
an Independent but did no campaigning. Daily News, July 2, 1984, p. 4. He finished a poor 
fifth behind Social Credit on 43 votes. 
52 New Zealand Herald, June 25, 1984, section 1, p. 5, July 2, 1984, section 1, p. 3 and July 
13, 1984, section 1, pp. 4, 13; New Zealand Times, June 24, 1984, p. 19. Seats it thought it 
could gain were Bay of Islands, Kaipara, Pakuranga, Hauraki, Tauranga, Waitotara, 
Wanganui and possibly Waipa. 
53 Social Credit Party, ‘The Winning Team’, n.d. [1984]. Copy in author’s possession. It made 
a misguided appeal along similar lines in a full page advertisement. See the New Zealand 
Herald, July 13, 1984, section 1, p. 10. This expanded the seats Social Credit thought it could 
win to fourteen and now included Rodney, Glenfield, Tongariro and Otago. 
54 Daily News, June 21, 1984, p. 7. 
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in Pakuranga did National’s vote fall more and allow Social Credit to prevail. 
Party strategist Henry Raynel had been in the electorate since February 
building up organisational strength and his prowess there gave him his third 
victory.55 Beetham lost support to the New Zealand party, from voters 
returning to Labour who chose to believe Beetham would still win and—most 
seriously—from boundary changes.56 He would have survived any single 
factor but not all three at once. 
 The New Zealand party claim that it ensured Labour’s victory by 
directly taking National support masked complex shifts. The New Zealand 
party did best where Social Credit was weak and vice versa but in some 
electorates both did well, splitting the third party vote so neither could win.57 
Opinion polls during the campaign underestimated New Zealand party support 
in Ohariu and Miramar and Social Credit support in East Coast Bays. In Eden 
the picture showed an overwhelming lead to Labour, who still won 
convincingly but there was some shift to the New Zealand party. In Pakuranga 
both Social Credit and National claimed to be ahead from their own polling.58 
There was a campaign shift to third parties in these electorates but overall 
there was also a shift to the New Zealand party from Labour as well as 
National. The impact of Jones’ meetings, strong party organisation and 
monetary resources gained it support over the campaign. 
 The New Zealand party appeared to perform the limited role that David 
McCraw previously gave Social Credit by acting as a two-step vote transfer 
from National to Labour. It seemed to take National votes in 1984 and pass 
them to Labour in 1987 in a similar way that Social Credit did in 1954 and 
1957. In 1984, though, these votes were already detached from National and 
many of them would have gone to Labour if the New Zealand party were not 
there as a more natural home. Therefore it impeded the transfer instead of 
facilitating it and this is seen in the NRB poll showing party support at the 
                                                          
55 New Zealand Herald, June 28, 1984, section 1, p. 28 and July 16, 1984, section 1, p. 20. 
Once Social Credit was at full strength in Pakuranga, Raynel intended to organise other 
electorates but the snap election prevented it. Raynel was unsure of pulling together a 
winning team in just four weeks. 
56 New Zealand Herald, June 29, 1984, section 1, p. 5; New Zealand Times, July 15, 1984, p. 
3; Fyfe and Manson, p. 169. Boundary changes alone wiped 1400 votes off his majority. 
57 Particularly in Bay of Islands, Kaipara and Tauranga. 
58 Fyfe and Manson, pp. 26, 31, 39, 60, 73; Daily News, June 29, 1984, p. 8; the Dominion, 
July 12, 1984, p. 1. 
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beginning of the campaign. National and Social Credit support did not change 
during the campaign but the New Zealand party increased by 5% at Labour 
expense and kept the third party vote high.59 Social Credit might otherwise 
have retained most of the 40% of New Zealand party support that came from 
former Social Credit voters. Some tactical voting by Labour voters did occur in 
target Social Credit seats but was only enough to win East Coast Bays and 
Pakuranga.60 Without the New Zealand party, Social Credit would have been 
stronger and thus tactical Labour voting might have been bigger.61 
 Alan McRobie reckoned that the impact of the New Zealand party on 
Labour’s seat majority was minimal. National lost no seats from New Zealand 
party intervention apart from Pakuranga and Labour did not win that.62 
However, the party prevented Social Credit holding Rangitikei, winning Bay of 
Islands and raiding the Labour vote to possibly win Hauraki and Tauranga.63 
Social Credit lost its position as New Zealand’s third party and beat the New 
Zealand party in only 15 seats, most of which were its targets. It was 
relegated to fourth place in 75 seats and pushed into fifth in five.64 The New 
Zealand party won 12.3% to Social Credit’s 7.6% by washing away much of 
Social Credit’s unconsolidated electoral soil.65 
Despite losing 13.1% of its 1981 vote, targeting paid off. Social Credit 
won two seats and came second in six more, four of them strongly.66 This was 
a far stronger position than 1975, 1972, 1963 and 1957—the other elections 
where Social Credit had a similar vote.  In fact it was stronger than any 
                                                          
59 At the campaign start Labour was on 48% and the New Zealand party on 7%. New Zealand 
Herald, July 7, 1984, section 1, p. 12. Labour won 43% in the election and the New Zealand 
party 12.3%. See also the Appendix. 
60 Again based on comparing special votes with the final result. In East Coast Bays, 
Pakuranga, Hauraki, Tauranga, Rangitikei and Waitotara the Labour vote fell by as much as 
4% during the campaign. 
61 For analysis of the New Zealand party impact, see Aimer, Political Science Vol. 40 No. 2, 
pp. 1-14. 
62 Alan McRobie, ‘1984: The End of an Era’, in Levine and McRobie, From Muldoon to Lange, 
pp. 134, 135. 
63 Winning Kaipara and Waitotara was unlikely due to a high National vote.  
64 Social Credit was third or better in all its target seats except Tauranga and even there took 
a much higher than average 16.5%. It also came third in Whangarei, King Country, 
Sydenham and Otago. Independents MacDonell and Courtney pushed Social Credit into fifth 
place in Dunedin West and Nelson (where it was only 100 votes ahead of Values). Mana 
Motuhake also did this in three Maori seats. 
65 Aimer, p. 13. 
66 Rangitikei, Waitotara, Wanganui and Hauraki. The other two, Bay of Islands and Kaipara 
could be built up again if the vote lost to the New Zealand party came back. 
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election apart from 1981 and 1978. Furthermore, apart from tactical and 
protest voting in target seats, it can be presumed that most people voted 
Social Credit because they believed in the party.67 These positive indicators 
potentially gave the party something to rebuild on. 
 
6.3 Terminal Decline 
 
After the snap election Garry Knapp declared that Social Credit’s lost vote 
was only on loan to the New Zealand party.68 He wanted Beetham to stay on 
as leader despite losing his seat, an opinion endorsed by Neil Morrison, newly 
successful in Pakuranga. Knapp would be Social Credit leader in the House 
while Beetham stumped the country rebuilding support.69 Beetham thought a 
party leader outside parliament lacked public credibility and he might have to 
step down but the decision ultimately lay with Social Credit’s August 
Conference.70 Both Social Credit MPs also wanted organisational changes 
including a youth arm to attract young voters and a new name.71 A New 
Zealand Herald editorial commented that picking up disaffected voters 
required more than a name change. It needed to convince voters that its 
economic policies were sound or change them.72 
 Organisational changes made included a youth arm and a divisional 
structure. The name change debate was held over until 1985 but Conference 
was more sombre than originally intended as Muldoon’s snap election 
prevented it being a publicity opener. It analysed the election and made plans 
to regroup. Beetham remained leader despite being outside parliament and a 
‘BCB’73 fund was set up to cover his full-time costs.74 However, this was an 
extra burden on top of normal election fundraising for the now struggling 
                                                          
67 The New Zealand Herald had this view. New Zealand Herald, July 16, 1984, section 1, p. 1.  
68 New Zealand Herald, July 16, 1984, section 1, p. 12. This claim was echoed by party 
president, Stefan Lipa. New Zealand Herald, July 16, 1984, section 1, p. 2. 
69 The Dominion, July 17, 1984, p. 7. 
70 The Dominion, July 16, 1984, p. 5; New Zealand Herald, July 16, section 1, p. 8. 
71 New Zealand Herald, August 4, 1984, section 1, p. 3. 
72 New Zealand Herald, August 6, 1984, section 1, p. 6. 
73 This was shorthand for Bruce Craig Beetham. 
74 Social Credit Guardian, March-April 1985, p. 2. It reached a total of $110,000 by March 
1985 and was expected to be much higher by the May target date. 
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party.75 Beetham had only previously been fully supported for five months and 
to ease pressure on the party Beetham resumed part time teaching.76 
 Prior to Conference Beetham made an insightful observation: 
 
The traditional voting patterns of the electorate are completely changing, 
and it is possible to achieve major swings, both with and sometimes 
against a nationwide swing. The pool of swinging voters continues to 
grow and grow and the strength of this group is sufficient now to make 
or break governments.77 
 
Social Credit examined voting patterns and noted they had been cyclic but 
were now highly volatile. From this it concluded that voters could come back 
to the party as quickly as they had left it.78 While theoretically true, Social 
Credit had to attract it or else it was not just ‘on loan’. Social Credit’s ability to 
recover was also threatened by the New Zealand party intention to carry on.  
Bob Jones insisted that the party was here to stay and would continue 
making inroads into traditional National party support and then take liberal 
Labour votes. Social Credit was now only a parliamentary vehicle for some 
members because it had long abandoned its founding ideals79 but Jones was 
attempting to position his party as the only one with political principles. The 
New Zealand Herald brutally stated that ‘only blind optimists’ would see Social 
Credit held seats as a positive endorsement of its policies rather than simply 
an anti-National backlash.80 While there was some truth in this assertion it 
was not the whole picture. If Social Credit could even partially recover, it could 
hold them but this was unlikely if National regained its credibility and if Labour 
free market policies proved effective and popular. 
The financial crisis caused by Muldoon’s refusal to devalue 
immediately following the election and his determination to remain leader 
damaged National’s popularity further but his replacement by Jim McLay at 
the end of November improved its position. Labour stayed as popular and 
                                                          
75 Miller makes this point. Miller, p. 395. 
76 Dominion Sunday Times, August 16, 1987, p. 17. He was fully supported after resigning as 
Hamilton mayor in October 1977 to February 1978 when he became MP. 
77 Social Credit Guardian, August 1984, p. 1. 
78 Social Credit Guardian, March-April 1985, p. 1. Its figures only noted the cycle for Social 
Credit votes and ignored the fact that third party voting had been high three elections in a row. 
It also ignored the fact that Social Credit’s vote stayed low for one or two elections following a 
decline and preferred to emphasise the volatility factor. 
79 Daily News, September 3, 1984, p. 3. 
80 New Zealand Herald, July 16, 1984, section 1, p. 1.  
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New Zealand party support settled around 10%. Despite Beetham’s attempts, 
Social Credit support returned to the pre-election level of 6%. 
 
6.3.1 A Name Change and the Timaru By-election 
 
Except that its residually strong organisation gave it two seats, Social Credit’s 
electoral position was essentially the same as after 1969. Despite the later 
O’Brien debacle two things helped the League then: an influx of talented 
young members and a dynamic new leader. Together they revitalised Social 
Credit by developing a solid organisation and revamped policies based on a 
modern version of Social Credit ideas. This was not true after 1984. Beetham 
was tired and jaded without a version of his dynamic younger self to replace 
him. Even in his decline there was no one to better him and he knew it. 
Neither Knapp nor Morrison had the needed leadership spark and their 
performance in the House did not gain renewed interest in Social Credit ideas. 
Recovery failure was not on Beetham’s shoulders alone. 
The 1985 Conference was moved back to May to ensure one before 
the next election. Social Credit planned for a 1987 election but thought one 
might happen in 1986 and wanted the bulk of fundraising done before then.81 
A name change was debated and accepted mainly because Beetham 
abandoned his lukewarm support of 1982 and lobbied hard for it. Beetham 
accepted that the word democratic was central to Major Douglas’s vision. He 
said that Douglas was interested in economic democracy with Social Credit as 
its mechanism and confusion arose from naming the car after the engine.82  
Social Credit was now the New Zealand Democratic party. However, a 
significant minority opposed the name change including the president and 
campaign committee convenor, Nevern McConachy, for the same reason as 
before: that the party seemed to be backing away from its principles.83 
Beetham brokered a compromise by incorporating Social Credit tenets in the 
party constitution and setting up a separate Social Credit Institute to 
                                                          
81 Social Credit Guardian, March-April 1985, p. 1. 
82 Social Credit Guardian, March-April 1985, p. 6. 
83 Social Credit Guardian, March-April 1985, pp. 7, 8.  
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guarantee that Social Credit ideas and principles continued in the party.84 This 
was similar to the time when the Social Credit Association uneasily co-existed 
with the political movement and added another arm to an already weak party. 
Beetham did not—or chose not to—notice the New Zealand party example 
that a bland name did not matter as long as its aims were clearly 
encapsulated in policy.  
The timing and location of the Conference in Christchurch allowed 
delegates to help fight the Timaru by-election caused by the death of Sir Basil 
Arthur and Henry Raynel ran the campaign. It was the last time the Social 
Credit name was used. Labour was unlucky that the by-election coincided 
with a National opinion poll lead and lost a seat held for 57 years. Raynel’s 
organisational magic was of little use in an electorate where Social Credit 
polled a poor fourth in 1984 and again competed with a buoyant New Zealand 
party for third party votes.85  
Social Credit and the New Zealand party increased their vote but only 
helped National win. While this confirmed Social Credit as a still struggling 
third party it had a far-reaching effect on the New Zealand party. Bob Jones 
wanted his party to win or at least give Labour a huge majority. He was 
pleased with Labour’s economic direction and helping it to lose a seat was not 
what he had in mind.86 National was still not sufficiently free market for him 
especially as Muldoon could resume leadership. Subsequently Jones 
unilaterally put the party in recess. If Labour strayed from the free market path 
the New Zealand party would be revived to re-champion the neo-liberal 
cause. Carrying on now was counterproductive. The executive and 
membership disagreed and continued on despite Jones’ departure.87 New 
Zealand party support plummeted and the Democrats regained third party 
spot despite a low rating. In March 1986, on the day Jim Bolger became 
                                                          
84 The Guardian, February 1986, p. 5. Don Bethune was its inaugural president and former 
Eden branch president, Tim Leitch, became its secretary.  
85 Miller, p. 395. 
86 For a full analysis of voting trends in the by-election, see NZ Listener, July 13, 1985, p. 18. 
On a strong turnout both Social Credit and the New Zealand party took Labour support, some 
of which stayed home. National held its 1984 vote and picked up some New Zealand party 
support in rural areas. 
87 See Aimer, pp. 5, 13. 
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National’s leader, the New Zealand party president announced a merger with 
it.88 A remnant persisted but it was effectively the end.  
 
6.3.2 Democrat Problems 
 
The Democrats were now the only third party of note but had troubles of their 
own. Efforts to regain lost support came to nothing.  Membership was about 
6,000 and, although much higher than the 1972 total, many activists had left 
or become inactive.89 The monthly party newspaper had always been 
published throughout the League period although restructured several times. 
In 1984 the editorial board made it a bimonthly publication but candidate 
advertising spreads paid for by branches in some target seats meant it stayed 
monthly during the election period.90 In mid-1985 it ceased publication until 
Waitotara candidate Stuart Perry relaunched it as a thin three times a year 
paper in February 1986.  
In October 1985 Knapp called for Beetham to step down as leader.91 At 
a time when he should have retired to become party elder statesman 
Beetham still thought no one could replace him and refused. It is not clear 
who would have taken over had he resigned. Knapp was front runner as 
deputy but his own threats to resign if he did not have his own way92 indicated 
prima donna traits undesirable in a leader—echoes of the O’Brien approach—
and he abruptly resigned as deputy leader in February 1986. Morrison won 
the post on the first ballot.93 This time Knapp had not threatened to resign 
beforehand and he also announced his retirement from politics after the 1987 
election but larger considerations were at play. Knapp had remarried in early 
                                                          
88 New Zealand Herald, March 27, 1986, section 1, p. 1. 
89 Miller, pp. 393, 394. 
90 See, for example, Social Credit Guardian, May-June 1984 and July-August 1984. These 
enabled an August edition to be published. Thus the July-August edition was actually a July 
one. 
91 Miller, p. 395. Knapp had backing from Lipa, Morrison, McConachy and Heffernan. The call 
was repeated at the November Dominion Council. 
92 Knapp threatened to resign as deputy leader in 1985 if the name change did not happen. 
Miller, p. 433. Since much of the name change success came from Beetham’s whole-hearted 
backing, Knapp’s threat seems to have had negligible impact. 
93 The Guardian, May 1986, p. 1. 
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1985 and was about to begin a new family.94 When he agreed to recontest 
East Coast Bays in late 1986 he mentioned the impact on his family life of 
being deputy. With lessened responsibility he could concentrate solely on his 
family and electorate. Intense lobbying emphasised his importance to 
continued third party presence in parliament and finally swayed him.95  
While Knapp enjoyed political life and wanted responsibility and his 
stamp on party direction, it was not the single-minded passion it was for 
Beetham or even Morrison.96 Knapp made a reasonable deputy but did not 
have party interests at heart the way Beetham did. Abandoning his nine year 
commitment as MP regardless of damage to the party or his own re-election 
shows this but he could not walk away from his political investment in the end. 
However, his political self-exile gave Morrison the platform to oust Beetham. 
Delegate scarcity deferred the 1986 annual conference to August. 
There Morrison became leader on a second ballot and Alasdair Thompson, 
candidate for Hauraki, was elected deputy.97 Compared to previous 
leadership battles it was tame, civilised and, for the first time, decided by vote. 
It still took its toll and Democratic support fell to 3%—the same as in 1972. 
The change had little effect and Morrison struggled to lift poll support above 
4%. Initially Beetham threatened to split from the Democrats and reform a 
Social Credit party98 but settled down to concentrate on retaking Rangitikei.99  
                                                          
94 Knapp had been married twice before and was separated when he became MP. Auckland 
Metro, March 1982, p. 38. 
95 The Guardian, December 1986, p. 5. This partially explains Lipa ruling himself out as 
candidate and the lack of Democrat activity as the selection date drew near. See New 
Zealand Herald, November 18, 1986, section 1, p. 15. 
96 Morrison wanted to be an MP enough to jeopardise his marriage over it. Morrison speech to 
Hawera Social Credit branch AGM, March 26, 1985. 
97 Miller, p. 397. Morrison gained 98 votes to Beetham’s 75. 
98 At the 1986 conference Beetham particularly objected to Morrison’s repudiation of the 
National Dividend. Miller, p. 397. Morrison was simply worried that Beetham’s renewed 
emphasis on an A + B theorem would lead to paying the dividend to cover the gap, a mistake 
Douglas made. See the Social Gredit Guardian, March-April 1985, pp. 5, 9. He was not 
repudiating the concept of a National Dividend to compensate citizens for an excess of 
unemployment caused in moving to a high tech industry base as part of a modernised 
integrated policy package. If that had been so, Beetham’s objection was understandable as 
this was the only thing likely to even remotely spark public interest. However, written 
Democrat tenets show that the former interpretation was the accepted one. The Guardian, 
May 1987, p. 4. Miller is right that Beetham shifted his position but he was trying to reconcile 
earlier views with Hunter’s later theories. See Miller, p. 398. This led him to the same 
erroneous conclusion about the purpose of the National Dividend held by many early Social 
Crediters. Morrison rejecting this view does not mean he stopped being a Social Crediter. 
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Social Credit’s plan under Beetham was to win power in 1984. After 
1981 this was set back to 1987. The Democrats now planned to do so by 
1993 but their initial goals were more modest: 10,000 members, 10% of the 
vote, $200,000 in the campaign fund and four seats.100 Membership was 
rising and, in anticipation of an August election, the 1987 annual conference 
was planned for June. Members were urged to attend, as the party wanted 
more than 300 delegates there.101 
 
6.3.3 The 1987 Election 
 
Differences with Beetham smoothed over, the party prepared for the 1987 
election. Report of an alliance with Mana Motuhake alarmed members but it 
was only for a joint private member’s bill to include third party representation 
on the Boundaries Commission. Morrison thought an electoral alliance in 
Maori seats made sense and talks were held with Values on how to maximise 
third party representation in the House102 but it never went beyond talks. The 
Democrats put up a full slate. 
The party went into the election with only 3-4% support and were 
pleased when it went up during the campaign, if only by 1%.103 It claimed to 
have the only sensible economic strategy but no significant group of voters 
seemed to be listening. Morrison was irrepressibly optimistic and said the 
Democrats would win five or six seats.104 He was thinking of the only six seats 
where they remained strong. Most commentators thought none would be won, 
particularly on falling support, but holding East Coast Bays was possible.105 
Labour was re-elected largely from a positive endorsement of Roger 
Douglas’s free market economic policies. National recovered significantly but 
                                                                                                                                                                      
99 Miller, pp. 398, 399. Beetham became involved in local politics becoming deputy mayor of 
Marton and deputy chair of the Wanganui Health Board. Dominion Sunday Times, August 16, 
1987, p. 17. 
100 The Guardian, December 1986, p. 5. The seats were East Coast Bays, Pakuranga, 
Rangitikei and Wanganui. 
101 The Guardian, February 1987, p. 2. and May 1987, pp. 5, 6. 
102 The Guardian, February 1987, p. 3. 
103 The Dominion, August 14, 1987, p. 6. 
104 New Zealand Herald, August 14, 1987, section 1, p. 8. As well as the main target seats he 
included Coromandel (formerly Hauraki) and Waitotara. 
105 New Zealand Herald, August 14, 1987, section 1, p. 1; National Business Review, August 
17, 1987, p. 8; James with McRobie, The Election Book, p. 82. 
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failed to dent Labour’s majority, let alone win. The Democrats were again New 
Zealand’s third party but in a parlous state. They won 5.7% of the vote, well 
up on the 4% poll rating they entered the campaign with but still their worst 
result. Social Credit might have obtained a similar result in 1972 without 
Beetham to rescue it. 
The third party vote was also on a thirty year low at 8%. The remaining 
vote was divided among a range of parties and groups including the rump 
New Zealand party, Mana Motuhake, Values and a handful of relatively strong 
Independents. This included Independent Labour ones protesting at what 
Rogernomics did to the New Zealand poor.106  
A positive response on Rogernomics was a last legacy of the snap 
election. Had National continued to the end of 1984 the 1987 election would 
have come after the October sharemarket collapse, making Labour’s re-
election considerably harder. As National espoused the same economic 
direction, it would have been difficult for them too, giving a critical platform for 
the Democrats to express an alternative economic policy. This might have 
regained support from newly discontented main party voters and maintained 
their parliamentary presence. However, with a rosy economic picture the 
Democrats struggled to make headway.107 
They came third in most seats but Mana Motuhake presence in the 
Maori seats, pushed them into fourth. Independents also did the same in four 
other seats108 and a combination of Independent and Values reduced the 
Democrat to fifth in Nelson.109 In their six target seats they maintained a 
strong second except in Waitotara, a strong third, but lost ground in all except 
                                                          
106 Since they stood in strong Labour electorates, it did not affect the outcome.  
107 Keith Allen’s death made an early 1984 election likely anyway and R.A. Anderson’s death 
in Kaimai in early 1987 may have convinced Labour to go early to avoid a by-election. The 
1987 election still occurring before October does not invalidate the point. 
108 A West Coast Independent and Labour Independents did so in Auckland Central, 
Pencarrow and Porirua and came close to it in Island Bay and Miramar. However, Democrats 
reclaimed third spot from the depleted New Zealand party candidates who stood in 31 seats 
and polled worse than fourth in twelve of them.  
109 Nevertheless he improved on his 1984 vote. 
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Wanganui.110 Hard hit by free market policies, Wanganui Labour voters 
stayed home or voted Democrat in protest but not quite enough to win.111 
Despite their woes the Democrats failed by only 600 votes to maintain 
two seats in parliament.112 Their position in seats was still better than in every 
election before 1978 except 1966. Winning two seats in 1984 solely from an 
anti-National backlash seemed true but closer analysis showed that National 
voters were only partially keen to return to the fold. Labour voters prevented a 
Democrat win in East Coast Bays and even in Pakuranga by supporting their 
own party rather than tactically voting Democrat.113 East Coast Bays showed 
less inclination to vote National than in 1980 and 1981 but a sharp return to 
National in Rangitikei meant that Beetham failed to regain it.114 In Wanganui 
the Democrats also failed to raid the National vote which increased by 1500. 
Taking a mere 20% of it would have seen a Democrat victory. 
Furthermore, consistent Social Credit voters since 1954 in 
northernmost rural seats, Bay of Islands and Kaipara, had deserted to both 
main parties. Neither seat was a Democrat target in 1987. So not only was 
former support still ‘on loan’ but more erosion took place in heartland areas, a 
serious problem for long-term Democrat prospects.  
 
6.3.4 Last Days 
 
Beetham stated after the 1984 election that the party had been around for 
thirty years and would still be around in another thirty115 but this was based on 
ability to continually bounce back after reversals. Political commentators 
                                                          
110 The Democrat vote dropped by 10% in Rangitikei, 8% in Waitotara, 6% in East Coast 
Bays, 2% in Pakuranga and only 0.6% in Coromandel. It rose by 6% in Wanganui. 
111 Terry Heffernan was only 27 votes behind on election night but the special votes took 
Labour’s margin to 248. This meant that voters switched to the Democrats during the 
campaign. Commentators considered it a possibility but a discounted one. National Business 
Review, August 17, 1984, p. 8. 
112 Knapp was only 311 votes behind National in East Coast Bays. 
113 The same Labour vote in East Coast Bays as in any of the previous three elections would 
have kept Knapp in. Further squeezing the Labour vote by only 0.5% in Pakuranga would 
have kept Morrison in. The same effect was also seen in Coromandel, Rangitikei and 
Waitotara. A total Labour collapse in any of them would not have given a Democrat win but 
Stuart Perry would have stayed second in Waitotara. 
114 A pattern for third party seats was emerging that has persisted. Once a third party has lost 
a seat it will not win it back. 
115 Daily News, July 16, 1984, p. 5. 
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continued to expect it116 but the reality was that members and activists were 
not replenished. New blood had a shorter time frame for success than the old 
guard and left when it was not achieved. Waitotara candidate Stuart Perry had 
no intention of always coming second so 1987 was a win or quit situation for 
him and he did not stand in 1990.117  
He was not alone. Alasdair Thompson also did not stand again in 
Coromandel and even Morrison retreated into local body politics. George 
Bryant produced his last manifesto for the Democrats in 1987. Beetham left 
and made good his threat to form a breakaway Social Credit party. Les Hunter 
became inactive after 1984 and subsequently ceased to have anything to do 
with the party. Keen as ever on monetary reform he rewrote his treatise on the 
evolution of economics in 2002.118 Nevern McConachy and many other 
stalwarts had retired. Stefan Lipa stepped down as president. Only Knapp and 
Heffernan were left.  
 In 1981 Colin James observed that New Zealand would be returning to 
a ‘normal’ two-party situation if the winner gained more than 45%.119 That did 
not happen then or in 1984 but 1987 was the strongest two-party race since 
1975. It seemed that the electorate’s flirtation with third parties was over and 
politics had returned to ‘normal’. In fact 1987 was abnormal and third party 
support flooded back in 1990, which resembled 1975 with two strong third 
parties.120 National still gained more than 45% of the vote but it was the last 
time any main party did so.121 
Bob Jones claimed that the New Zealand party ‘detribalised’ liberal 
voters by detaching them from traditional ties.122 This rested on the 
assumption that they came from National and went to Labour, a view already 
questioned and ignored the fact that Social Credit had detached voters from 
the main parties for three decades. The New Zealand party added to this 
process by attracting voters Social Credit had not reached but also included 
                                                          
116 See, for example, James with McRobie, The Election Book, p. 39. 
117 Democrats Waitotara News, n.d. [1987]. Copy in author’s possession. 
118 Les Hunter, Courage to Change: A Case for Monetary Reform (Mount Maunganui: 
Harbourside Publications, 2002). 
119 Colin James, ‘Figuring Out on Winning by Default’, National Business Review, November 
23, 1981, p. 25. 
120 With the Greens in Social Credit’s position and NewLabour in Values’. 
121 National came closest in 2008 with 44.93%. 
122 Daily News, August 17, 1987, p. 9. 
 130
many that would have otherwise supported Social Credit. Knapp’s comment 
about its support only being ‘on loan’ after the 1984 election really reflected 
his party’s inability to hold them once detached. 1990 proved that a slice of 
the 1987 vote was only ‘on loan’ to the main parties who had a similar 
problem holding it. Third party votes returned to the new third parties with only 
a small portion for the Democrats and Social Credit. 
Knapp’s attempt to regain East Coast Bays in 1990 was unsuccessful 
and, like Beetham earlier, he slipped further back. Heffernan came third in a 
tight three-way contest for Wanganui won by National.123 Beetham’s 
breakaway party fared better than O’Brien’s 1972 New Democrats even 
though only contesting two-thirds of the seats. It took 1% of the vote 
compared to the Democrats’ 1.7%124 but the Democrats were so much 
weaker than Social Credit was in 1972. Both predominantly gained fewer 
votes than Green and NewLabour candidates.125  
NewLabour broke away from Labour wanting a return to traditional 
Labour policies. The Greens were a New Zealand version of European 
political Green movements and built to some extent from the ashes of the 
Values party. NewLabour leader Jim Anderton restored third party presence 
to parliament by retaining the seat he won as a Labour MP but saw no future 
in a continually split third party vote. Since his party and the Greens occupied 
a similar position on the political spectrum and had many compatible aims, it 
made sense to form an Alliance. The Greens came in reluctantly and Mana 
Motuhake was also included.126 
Revived Social Credit disappeared again in 1991 and the Democrats 
only survived by joining the Alliance. There they punched well above their 
                                                          
123 Knapp was a poor second on 25% and Heffernan took 29%. National polled only 47.5% in 
East Coast Bays in a very good election for them. National won Wanganui with a vote less 
than Heffernan’s in 1987 because the Labour vote was split with the Greens and NewLabour. 
124 The Democrats did not contest the Maori seats or Rangitikei and Palmerston North where 
the Beethams were standing. Sadly Social Credit did not return the favour for Knapp and 
Heffernan. Beetham’s candidates beat the Democrats in 39 seats out of the 64 where they 
both stood (61%). 
125 Democrat and Social Credit vying for the same small vote pool meant that various 
Independent, Christian Heritage and McGillicuddy Serious candidates also often beat them.  
126 Matt McCarten, Rebel in the Ranks (Auckland: Random House, 2002), pp. 97-100. The 
small Liberal party formed by two breakaway National party MPs in 1991 also joined. For an 
analysis of how compatible the two parties were, see Raymond Miller, ‘Postmaterialism and 
Green Party Activists in New Zealand’, Political Science Vol. 43 No. 2, December 1991, pp. 
43-66. 
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weight. A Democrat candidate was chosen as Alliance flag bearer in the 1992 
Tamaki by-election and again in Selwyn in 1994, trouncing Labour and 
coming close to an upset win against National both times. Although their 
organisation skills and fundraising abilities were valuable to the Alliance it was 
clear that Social Credit ideas were not. When Winston Peters began the New 
Zealand First party, Heffernan defected from the Alliance and Knapp also 
joined him.127 This was a more natural home for them than the radical ‘left’ 
despite the fact that Peters was equally uninterested in Social Credit 
economics. It ruined any chance Heffernan had of winning Wanganui in 1993 
because of vote splitting and he later joined the National party. 
The Alliance and New Zealand First won two seats apiece in 1993, the 
highest third party representation since 1935 and the advent of MMP gave the 
Democrats two MPs under the Alliance umbrella in 1996. With the Alliance 
break up in 2002 most of the Democrats went with Anderton’s Progressive 
party and provided its backbone but support in the election that year was 
insufficient to return either Democrat. In 2005 a group of Progressive 
Democrats, some who had been active in Social Credit for many years, 
reformed a Democrats for Social Credit party although many Democrats 
remained with Anderton.128 The new party is faithful to Social Credit principles 
and contested both the 2005 and 2008 elections. It still exists despite a 
minuscule vote129 but the third party baton has well and truly passed on to 
other parties. 
                                                          
127 McCarten, pp. 111, 112, 114, 115, 145. McCarten claimed that Democrat ability in these 
areas was overrated (p. 102) but if none of their policy ideas were going to be adopted, their 
reluctance to organise or provide funds is not surprising. 
128 Trevor Barnard, one long-time Social Crediter remaining active and a main organiser of 
the 1980 East Coast Bays by-election win, stayed with Anderton. 
129 0.05% in each. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
The Legacy of Proportional Representation  
 
Social Credit championed proportional representation (PR) for a long time. 
This chapter starts with how the movement came to adopt PR as a policy. 
Then it discusses the ongoing debate on PR versus FPP and Social Credit’s 
contributions in the context of the 1978 and 1981 election results. Finally it 
examines the road to MMP, including Social Credit’s failed Fair Votes 
campaign, and sums up the party’s influence in having MMP accepted. 
 
7.1 How Social Credit Adopted PR  
 
Most third parties promote PR in a two party system from self-interested 
survival. The New Zealand Labour party did so when it began. Thirty years 
later in 1934, realising the system now worked to its advantage, PR vanished 
from the manifesto and stopped being a policy concern for fifty years.  
 Social Credit approached this issue completely differently. Following 
Douglas’s disapproval of ballot box politics and staying out of electoral politics 
altogether, it did not matter whether political representatives were elected 
fairly since the whole system was unjust and undemocratic. Even when the 
movement went political as a matter of survival, PR was not important as 
Social Credit expected to become government in a single bound. Only after 
continued election attempts locked Social Credit into permanent third party 
status at around 8% of the vote and no seats, was it adopted as policy. 
 Social Credit defined democracy as people with personal freedom able 
to freely elect and control their government and the economy to obtain socially 
desired results. Democracy was linked to changing the monetary system. 
Political reform meant giving electors the ability to remove representatives at 
any time rather than have them controlled by a party machine.1 The early 
                                                          
1 F.D Danks and G. Hinton Knowles (eds.), Social Credit is the Key (Wellington: New Zealand 
Social Credit Association, 1946), pp. 9, 13, 15. Social Credit’s democratic aspirations are 
close to political scientist Stephen Hoadley’s outline. See J. Stephen Hoadley, ‘Democracy as 
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League also guaranteed this for its elected candidates2 and by Beetham’s 
time it meant that MPs only had to support the monetary policy and could 
support other issues on merit or as guided by their electorates. 
 Cracknell’s belief that Social Credit would prevail by gradual electoral 
growth and his Hobson breakthrough meant that PR was not considered. One 
Social Credit policy added then was creating non-party elector organisations 
to liaise with MPs and for them to report back to electorates after 
parliamentary sessions. This ensured that representatives were accountable 
to voters.3 The 1969 electoral reversal caused Social Credit to put PR into its 
1972 policy.4 Social Credit also attacked the main party stranglehold on 
parliamentary processes for undemocratically excluding other political voices.5 
However, it recognised that the only realistic way to break this monopoly was 
to build up Social Credit so it could win sufficient seats under the present 
system to force change. Meanwhile Social Credit continued promoting PR and 
criticising FPP unfairness.6 
 This was considerably distant from where it started but reflected 
reluctant acceptance of political reality. It began as an influential apolitical 
pressure group and descended to an uninfluential minor party. Therefore 
Social Credit had to shift from ignoring electoral processes to accepting and 
working with them to have any success. This did not mean abandoning Social 
Credit ideals but submerging them in a political programme that outlined steps 
to achieve them7 and promoting PR was one step. Entirely consistent with 
Social Credit philosophy respecting individual freedom, true democracy and 
dislike of party, it chose the single transferable vote (STV) system that 
emphasised candidate quality at the cost of true proportionality.8  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Approach to the Future’, in J. Stephen Hoadley (ed.), Improving New Zealand’s Democracy 
(Auckland: New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies, 1979), p. 11. 
2 See New Zealand Social Credit Political League: Canterbury Branch, New Zeal for New 
Zealanders (Christchurch: Bullivant and Co, n.d. [1954]), pp. 4, 13, 14. 
3 New Zealand Social Credit Political League, 1969 Election Policy, p. 62. 
4 New Zealand Social Credit Political League, Policy in Brief: Basic Policy 1972, n. p. [p. 11].  
5 New Zealand Social Credit Political League, The Little Green Socred Book (Palmerston 
North: Orion Publications, 1972), p. 29. 
6 George Bryant (ed.), A New Society: What the Socreds Want (Palmerston North: Orion 
Publications, 1972), p. 8. 
7 See, for example, The Little Green Socred Book and A New Society: What the Socreds 
Want. They were also scattered throughout the manifestos in the relevant policy planks. 
8 This was specified in the full policy. New Zealand Social Credit Political League, N.Z. for All 
N.Z.’ers: Election Policy 1972 (Wellington: New Century Press, 1972), p. 46. 
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 Social Credit gained one seat in 1966 but was greatly under 
represented.9 Since support then waned because of the electoral cycle and 
internal wrangling, there was no great sense of unfairness. The common and 
academic view had the League functioning as an outlet for protest voters 
unhappy with the main parties. But the electorate was far less happy with 
main parties in the 1970s than in the 1960s although this was not clear until 
1978. In 1972 a landslide Labour government replaced a National one that 
lasted twelve years but was itself as comprehensively replaced just three 
years later. In this quest for satisfactory government, unfairness to third 
parties was easily overlooked despite attempts to bring it to public attention.  
 Third party voting averaged 10.5% during the 1950s and 1960s, once 
Social Credit became New Zealand’s permanent third party.10 It averaged 
11.5% in the early 1970s, a one-percent jump in just two elections.11 Now two 
minor parties had no voice in parliament despite an increasing vote share.12  
 
7.2 The PR Debate 
 
In 1974 Labour set up a parliamentary select committee on electoral reform 
so Beetham and future League president, J.S. Lipa, put forward proposals 
including adopting PR using STV.13 After the 1975 election Beetham began a 
nationwide campaign for PR aiming to create New Zealand’s largest petition. 
It was presented to parliament in August 1977 nowhere near that size. Both 
initiatives were ignored.14 Beetham argued for PR in the book Politics in New 
Zealand: A Reader and part of his article emphasised unfairness in the 1975 
result.15 What really brought home the injustice of FPP to everyone was the 
1978 election outcome.16 
                                                          
9 A proportional seat share of 14.5% would have given it eleven.  
10 Average of elections from 1954 to 1969. 
11 10.3% in 1972 and 12.8% in 1975. As change of government elections, shifts were 
predominantly from one main party to the other but some support was lost in the exchange.  
12 Social Credit on 7.4% and Values on 5.2%.  
13 Bryant, Beetham, p. 59.  
14 Levine and Lodge, pp. 33, 34; Levine, The New Zealand Political System, p. 77, 110. 
Levine was unsure whether the campaign failed from public opposition, lack of interest, 
distrust of Social Credit or lack of resources. See also Miller, p. 328. 
15 Bruce C. Beetham, ‘The Case for Proportional Representation’, in Stephen Levine (ed.), 
Politics in New Zealand: A Reader (Auckland: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 284-287. 
 136
  It began with the 1977 electoral boundary redistribution, regarded as 
favouring National. Party president George Chapman thought so and Labour 
emphasised the bias during campaigning.17 The charge gained credibility 
when the 1978 result gave Labour a lead of 0.6% but National had 50 seats to 
Labour’s 41.18 Third party voting soared to 19.8%. Social Credit’s share was 
16.1%, more than twice the 1975 total and its highest vote. Yet it only retained 
Rangitikei without adding more seats.  
Les Hunter, League parliamentary researcher immediately published a 
booklet to argue for PR, using the result to illustrate his points.19 First, not all 
votes were equal as it took twenty times as many to elect a Social Credit MP 
and one and a quarter times as many to elect a Labour MP as it did to elect a 
National one. Second, the result hung on 722 ‘super’ voters in six marginal 
electorates. If these had switched from National to Labour, the government 
would have changed and this gave them a greatly disproportionate and 
undemocratic influence. Third, single member electorates meant that at least 
50% of the votes were wasted if more than two candidates stood. Fourth, if 
most seats were marginal then the government could be changed on small 
voter shifts. If not, then contests were decided on small numbers of marginal 
seats changing hands and both gave distortions.  
The solution was multi-member electorates using STV to reduce vote 
wastage and the effect of electoral boundaries, thus producing a roughly 
proportional result. Hunter recommended three to nine seats per electorate 
and a minimum of 120 seats.  Maori seats would be abolished or New 
                                                                                                                                                                      
In 1978 Values campaigned for PR with Social Credit, drawing attention to the unfair 1975 
result in their manifesto. 
16 See, for example, Martin Holland, Electoral Behaviour in New Zealand (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), pp. 6, 7; Howard R. Penniman (ed.), New Zealand at the Polls: The 
General Election of 1978 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 68, 69, 96-
98; Levine, The New Zealand Political System, pp. 110-112.  
17 Alan McRobie, ‘The Electoral System and the 1978 Election’, in Penniman (ed.), New 
Zealand at the Polls, pp. 78-84. McRobie indicated that its effect in general electorates was to 
correct a 0.5% bias towards Labour. Only when including Maori seats was there an overall 
bias to National. Chapman used this to fudge the unfairness of 1978. Chapman, The Years of 
Lightning, pp.187, 188. 
18 National later gained Hunua from an electoral petition. When the Courts overturned the 
official election result based on rigorous interpretation of electoral law ignoring the clear intent 
of mainly Labour voters, it merely rubbed salt into the wound. For details, see Penniman, pp. 
251-264. 
19 L.W. Hunter, Better Democracy: The Case for Electoral Reform (Tauranga: New Guardian 
Publishing, 1979). It was done so quickly that an erratum was added for the changed Hunua 
result. 
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Zealand treated as one multi-member Maori seat.20 He also wanted the 
Representation Commission to include party representatives from National, 
Labour, Social Credit and one for the rest.21 However, no matter how 
eloquently Social Credit argued for PR or changes to the Commission, major 
parties were not going to adopt something that removed their advantages 
unless the electorate forced them and there seemed no chance of that.22  
With increased public interest in electoral change, a book came out in 
late 1979 on improving New Zealand’s democracy. Taking a wide view, it 
pointed out how unrepresentative parliament was by age, gender, ethnicity 
and occupation. It suggested that government processes needed to be 
augmented with referendums, decentralisation with direct democracy, and 
industrial democracy along with a possible Bill of Rights.23 Such 
augmentations had been Social Credit ideas since the time of Douglas. More 
specifically, the electoral system needed reform to give votes equal weight 
and increased MP numbers to curtail executive mediocrity. Political scientist 
Nigel Roberts argued for PR as a way to overcome both nationwide and 
regional unfairness. His survey, similar to Hunter’s, demonstrated that 
overseas experience showed that PR gave stable, tolerant government with 
better voter representation and candidate choice despite large numbers of 
parties in some countries. His conclusion, like Hunter’s, was that governments 
were stable or otherwise regardless of the voting system.24  
A Social Credit survey in the Eden electorate in June 1981 showed 
69% support for PR.25 Even in true blue Karori 44% were in favour.26 One of 
Social Credit’s single page policy papers for the election was on electoral 
reform. It stated that continued election of New Zealand governments on 
minority votes was undemocratic and pointed out the value of PR.27 Professor 
                                                          
20 In previous elections Social Credit policy was abolition but in 1980 it decided to retain them. 
Social Credit Guardian, November 1980, p. 2.  
21 Hunter, Better Democracy, pp. 1, 2, 10-18, 23, 24, 28, 29. 
22 See Levine, The New Zealand Political System, p. 112; McRobie in Penniman, p. 98. 
23 Hoadley, Improving New Zealand’s Democracy, pp. 50-52, 70, 71, 98, 127-129, 140-142. 
24 Hoadley, pp. 26, 30, 31; Nigel S. Roberts, ‘PR: Lessons From Abroad’, in Hoadley, pp. 73-
81; Hunter, Better Democracy, pp. 5-8. 
25 N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch Newsletter, September 1981, p. 4. 
26 Jeffrey Sheerin, ‘The People and the System: A Second Look’, Political Science Vol 33 No 
2 (1981), p. 203. Only 36% were against. 
27 Social Credit Policy Paper Number 7: Electoral Reform, Campaign Committee, NZSCPL, 
1981. 
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Robert Chapman, arguing for FPP, noted that one of its strengths was a 
majority of voters, namely those voting for the two main parties, deciding 
between alternative governments by majority. A single aberration from a bad 
redrawing of boundaries was no reason to discard it.28 
However, the 1981 election on the same ‘bad’ boundaries, gave the 
same outcome. Social Credit increased its vote to 20.7% out of a total third 
party vote of 22.2%. This time it held two seats but, since the League again 
won a seat in a by-election, it again took no more. Labour’s lead over the 
government was only 0.2% but National held four more seats and a slim 
overall majority of two. Twice the second placed vote winner had come first in 
seats with third party voters severely under represented. This time if 263 
‘super’ voters in four marginal electorates had switched from National to 
Labour the result would have been reversed.29 If the system was so sensitive 
that altering electorate boundaries alone changed the outcome and ensured 
that second choice could continue winning, then Hunter’s idea of multi-
member electorates mitigating this made sense.30 
 Another interpretation of the two outcomes was that the Social Credit 
vote distorted the results but this was not new. Governments elected on 
minority votes in the rigid two-party period came about because Social Credit 
appeared on the political stage, so it had already permanently distorted 
election results.31 However, governing parties usually had support over 45%. 
While the two main parties had around 90% of the vote and the leader formed 
the government, this seemed acceptable. Now the main party share was 
below 80% with single party governments elected with less than 40%. When 
Social Crediters and others pointed out that 60% of voters had voted for 
neither National nor Labour in 1981 to show the injustice of FPP, the rejoinder 
was that 80% had not voted Social Credit either.32 Robert Chapman used this 
                                                          
28 Robert M. Chapman, ‘On Democracy as Having and Exercising a Clear Choice of 
Government’, in Hoadley, p. 86. 
29 Taupo, Eden, Gisborne and Helensville. See The Social Credit Guardian, June 1982, p. 8. 
Its article actually stated 915 ‘super’ voters in six marginal electorates but this is wrong. 
30 Hunter, Better Democracy, pp. 14, 15. MMP divorced the party vote from the electorate 
vote so electorate boundaries are not a factor at all. STV would have reduced boundary 
effects but not eliminated them. 
31 1890 to 1908 were majority governments except for 1896. 1911 to 1928 were all minority 
governments because of three parties operating. 1931 to 1951 were majority governments 
except for 1935 and 1943. All governments since 1951 have been minority ones. 
32 See, for example, the New Zealand Herald, December 3, 1981, section 1, p. 20.  
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argument with 1978 figures to indicate that PR would foist Social Credit ideas 
on policy and therefore ‘one-sixth [of the voters] proposing to sway the other 
five-sixths.’33 Under PR a minor party can have influence beyond its vote 
share34 but Chapman’s view implied that it would be more unfair than FPP. 
 However, third parties have an unfairly high vote threshold to overcome 
for success under FPP and where support is evenly spread across all 
electorates almost impossibly high. Analysing this effect by boosting Social 
Credit’s vote in National and Labour seats, the same 1981 outcome was 
possible with Social Credit taking over 40% and National winning with only 
28.5%.35 As a third party Labour circumvented this threshold by concentrating 
its vote in working class urban electorates. Therefore it held a presence in 
parliament but with insufficient support to advance. Only when it appealed to a 
wider constituency in the Depression did Labour become the government. 
However, the uneven spread persisted and prevented it being the government 
later. This weakness showed up clearly in 1978 and 1981 and only changed 
in 1984 when new policies again attracted a wider electoral group. Had Social 
Credit succeeded in developing a similar seat winning sectional base, it may 
have had similar problems progressing to the Treasury Benches. Chapman 
observed that Labour stalled in the 1920s but blamed policy and not uneven 
vote distribution. He argued that new third parties needed the FPP gateway 
effect until they learned to develop sensible broad policies whereas under PR 
silly policy would be forced on the government despite misgivings of most 
voters.36 Chapman assumed that third parties would not have good policy to 
start with. Even if this was true and they eventually developed it but voters 
gave them an even vote distribution, a 40% gateway was ridiculously 
excessive. In Labour’s case as a third party, it was capriciously much lower.37 
                                                          
33 Chapman in Hoadley, pp. 87, 88.   
34 The major partner must ensure it does not. 
35 The FPP boundary condition vote for one party winning a bare majority is 25.5x%, where 
0<x<0.1 and ‘x’ depends on the number of seats, how many electors are in them, and 
whether the majority is one or two. It assumes electorates of equal size and a steady non-
vote. Where these are not equal or more than two parties run, this percentage can be smaller. 
36 Chapman in Hoadley, pp. 89, 90. Therefore Labour’s lack of success in the next 35 years 
was because it had to relearn to make sensible policy as a major party or Social Credit’s 
distortion effect meant the voters were stuck with National’s ‘inferior’ policy.  
37 But Chapman also argues that a third party must capture a sectional base first to prove 
itself. Chapman in Hoadley, pp. 90, 91. So, therefore, a third party under FPP must start with 
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Further unfairness came from the 1981 reconfiguration analysis giving 
Labour 30%. Now National not only could win with little more than quarter of 
the vote but also could come third and still govern.38 Could Robert Chapman 
consider this aberration an acceptable outcome even if only once? If the sole 
function of FPP was so a single governing party could do so undiverted—that 
is, without having to alter policy to accommodate impracticable third party 
ones, as Chapman inferred—then he might.39 While New Zealand voters liked 
FPP decisiveness, a majority did not like a system that delivered seats 
tenuously related to voter support, ignored sizeable third parties, allowed the 
second largest party to govern, and had few checks on single party 
government executive power. 
 
7.3 The Fair Votes Campaign  
 
Social Credit’s reaction appeared in the December 1981 Guardian. On the 
cover a pie graph superimposed on parliament buildings showed the 
proportion of votes for National, Labour and Social Credit along with the seats 
for each. The headline read, ‘Democracy?’ Inside it said: 
 
[O]ne outcome that cannot be denied—the renewed debate of the merits 
of proportional representation. If the situation in 1978 did not bring any 
conclusive result from a similar debate, the ludicrous situation in 1981 
demands that the matter be faced squarely and resolved.40 
 
February’s issue examined New Zealand political institutions and looked at 
PR. While observing that growing numbers of people wanted change, it 
acknowledged that ‘the present system,…favouring the two major parties, is 
the one that they prefer. Making any change is not going to be easy’.41 When 
Social Credit seemingly held the balance of power after the 1981 election 
                                                                                                                                                                      
a narrow policy, appealing to a small—but not too small—section, and then widen it. This 
makes no sense. 
38 It could be argued that none of this would actually happen. However, Alberta Social Credit 
won 41.1% but only four seats out of 75 in 1971. In 1993 National won a bare majority on 
35.1%, the lowest support for a single party government since parties began in New Zealand. 
With Labour on 34.7% and the third party vote at 30.2%, it is not far from a vote configuration 
that would put National third and still win. 
39 See Chapman in Hoadley, pp. 86, 94. 
40 Social Credit Guardian, December 1981, pp. 1, 3. 
41 Social Credit Guardian, February 1982, p. 9. 
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Beetham wanted any Social Credit accommodation or coalition deal linked to 
adopting PR but nothing eventuated.42 
Buoyed by an NRB poll in March 1982 showing that 54% of voters 
wanted an alternative to FPP and 36% favoured PR, deputy leader Knapp 
promised to revive a petition.43 This began the Fair Votes Campaign, intended 
to gather sufficient signatures electorate by electorate to force the government 
to take notice. As preparation, PR seminars were organised for Social Credit 
members and the general public. Candidates ran them to help raise their 
profiles. Auckland’s West Region held one at Epsom Teachers Training 
College on June 20, 1982 involving all its candidates.44 An impromptu mock 
STV election was held treating five of the seven West Region electorates as a 
single multi-member electorate using the 1981 figures to show how more 
representative it was. Social Credit would have gained a seat from Labour.45 
Seminars were backed up with articles in the Social Credit Guardian.46 
 It was a good start, gaining initial publicity. Knapp’s plan of breaking it 
down into electorate bites made it manageable. Most of the work was to be 
completed by Christmas and an overwhelming petition for change presented 
to parliament by the middle of 1983. He wanted it done quickly while the issue 
was large in the public mind and enthusiasm high amongst Social Crediters. 
                                                          
42 New Zealand Herald, November 30, 1981 section 1, p. 1 and December 1, 1981, section 1, 
p. 1. See also National Business Review, December 7, 1981, p. 6. 
43 New Zealand Herald, March 11, 1982, section 1, p. 3; Social Credit Guardian, April 1982, p. 
5. Knapp doing it instead of Beetham also meant it could be seen as a new initiative and not a 
second try at a failed one. 
44 N.Z. Social Credit Political League Eden Branch Newsletter, June 1982, p. 1. David 
Shields, politics lecturer from Waikato University, was guest speaker to explain PR. The 
newsletter also observed that FPP was not good enough to elect the National party president. 
45 The electorates were Helensville, Mt. Albert, New Lynn, Te Atatu and Waitakere. STV gave 
Labour three seats (60%), National one (20%) and Social Credit one (20%), compared to 
Labours’ four (80%) under FPP. This example still was too disproportionate and only gave 
benefits to Social Credit. It would have been better to also include multi-member examples 
from both National and Labour strongholds to show how proportionality could benefit 
everyone by redistributing some seats to all parties. As well, instead of being happy that a 
Social Credit MP would have been elected, Waitakere candidate, Pat Wojcik, was more 
concerned that the last successful place was a contest between her and the Helensville 
candidate. It showed STV’s main weakness that good candidates from the same party could 
be pitted against one other.  
46 See, for example, Social Credit Guardian, February 1982, pp. 4-9, 11, 12, March 1982, p. 
12 and June 1982, pp. 5-8. Most Social Crediters readily accepted PR from disappointment 
about 1981 although some opposed STV. For arguments against STV, see the Social Credit 
Guardian, September 1982, p. 2, and rebuttals of them in the Social Credit Guardian, 
October-November 1982, p. 2 and February 1983, p. 12. 
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 He was right but the campaign was too rushed and competed with 
other priorities. With the threat of another election in early 1982 branches 
wanted to boost membership and raise campaign funds as quickly as 
possible. Larger branches made better headway with Fair Votes but smaller 
ones struggled. Knapp also had many other public and party demands on 
him, which meant he was unable to oversee the process properly. No 
provision was made for strong branches to help weak ones, all branches had 
to find their own resources individually and no nationwide advertising kept the 
issue in the public mind.  Social Credit’s own goal over the Clyde Dam 
diverted attention from the campaign.  
Slow branches saw Knapp’s reminders to finish their share as irritating 
and demanding, which provoked resistance. Some did remarkably well. 
Lyttelton and Sydenham were largely completed by February 1983 but Eden 
still had a substantial amount left and Hastings, a large branch, had not even 
begun.47 With Social Credit stalled on fundraising and membership and 
worried about its decline in opinion polls, the Fair Votes Campaign fell further 
in priority as 1983 wore on. Eventually Knapp gathered what he had and 
presented it to parliament in early 1985. Fair Votes gained 46,000 signatures, 
far short of expectations and only 5,000 more than Beetham’s 1974 petition. 
Social Credit considered that it triggered the Royal Commission on Electoral 
Reform48 but the 1974 petition had not sparked one and it really came about 
from wide debate on the unfair 1978 and 1981election results. 
Fair Votes failed and wasted Social Credit time and energy. Apart from 
the lack of solid co-ordination and conflict with more important branch 
priorities it did not produce the massive groundswell of public opinion needed 
to succeed. It slowly ran out of steam months after it should have been 
abandoned and even failed as a historical marker on the road to PR.49 Knapp 
gained far greater impact when he and twelve party members barricaded 
                                                          
47 Social Credit Guardian, February 1983, p. 11. 
48 Social Credit Guardian, March-April 1985, p. 4.  
49 It only appears in Raymond Miller’s thesis as a policy in a list. Miller, p. 385. Beetham’s 
original petition was mentioned in several places including an article on PR written on August 
21, 2003 featured on the Green website. Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, ‘PR - How 
the People Let Themselves in - Part I’, retrieved from <http://www.greens.org.nz/node/16146> 
on August 16, 2009. Also see footnote 14. 
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themselves in one of parliament’s rooms on Guy Fawkes’ Day, 1988 to 
protest at Labour’s failure to hold a PR referendum.50  
 
7.4 The Road to MMP 
 
The 1984 election result continued to expose FPP flaws. Labour won but its 
43% vote was the fourth lowest single party win since party politics began.51 
Third parties took 21.1%, down slightly on 1981, but still only had Social 
Credit’s two representatives. The New Zealand party won none despite polling 
12.3% to Social Credit’s 7.6%. This added fuel to the debate. 
Concerned about excessive executive power that the electoral and 
parliamentary structure gave Muldoon’s government and responding to public 
anger about FPP unfairness, Labour promised reform if elected in 1984. A 
Royal Commission on electoral reform recommended PR using the MMP 
system when it reported back in 1986. Labour did not hold the suggested 
referendum at the 1987 election, provoking Knapp’s parliamentary protest. 
In January 1987 the Electoral Reform Coalition (ERC) began and was 
big enough for a conference in March. By the middle of the year it had 1,000 
supporters, several patrons and a dedicated activist group. It drew from a 
number of parties and political persuasions including Labour, Values, Social 
Credit (Democrat), trade unions, and the Women’s Electoral Lobby. 
Focussing exclusively on electoral reform, it promoted this as an issue for the 
election.52 This was exactly what Knapp attempted with Fair Votes but, not 
tied to one party, its purpose was undiluted. 
The ERC put pressure on Labour throughout the 1987 term but it 
reneged on a 1987 campaign promise for a binding referendum. National 
promised one concurrent with the 1993 election depending on the result of an 
indicative one in 1992. When this was overwhelmingly for change, the ERC 
campaigned successfully for PR because it effectively tapped into the 
                                                          
50 See Martin, p. 317; Raymond Miller, ‘Minor Parties’, in Hyam Gold (ed.), New Zealand 
Politics in Perspective (Third Edition) (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), p. 321. 
51 1919, 1978 and 1981 were lower. Reform won 37% in 1919. 
52 Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, ‘PR - How the People Let Themselves in - Part I’, 
retrieved from <http://www.greens.org.nz/node/16146> on August 16, 2009. 
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groundswell for change in a way that Social Credit could not. 54% of electors 
voted to introduce MMP.53 
Despite failed petitions Social Credit efforts were important on the road 
to PR. For fifteen years from 1972 the League tirelessly advocated it with 
other third party, academic and journalistic voices joining the chorus from time 
to time to keep the issue in the public ear. When Social Credit ceased to be 
an important third party, the ERC formed to take the cause onward to victory 
when the overwhelming clamour of public support finally came. Social Credit’s 
most eloquent voice was its election results. 1978 and 1981 clearly spoke of 
FPP’s unfairness with 1984 confirming it. 
Social Credit did not manage to remould two party politics to achieve 
significant representation or become a major party. However, from 1978 on it 
helped detach 20% of voters from the main parties who became permanent 
supporters of minor parties.54 Ultimately this distorted FPP too far for wide 
acceptability and unnecessary promises for reform from the two main parties 
trying to embarrass each other led to MMP. Even under the old system Social 
Credit forced change. From 1946 when the last Independent vanished from 
parliament third parties were absent from the House until 1978, except for 
Vern Cracknell’s three year stint in Hobson. After 1978 National and Labour’s 
monopoly was broken. Apart from the three years between 1987 and 1990 
third parties have been represented ever since.55 
Social Credit’s hope of STV with its emphasis on the quality of 
candidates was not realised.56 MMP’s strong emphasis on party would have 
been disliked by older Social Crediters antipathetic to party systems. 
Nonetheless it was much superior to FPP. MMP came too late for Social 
Credit57 but its efforts paved the way for later third parties to reach parliament. 
                                                          
53 For more details, see Martin, pp. 317, 318; Colin James and Alan McRobie, Turning Point: 
The 1993 Election and Beyond (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1993), pp. 123-128; Jack 
Vowles et. al. Proportional Representation on Trial (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 
2002), pp. 2, 3. 
54 The 8% third party vote in 1987 was only temporary. The average third party vote from 
1978 to 1993 was 20%. 
55 Another 250 Democrat votes in Wanganui in 1987 would have kept it unbroken. 
56 STV made a late rally in the 1992 indicative referendum to be just ahead of FPP. If it had 
been a true run-off election in 1993, the choice would have been between MMP and STV. 
57 Apart from two Democrat MPs as part of the Alliance from 1996 to 2002. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusion 
 
The baldest judgement of Social Credit’s long history in New Zealand is that it 
failed and all its effort essentially wasted. It barely achieved representation 
with only a remote chance of forming a government. To argue that it faced an 
extremely unfair electoral system and further argue that it achieved some 
minor political victories, while true, seems like looking for consolation as the 
movement itself often did following a disappointing election result. 
 
8.1 The Electoral System: Periods, Effects and Theories  
 
Yet Social Credit did face an unfair system and this is important in its history. 
Furthermore it lasted longer and did better than any third party in New 
Zealand political history. Comparison with Labour’s early history is invalid. 
Certainly Labour progressed from a third party to a governing one and is the 
only one to have done so but its progress happened under an electoral 
system far friendlier to third parties. Labour’s success led to the view that third 
parties could succeed despite the system but underlying this was the 
assumption of a homogenous electoral system over time. In fact New Zealand 
had three different electoral periods between 1890 and 1993. 
 The first, between 1890 and 1935, was a flexible two-party period that 
allowed third party and other representation. Labour became established in 
this period. The second was a rigid two-party period in which it was 
impossible for third parties to progress due to a limited third party vote and 
this operated from 1935 to 1969. From 1972 to 1993, growing long-term 
dissatisfaction with the main parties led to a continually increasing third party 
vote but this tended to be split among a number of third parties. It was 
possible for a third party to succeed in this last rigid two-party period with 
fragmentation but it was still very difficult. 
So Labour’s incredible run of political good fortune rapidly established it 
a foothold in parliament between 1908 and 1919 despite internal divisions 
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arguably as bad any of Social Credit’s.1 Then the more flexible electoral 
system allowed Labour to maintain it for a decade when its vote stalled. After 
that an unparalleled Depression and coalition between its main party rivals 
enabled it to proceed rapidly to power. Social Credit did not have these 
significant advantages. Even the flexible electoral arrangements that existed 
between the main parties and Labour in the 1920s would have allowed Social 
Credit to win at least Hobson in the 1960s and an enduring foothold in 
parliament after 1978. This disposes of the argument that Social Credit did not 
succeed because it was not a good enough party. In the inflexible party 
system that prevailed after 1935, no third party could prevail unless it was 
exceptional. Social Credit almost did despite the many disadvantages arrayed 
against it and mounted a much stronger challenge than any other third party. 
 The rigid electoral system discriminated against third parties in several 
ways. First, it encouraged a wasted vote argument from main parties to 
discourage third party voters. People did not vote for third parties because 
they could not win and they could not win because people would not vote for 
them. Opinion polls only locked in this thinking. Second, general and wide 
voter appeal would not overcome this. Votes had to be concentrated in seats 
to win them. This was hard to do in New Zealand where the electorate was 
relatively homogenous without strong class lines and regional causes. Third, 
New Zealand voters were conservative by nature, making it harder to take 
support off the main parties. Fourth, New Zealand was too small to provide 
the critical mass of 500 or more seats required to make individual electorates 
insignificant enough for local factors to prevail over nationwide party trends 
thus allowing a third party to gain enough of the shifting protest seats for an 
enduring foothold in parliament. An additional problem unique to New Zealand 
was the constant alteration of boundaries to maintain equal electorates. This 
continually removed hard built up support in strong Social Credit seats into 
less winnable ones and made won seats more difficult to hold. The most 
blatant example was removing Marton from Rangitikei in 1984 against 
historical precedent. 
                                                          
1 This included being two parties and having breakaway groups. From 1912 to 1916 there 
were two Labour parties: ‘United’ Labour and the Social Democrats. In 1919 Labour had to 
face Moderate and Independent Labour candidates that cost it three seats. 
 147
 Publicity was also harder for Social Credit. The media often ignores 
third parties. Social Credit gained wonderful coverage while it ascended in the 
polls in late 1980 and early 1981 and was accorded equal free election 
coverage time with the main parties. This did not carry through to 1984 and 
Social Credit was also ignored more because it was not ‘new’ like the New 
Zealand party. Thus restriction of media time because third parties were small 
or not continuously exciting enhanced advantages main parties already 
enjoyed under FPP. Main party tactics of running candidates in all electorates 
even hopeless ones helped keep the system rigid. This intensified as Social 
Credit support grew. Labour poured resources into seats where Social Credit 
was strong in 1981 to prevent further vote erosion. Thus Labour reduced 
Social Credit chances to win them and risked losing the election itself by 
diluting its efforts. National put up huge sums of money to win back lost seats 
which hampered Social Credit’s election campaign by tying down its leaders 
to their electorates. This lessened Social Credit’s likelihood of success. 
 Political scientists and historians, aware of these factors, postulated a 
limited role for third parties. Judith Bassett argued that growing third party 
support kept main parties flexible and responsive to the electorate. Main 
parties responded by changing policies and tactics, including appropriating 
third party ideas, to win it back. David McCraw’s more limited role for third 
parties—particularly Social Credit—was solely one of detaching votes from a 
main party into a temporary reservoir before transferring them to the other. 
Thus third party voting was cyclical and peaked when both main parties were 
unpopular before ebbing again. 
 Most conclusions about the role of third parties are drawn from the 
period most hostile to third parties. The development of political science in 
New Zealand has been piecemeal and often focussed on the period after 
1935. Thus theories on how the electoral system worked was drawn from the 
most rigid period when the two-party system was at its purest. Therefore, 
while changes are noted, no overarching framework clearly delineates 
electoral periods so characteristics of each period can be compared and 
contrasted. Third parties show the differences clearly for it is in them that 
periods have the most impact. Social Credit’s history is valuable as it covers 
two different electoral periods as yet not fully charted. Furthermore its history 
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is not solely one of a passive victim suffering electoral effects beyond its 
control. Its long existence ultimately helped change the system from a 
disproportionate to a proportionate one.  
Political science also downgraded the role of third party voter to one of 
protest. Thus all third party voting was explained by this single criterion and 
failed to take into account many other reasons for third party voting or, if 
acknowledged, were regarded as comparatively unimportant.2 
 
8.2 Myths on the Nature of Social Credit 
 
Social Credit began as a popular movement and not a political party. Its 
founder, Major C.H. Douglas had a democratic and economic vision of 
modern western nations based on the importance of the individual. His 
economic theories could be adopted by any government, which put the 
movement outside party politics. Douglasism was one contender to replace 
the failed monetary system that spawned the great Depression in the 1930s 
but Keynesianism was ultimately adopted. In New Zealand Social Credit had 
a powerful influence on the first Labour government but how many of its ideas 
were actually adopted is a matter of debate and generally discounted. After 
the 1954 election the National government took Social Credit seriously 
enough to convene a Royal Commission to look into it. The Commission 
concluded that Social Credit’s monetary ideas made no economic sense and 
this was not helped by its lack of a unified response or coordinated effort. 
True to its belief in individuality Social Crediters presented their own and 
conflicting ideas which gave their political rivals the ‘funny money’ stick to beat 
them with. Therefore Social Credit monetary ideas were believed to have little 
validity at all. 
From this two powerful but false myths emerged. First, a ‘pure’ Social 
Credit existed that might have worked in the Depression but was superseded 
by Keynesian economics and would not work in a modern economic climate. 
A segment within Social Credit arguing that it was still relevant and did not 
need updating only reinforced this view. When Bruce Beetham and his team 
                                                          
2 It would be interesting to know what cumulative proportion of main party support voted 
Social Credit and ascertain a total measure of ‘protest’. 
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attempted to make Social Credit relevant to 1970s and 1980s economic 
conditions, the charge from within was that they and their followers were not 
Social Crediters at all. ‘Purist’ Social Crediters refused to accept that Douglas 
was a visionary outlining desirable social ends and the practical details were 
to be the province of ‘technical experts’. Beetham believed in Social Credit 
and sought to be a Douglas expert by converting it into a viable political 
programme. The charge from without was that Beetham did not believe in 
Social Credit but pragmatically altered it into a winning political vehicle for 
political power.3 This idea contradicted the idealistic side of Beetham’s 
character and his single-minded dedication to the Social Credit cause. He 
frequently said there were far easier ways to achieve political power than by 
joining Social Credit and he frequently passed up opportunities to 
pragmatically exercise such power. Underlying this whole debate was the 
implication that Social Credit was not allowed to change and develop or else it 
was no longer Social Credit. 
 The second myth was that Social Credit economic policies were 
necessarily hyper-inflationary and fallacious economic arguments only applied 
to Social Credit ones. From this it followed that Social Credit had no good 
ideas at all and after a decade of leadership it vexed Beetham that after all 
this time his political ideas were still regarded as without substance. Political 
historians analysing its impact on Labour took a similar approach. Social 
Credit was nonsense and what Labour did in 1935 was not Social Credit but 
only superficially resembled it.4 This attitude has largely prevented 
dispassionate examination of the true amount of influence Social Credit had 
on Labour. The monetary reformers in Labour had similar assumptions to 
Douglas5 and the Social Credit idea that the government alone should control 
the supply of money and credit was accepted by Labour Prime Minister 
Norman Kirk as late as 1974. 
 These myths impinged on the later debate regarding the Canadian 
provincial governments of Alberta and British Columbia in four ways. They 
were Social Credit and failed, they were not allowed to be Social Credit and 
                                                          
3 Raymond Miller’s PhD thesis adopts this view. 
4 See, for example, Sinclair, pp. 96, 104, 106. 
5 Sinclair, p. 104. 
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became something else, whether they were Social Credit or not they were on 
their way out, or Social Credit was a convenient political vehicle for orthodox 
government. The aim of these arguments was to cast doubt on Social Credit 
viability in New Zealand and became a prime example of how party partisan 
debate can obscure the true political nature of a government. Good ideas 
Canadian Social Credit developed independently of mainstream party 
ideology, such as the Albertan Heritage fund, were thereby overlooked. 
 
8.3 The Evolution of Social Credit 
 
Despite the belief that Social Credit could not evolve, the New Zealand 
movement underwent several adaptive phases. Initially the movement was 
downgraded from a popular movement to a political lobby group of decreasing 
effectiveness. It threatened to die out until the movement decided to contest 
elections but took a long time to develop into an effective political party. Here 
the nature of the electoral system aided it. With a guaranteed supply of 
discontented main party voters willing to protest vote, Social Credit had a 
small consistent voter base almost regardless of what it did.  
 Party development was in four phases: uncertain political action, 
amateur political party, semi-professional party, and fully professional party. 
The first phase arose from the conflict between the necessity of political action 
and principle of preserving an apolitical movement, which resulted in a half-
hearted party attempt in 1943 psychologically arranged to fail. The second 
phase came in 1953 when Social Credit decided on serious political action but 
an amateur effort came from the naive expectation that simply contesting 
elections and putting the message to the people would gain them power in a 
single bound. This was quickly disabused.6 Only when later leader Vern 
Cracknell insisted that organising to win seats would positively affect the 
outcome did Social Credit move into its next phase in the early 1960s. 
However, the movement did not examine the reality of the electoral system 
and the need to identify current Social Credit supporters and target new ones 
                                                          
6 This did have its basis in Social Credit winning power from nothing both in Alberta in 1935 
and British Columbia in 1952 but the differences between those and the New Zealand 
situation were not examined.  
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with fresh policy. Thus it was only semi-professional. Cracknell’s incremental 
idea of slowly building support over several elections also did not take 
account of electoral cycle reverses such as that of 1969. This was nearly 
Social Credit’s undoing as it dumped Cracknell and went through the 
disastrous O’Brien period.  
Nevertheless, this began its fully professional fourth phase. Without 
this process under Beetham’s strong leadership Social Credit would have 
faded away during the 1970s as other third parties such as Values and the 
New Zealand party arose as potentially more attractive options for third party 
and protest voters. This had implications for the way many branches were 
organised. Under the discouraging rigid period they had become political 
clubs for Social Crediters with limited political activity as they did not expect to 
win but subsisted on a small and constant support level. They, too, would 
have faded away with the advent of more attractive third parties depleting 
their voter reservoir. 
 
8.4 Social Credit’s Political Luck 
 
As a party Social Credit had a great deal of political luck. It entered the 
political arena at a third party vote high point. While inevitable third party 
troughs triggered internal conflict,7 it reorganised in time to catch the next 
wave. The 1966 wave also coincided with Labour party weakness in the 
Hobson seat and, combined with Cracknell’s personal popularity in the 
electorate, was enough to win. 
 The most fortunate period in Social Credit history was its last. It had a 
dynamic, charismatic leader with vision, determination and drive to see it 
through and a team of talented politicians and organisers just when it needed 
it most. From this Social Credit built up a formidable organisation and strategy 
it needed to succeed in the adverse electoral system it faced. It updated its 
ideas and used its principles to form an attractive policy programme. The idea 
that such gifted people should exist in what was regarded as an axiomatically 
inferior political philosophy meant that either they were in the wrong party or 
                                                          
7 This may have deepened and prolonged the troughs. 
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they were using it as a vehicle to achieve something else. That they might 
enthusiastically accept and work for Social Credit ideals was discounted.  
Social Credit planned to achieve power in several steps. First, it had to 
fend off other serious contenders like Values and remain the pre-eminent third 
party. Then it needed to build up its organisation to win seats, establish a 
parliamentary foothold, displace the main Opposition party and, finally, 
become the government. Its plan was considered audacious and provoked 
incredulity.8 However, Social Credit attained the first three goals and briefly 
displaced the Opposition in the polls but it did not quite gain a permanent 
foothold in parliament. 
 It would have done no good to organise in the late 1960s as they did in 
the late 1970s. As political scientists correctly observed, the third party vote 
was not large enough for success and the intractable governing problems of 
unemployment, inflation and other economic woes that allowed third party 
voting to grow had not yet appeared. Social Credit became a seriously 
organised third party at the right time and succeeded in garnering the bulk of 
this increasing third party vote. Winning the vital by-elections of Rangitikei in 
1978 and East Coast Bays in 1980 helped detach more main party support 
and put Social Credit’s support equal to Labour’s by the end of 1980.  
At this point Social Credit’s political luck ran out and its further success 
was in spite of political circumstances. Drawing support from Labour rather 
than National subjected the party to an electoral squeeze. Since National 
could still win in 1981, Social Credit chances of winning in the National seats it 
was strong in were blunted and prevented a needed breakthrough. It did not 
help itself in selection blunders and candidate withdrawals that reduced its 
chances in several key electorates including its only potential win in a Labour 
seat.9 Social Credit also never entered into electoral alliances with other third 
parties or Independents even where this might have increased third party 
representation. Withdrawing for the Nelson Independent in 1981 would have 
increased non main party members to three. 
Social Credit had transformed its electorate ‘political clubs’ into 
organisations desiring to win but this was hampered by older members who 
                                                          
8 See, for example, Zavos, pp. 154-162. 
9 Bay of Islands, Whangarei, Helensville, Hastings, Waitaki and Awarua. 
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did not want change or to lose their influence in a bigger organisation. 
Hastings was a test case to prove Social Credit’s contention that a strong 
electorate organisation and candidate could build up voter support to win. 
However, if either were not sustained long enough, the attempt would fail as it 
did in Hastings. Organisationally the party was ready for a breakthrough in 
1984 with the ability to gain more electorally attractive candidates. Falling 
support prevented this and effectively Social Credit was only really ready to 
fight the 1981 election in 1984.  
 Despite contrary assertions, Social Credit was not dealt a fatal blow in 
1982 over the Clyde dam debacle.10 The three factors that really caused its 
decline and prevented a significant recovery were: Labour finally became a 
viable alternative government, the New Zealand party was formed and took 
Social Credit support, and Muldoon called a snap election that caught it 
unprepared. All these happened consecutively in a short period so that Social 
Credit had insufficient time to recover lost support before losing more. Social 
Credit kept two seats in 1984 and the claim that it was only from continued 
anti-National feeling rather than positive party support overlooked the strong 
organisation and attractive candidates in them.  
 Beetham thought that the party simply needed to regroup and ride out 
the trough but he was no longer the dynamic leader of 1972. There was no 
charismatic replacement for him, neither was there a new infusion of 
passionate activists nor a reworking of policy to see the party through until it 
reignited interest. New members having replaced the old ‘political club’ had 
less stamina. When political success did not occur quickly, they left the party 
or became inactive. Thus Social Credit’s reorganisational success helped 
destroy it but older members had no winning ambition. Austin Mitchell’s 1969 
comment that it would always endure as ‘an electoral dog pound’ for 
discontented voters was no longer true as there were now other competing 
‘pounds’ for these voters. Electorate organisations with no ambition might take 
longer to fade but they would fade nonetheless. Social Credit successfully 
navigated three electoral cycles but the party was tired and only now held its 
position from concentrating effort on winnable target seats.  
                                                          
10 Raymond Miller and historian Michael King are two who held this view. 
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 In 1984 when economic reform was badly needed the electorate voted 
for Douglasism but of the Roger free market variety rather than the Major’s 
Social Credit one as repackaged by Beetham and his team. 1987 saw a 
diminished third party vote when voters temporarily returned overwhelmingly 
to the main parties to show approval of the new economics. Social Credit, 
now the Democratic party, had its last piece of political ill luck. The 1987 
election was held before the disastrous sharemarket crash in October, which 
might have generated considerable voter discontent favourable to third 
parties. The Democrats were now too weak to recover and third party votes 
passed on to fresh emerging parties. 
 
8.5 Social Credit Impact 
 
Social Credit failed in its aims of sparking an enduring popular movement or 
becoming a government although it arguably had a profound influence on the 
direction of Labour party policy in the 1930s. In one sense its history in New 
Zealand is one of having ‘fought the long defeat’.11 Its only subsequent 
success lay in reinventing itself as a political party and reworking its message 
several times to the point of a near breakthrough into main party status in 
1981 before finally fading away. Twice it presented an alternate economic 
vision and twice it was rejected. Unless these ideas are reformulated into a 
form not recognisably Social Credit there will not be a third time.12 In the light 
of the worldwide economic crisis of 2009, Social Credit’s claim that the 
monetary system needed fundamental reforming still has validity. 
 However, it did have a more profound effect on the electoral system by 
virtue of its longevity. Over three decades it detached 20% of the vote from 
the main parties, augmented by voter groups it could not reach itself such as 
those supporting Values and the New Zealand party, thus rescuing New 
Zealand from an ossified rigid two-party system most hostile to third party 
influence. Social Credit paved the way for the change to MMP but not by 
                                                          
11 J.R.R. Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 
372. 
12 Economist Gareth Morgan’s recent December 2009 idea of paying every adult in New 
Zealand a $10,000 a year allowance to replace the unemployment benefit is a new version of 
Social Credit’s National Dividend. See N.Z. Listener, January 30, 2010, p. 17. 
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directly provoking a groundswell of opinion for proportional representation. Its 
own direct efforts only detracted from its electoral goals but the strength of its 
support alone amply demonstrated the unfairness of the electoral system. 
Changes came too late for Social Credit and the Democrats but subsequent 
third parties have benefited from their endeavours. A proportionate system 
where third parties have input into government, provided it is not changed 
back to a disproportionate one, is Social Credit’s enduring legacy.  
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Appendix  
 
Some Electoral Statistics 
 
There are many electoral statistics scattered through the body of the thesis 
and some tables are included here as a point of reference. The first table is a 
summary of election results during the rigid period (1938-1969) and the 
fragmented one (1972-1993). 
 
Election National Labour Socred1 Values2 Alliance3 NZ/NZF4 TTPV5 
1938 40.3 55.8      3.9 
1943 42.8 47.6      9.7 
1946 48.4 51.3      0.3 
1949 51.9 47.2      0.9 
1951 54.0 45.8      0.2 
1954 44.3 44.1 11.1    11.6 
1957 44.2 48.3  7.2     7.5 
1960 47.6 43.4  8.6     9.0 
1963 47.1 43.7  7.9     9.2 
1966 43.6 41.4 14.5    14.9 
1969 45.2 44.2  9.1    10.6 
1972 41.5 48.4  6.7 2.0   10.1 
1975 47.6 39.6  7.4 5.2   12.8 
1978 39.8 40.4 16.1 2.4   19.8 
1981 38.8 39.0 20.7 0.2   22.2 
1984 35.9 43.0  7.6 0.2  12.3 21.1 
1987 44.0 48.0  5.7 0.1   0.3  8.0 
1990 47.8 35.1  1.7 6.8  5.2  17.1 
1993 35.1 34.7   18.2  8.4 30.2 
 
Table A.1. Summary Election Results: 1938-1993 (% for Each Party)6 
                                                          
1 Democrat after 1984. 
2 Includes the Green party in 1990. 
3 Includes NewLabour in 1990. The Greens and the Democrats were in the Alliance in 1993. 
4 New Zealand First (NZF) in 1993, otherwise New Zealand party (NZ). 
5 Total Third Party Vote. 
6 Retrieved from <http://www.elections.org.nz/record/resultsdata/fpp-seats-won.html > on 
January 9, 2009. 
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The next table shows the average third party vote in each FPP electoral 
period to show how much harder it was for third parties in the rigid era. 
 
Period Av. Vote (%) Range (%) Av. Seats won Range 
Flexible7 22.68 10.5 – 35.2 9.7 2 – 25 
Rigid   7.1   0.2 – 14.9 0.1 0 – 1  
Fragmented 17.7   8.0 – 30.2 1.3 1 – 4  
 
Table A.2. Third Party Votes and Seats Won in Each Electoral Period9 
 
The third table indicates the proliferation of candidates that occurred in the 
fragmented period compared to the rigid one. 
 
Period Av. CPE10 Range 
Rigid 2.99 2.14 – 3.63 
Fragmented 5.18 3.68 – 6.98 
 
Table A.3. Candidates Per Electorate 
 
The fourth table gives the increasing third party peaks. 
 
Period Election Peak Vote Period Av. 
Rigid 1943 9.7  
 1954 11.6  
 1966 14.9 12.1 
Fragmented 1981 22.2  
 1993 30.2 27.2 
  
Table A.4. Third Party Peak Vote (%): 1943-1993 
 
                                                          
7 From 1890 to 1935. 
8 Does not include the Second Ballot results of 1908 and 1911. 
9 Labour is treated as a third party until 1931. The non main party seats won in 1938 and 
1943 (three in all) were leftovers from the flexible period and were won because one main 
party did not put up a candidate. Hence they are excluded from the table. 
10 Average number of candidates per electorate. 
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The last three tables are selected excerpts from the NRB polls between 1969 
and 1984. This gives an overview of the changes in poll ratings for each party. 
 
Date National Labour Socred Values 
1969, Sept. 48 39 12  
          Nov. 44 44 11  
Election 45 44  9  
1971, Nov. 40 51  8  
1972, Mar. 48 46  5  
          May 46 50  3  
          Sept. 46 49  3  
         Nov. 44 45  8  
Election 42 48  7 2 
1974, May 44 44  5 5 
          Nov. 44 44  7 4 
1975, Mar. 46 42  6 6 
          May 46 43  5 6 
          Sept. 52 39  5 4 
         Nov. 46 44  6 4 
Election 48 40  7 5 
1977, Nov. 48 37  9 5 
1978, Jan. 45 37 13 5 
          Mar. 41 31 22 5 
          May 40 37 16 4 
          July 47 36 14 3 
          Sept. 44 35 16 4 
          Nov. 44 35 17 3 
Election 40 40 16 3 
 
Table A.5. Excerpted NRB Poll Results (%),  
September 1969 to November 197811 
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Date National  Labour Socred 
1979, May 33 43 22 
1980, May 41 38 19 
          Nov. 38 30 31 
          Jan. 38 30 31 
          Mar. 43 27 29 
          May 42 30 27 
          July 42 34 23 
          Sept. 40 34 25 
          Nov. 42 35 22 
Election 39 39 21 
 
Table A.6. NRB Poll Results (%), May 1979 to 
November 198112 
 
Date National Labour Socred NZ Party 
1982, May 42 38 19  
          July 39 39 21  
          Nov. 41 40 18  
1983, Apr. 40 50   9  
          May 41 48 10  
          July 43 48   8  
          Sept. 45 37 11   6 
          Dec. 35 38   8 18 
1984, Feb.     40 36   5 18 
          Apr. 38 41   6 14 
          June 36 48   8   7 
Election 36 43   8 12 
 
Table A.7. NRB Poll Results (%), May 1982 to June 198413 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 Penniman, p. 171. 
12 New Zealand Herald, November 14, 1981, section 1, p. 1. 
13 New Zealand Herald, July 7, 1984, section 1, p. 12. 
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